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CHANG-CHEN LUN
KARATALARATNA

OR

THE JEWEL IN HAND

(*A Logico-Philosophical Treatise of The Madhyamaka School*)

BY

ACARYA BHĀVAVIVEKA

Translated into Sanskrit
from

The Chinese version of HSUEN TSANG
(*A. D. 602—664*)

BY

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CONTENTS

i—xvi

INTRODUCTION —

{ 1	Madhyamaka and its Early Sources	
2	Two Schools	3
	Buddhist Logic	
	and its Early Authorities	4
	The Author	
	and His Life	5
	His Sautrantika atti-	
	tude	6
	References to the Author	7
	His	
	Works	8
	The Present Treatise	}

1

ENGLISH SUMMARY

SANSKRITA TEXT—

Chap 1

Chap 2

33

67

101

ADDITIONAL NOTES

105

INDICES

121

APPENDIX (CHINESE)

123

ADDITIONS AND ALTERATIONS ERRATA

INTRODUCTION

1 The Buddha's preaching is characterised as moderate path avoiding the two extremes viz indulgence in sensual pleasures and taking to the habitual practice of self mortification. When attempts were made to interpret and find out the true import of the Master's teachings in the days of the past Ācārya Nāgārjuna claimed to have struck at the depth of the Master's utterances and styled his interpretation as moderate *Madhyamaka* and accordingly his treatise in verses was designated *Madhyamakāśāstra* or *kārikā*. Nāgārjuna's main contribution to the evolution of Buddhist thought is an emphasis on Prajñā the ultimate knowledge derived from understanding the true nature of things in their real perspective viz *Sūnyatā*. This *Sūnyatā* in his opinion is only a synonym for dependant origination *Pratiya samutpāda*. The *Sūnyatā* doctrine is not quite unfamiliar with the earlier Buddhists. They take it for *śūnyatā* as an equivalent for dependant origination is quite an innovation of Nāgārjuna.

The *Sūnyatā* doctrine he says has been introduced by Buddhas as an antidote for all wrong views and beliefs (M k XIII 8). It appears that Nāgārjuna is quite right in so saying since it can appropriately corroborated from some earlier utterances of the Buddha. When Dighanakha a Perivrajaka e.g. conveys his conviction to the Buddha not to entertain any view the latter remarks that many persons professing not to entertain any view instead of giving up that view entertain a new one and there are a few persons who having given up that view do not at all entertain a new one. The Buddha further points out that a man sticking himself to any one of the three views

(१ सद्य मे न खमति २ सद्य मे खमति, ३ एक्य मे लमति एक्य मे न खमति)

would give rise to a quarrel and in order to avoid any quarrel he should give up that view and not entertain a new one. Note the passage in conclusion

विमुक्तचित्तो न केन चि खयदति न केन चि विवदति । ये च लोके द्रुत तेन बोद्धवति
अपमसति । M I p 500

INTRODUCTION

1 The Buddha's preaching is characterised as "moderate path" avoiding the two extremes, viz, indulgence in sensual pleasures and taking to the habitual practice of self mortification. When attempts were made to interpret and find out the true import of the Master's teachings in the days of the past Ācārya Nāgārjuna claimed to have struck at the depth of the Master's utterances and styled his interpretation as 'moderate' *Madhyamaka*, and accordingly his treatise in verses was designated "*Madhyamakāśāstra*" or *kārikā*. Nāgārjuna's main contribution to the evolution of Buddhist thought is an emphasis on *Prajñā* the ultimate knowledge derived from understanding the true nature of things in their real perspective viz *Śūnyatā*. This *Śūnyatā*, in his opinion, is only a synonym for "dependant origination", *Pratiya samutpāda*. The *Śūnyatā* doctrine is not quite unfamiliar with the earlier Buddhists. They take it for *nairātmya* *Śūnyatā* as an equivalent for "dependant origination" is quite an innovation of Nāgārjuna.

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विमुक्तचित्तो न केन चि सवदति न केन चि विवदति । य च लोके दुत्त तेन बोद्धति
अपरामसं ति । M. I. p. 500

Here we may rest fully convinced of the fact that Nāgārjuna's stand is fittingly and antecedently endorsed by the Master. The instance of Dīghanakha is also cited by Bhāvanivēka on p 48.

Moreover we find many verses collected in the Suttanipāṭa which beyond any shadow of doubt lend support to the negative attitude advocated by Nāgārjuna. Some of such verses are deserved to be cited here.

न कण्यन्ति न पुरेस्खरन्ति अच्यन्तमुद्धोति न ते वदन्ति ।

आदानमग्न्य गयित विमज्ज आस न कुब्धन्ति बुद्धिं चि लोके ॥ 794

याणे पि सो निस्पय नो करोति । . 800

न कण्यन्ति न पुरेस्खरन्ति धम्मा पि तेस न पटिच्छितासे ।

न ब्राह्मणो सीलवतेन नेय्यो पारगतो न पच्चेति तादोति ॥ 803

सम्बन्ध मुनि अनिस्सितो न पिय कुब्धति नो वि अण्णियम् । ॥ 811

विसेनिक्त्वा पन ये चरन्ति दिट्ठेहि दिट्ठि अविरुज्जमाना । 833

The conversation between the Buddha and Māgandiya is very interesting where the Master says

न दिट्ठिया न सुट्ठिया न याणेन सीलवतेनापि न सुद्धिमाह ।

अदिट्ठिया अस्सुट्ठिया अज्जाण्य असीलता अन्वता नो पि तेन ।

एते च निस्सज्ज अनुग्गहाय सन्तो अनिस्साय भवं न जप्पे ॥ 839

स सम्बन्धमेसु विरेनिभूतो य किं चि दिट्ठि व सुत सुत वा ।

स पन्नभारो मुनि विण्णुत्तो न कणियो न्परतो न पत्तिथो ॥ 914

From these citations it appears that Nāgārjuna's absolute negativism is not without its counterpart in the earlier canonical literature. According to the Mādhyamika Prāsaṅgikas a man of spiritual career should not adhere to any proposition of his own but may refute the other's one reducing it to an absurdity. The non-adherence to any view by an ascetic is sufficiently stressed in the verses of the same book. Read e.g. verses 832 874 876 883 892 894 903 904 913. It may incidentally be pointed out that he should not engage himself on debate

with any body with a view to establishing any thesis of his own. The reason for this is fully demonstrated in verses 824—832, cp Dighanakkhaṭṭha M I 74 p 499. Almost the same attitude is advocated by the Mādhyamika Prāsaṅgikas. Absolute negativism therefore is not a whimsical creation of Nāgārjuna though he has made it into a grand system that would stand every scrutiny of critics.

A candidate for Bodhi should view things as devoid of any substantiality and get himself detached from all sorts of discriminative thoughts and assertions. When the mind is thus made completely aloof, then it is stated that the non dualistic and undivided principle shines forth. Thus the doctrine of Śūnyatā helps a candidate to achieve that goal. Hence it is only a means to the end and not the end itself, of M K XIII, 8 c d, as also well stressed in the present treatise. This position of the system quite accords with the Buddha's repeated warning in different discourses :

युक्तीम धम्म.....निद्वयत्वाय, न गद्वयत्वाय ..धम्मा पि बहुतत्त्वा पायेव अयम्मा ।

(Maj. I, 22 Aggaddāpamasutta 39 Mahatābhāsākhayasutta)
It is interesting to note that some such idea is also stressed in the other school of thought, cp Suvarṇasaptati, pp 26, 101.

येन ह्यत्रसि तत्त्वज ॥

2 There are two methods to uphold the non substantiality of things as advocated by Nāgārjuna. The first method, viz *prasaṅga* was started by Ācārya Buddhapālita in the first half of the 6th century A D. and successfully maintained by Ācārya Candrakīrti in the first half of the 7th century A D. The Second one namely the *svāntara anumāna* method was founded by Bhāvaviveka, 550 600 A D. the author of the present treatise. The advocates of the former method maintain that Śūnyatā could be established only by means of *prasaṅga*, ie *reductio ad absurdum* of all theses arguments and examples of the opponents, and hold that no thesis argument or example of their own is possible (M. Vṛtti, pp 16, 18, 34) for the reason that absolute truth could not be asserted by any of the discursive thoughts. The latter school, on the other hand, criticising the *prasaṅga* method, pleads that Śūnyatā may also be established by means of an independent inference in spite of the indescribable character of the absolute truth, hence the school goes under the name of *Svāntarika*. This method of inference has not won

favour with Candrakīrti, the celebrated interpreter of Nāgārjuna who attacks vehemently Bhāvaviveka and upholds Buddhapaṇita's standpoint.

3 Buddhist logicians claim that their logical theories have, of course in a caricature form, been endorsed by their Master himself. In support of this some scriptural passages are also cited and elucidated.¹ The logical tradition, preserved in Chinese Buddhist literature also supports the above claim.² It is well-known that the Buddha was a Hetuvādin. One of his foremost disciples chanted a song in his praise

1. See Dharmakīrti, *Pramāṇavārtika*, I, 286, d

वृत्तिः—“नीलसमग्रा पुरुषो नील जानाति नो तु नीलमिति । इति ब्रुवता प्रत्यक्षं दर्शितम् । अनुमान नोक्तम् । . . शून्याः परप्रवादा इत्यादिना शब्दादेरेव निषेधात् प्रयोगस्य परार्थानुमानरूपस्य दर्शनाद्व्ययमेऽस्यानुमानस्य निर्देशः कृत एव भगवता । तमेव प्रयोगमाह ।

.....यत्किञ्चिदुदयार्थमकम् ।

निरोधधर्मकं सवे तदित्यादावनेकपा । 287 a-b.

अनुमानाधयो लिङ्गमविनाभावलक्षणम् ।

व्याप्तिप्रदर्शनात् हेतोः साध्येनोक्तञ्च तत् स्फुटम् ॥ 287 c-f.

पृ.....हेतोरुदयधर्मकत्वस्य साध्येन निरोधधर्मकत्वेन

व्याप्तेः प्रदर्शनात् यद्विद्वदुदयधर्मकं तत् सर्वं निरोधधर्मक- (महावग्न I, 1.8)

मित्यादिना स्फुटः प्रव्यञ्जो दर्शितः ।

The first passage quoted above is attributed to some Abhidharma book of. *Pram vārtika*, Parisatā, p 518 (J. B O R S Vol X\VI).

The definition of *kāryānumāna* is given in this āgamaic verse :

धूमेन ज्ञायते वह्निः सलिलस्य बलाकया ।

निमित्तैर्ज्ञायते गोत्रं बोधिसत्त्व च धीमतः ॥ *Id.*

The Boṭhisattvanimittas are given by Candrakīrti, see *Madhya mahāvātara* VI 4-5 with references thereto. The following āgama gives the definition of *Bvabhāvāhetu*

अनित्या बत सस्कारा उत्पादप्ययधर्मिणः ।

उत्पद्य हि निरुध्यन्ते तेषां व्युत्पन्नः सुखम् ॥ *Id.*

Some similar treatment is also made by Kamalaśīla, see *Tattvas* Panjikā

proclaiming to the world that his Master's unique contribution lies in his discovery of an ultimate *hetu* cause for all evil things (*dharmāḥ*) that are produced by causes. The universe in his view is merely a series of causes and effects (*idampaccayatā*). One may witness in all his Discourses the argumentative and persuasive character of his speech. His art of debate and logical thinking are fully exhibited when his opponents are equally equipped. Once Saccaka a follower of Nighanṭa doctrine comes to conduct a debate² (*vāda*) with the Buddha to combat the latter's views on impermanence and non-substantiality of things (*sabbe saṃkhārā aniccā sabbe dhammā anattā* Maṃ 1, 35 p 227). He is reported to have held the view that *rūpa* is the soul and so also *vedanā* *viññāna*. The Buddha refutes it by pointing out its glaring fallacies and sequences with his usual method of illustrations and similes. Again Upālī a house holder disciple of Nighanṭa goes to the Buddha for debate on relative strength of the bodily vocal and mental actions. Nighanṭa's contention is that the bodily action is more sinful than the others two. Upālī wanted to establish it refuting the Buddha's view. The Buddha remarkably vindicates the obvious inconsistencies with Nighanṭa's standpoint and makes Upālī convinced of them. A

2 From the Buddha downward broadly speaking five stages may be mentioned in the evolution of Buddhist logical theories.

- 1 Buddha—Aśvaghoṣa upto 600 A N (=after Nirvāṇa) Works Four Āgamas and Hinayāna Sūtras.
- 2 Nāgārjuna—Piṅgala upto 800 A N
Works Mādhyamaka Sūtra (Vignahavyāvartani) Saṃśakṣa and Drīḍhasamukha (or—N kīya).
- 3 Maiteya—Vasubandhu—Guṇamati upto 1000 A N
Works Praharagāryavāḥśāstra Upāyabṛdaya and Tarkaśāstra.
- 4 Diṇḍiḡga—Bandhuprabha Agotra (?) upto 1100 A N
Works Nyāyamukha Nyāyapraveśa Vaipulya Saṃśāstravyākhyā and Prajñāpradīpa (of Bhāṣaviveka).
- 5 Dharmakīrti—Devananda (?) upto 1500 A N
Numerous works
(Cited from Lu Chang's work on Hetuvidyā as supplied by Mr Hsu Hu a devoted Chinese scholar Chinabbayan).

3 Saccaka's pride in debate is nicely described at the beginning of the Sutta p 227 ll 5—12 and on p 228 l 80—p 229 l 6 *etam etāham Samanānam Gotamam vādena vādam āhaḍḍhissām* *seyyathā* with three similes.

man cannot destroy with a sword the whole population of Nālandā within a moment, but a Śramaṇa can do so with *manoḍanda* mental deed. Then the Buddha proves that *manoḍanda* is greater in effect than *kayaḍanda*, bodily deed (Maj. S 56). Similarly a prince, Abhaya by name was urged by Nigahanṭa Nāthaputta to conduct a debate with the Buddha on whether or not the Tathāgata would utter unpleasant word. If the Buddha replies to this question in negative, ask : why did Devaputta become enraged ? The prince carried out the plot by inviting the Buddha to his house. The question was really crucial. The Buddha won over him by giving an example of the child who hurts himself foolishly (Maj. S 59).

All the above and other conversations would certainly testify to us the Buddha's acquaintance with the art of debate, of course, in a time-honoured fashion. His theory of *dharmaśakṣus* is always put in a form of concomitance

यदिक्चि उमुदयधम्म, सव्वं त निरोधधम्म ति ।

Much more interesting point is that the concomitance is used together with *upanaya* sentence :

सो इति पटिसचिक्खति : इदं वि खो पन अभिसखत्त अभिसंचेतयित्, य खो पन ऋचि अभिसखत्त, अभिसंचेतयित्, तदन्विच, निरोधधम्म ति पजानाति ।

Idam in the first sentence, refers to four dhyānas, four Brahma-vihāras and three ārūpyadhyānas. One may note that *vyūpti* and *upanaya* sentences are used in an order just reverse of the later days' usage. Or it may be a *pratyākṣ* sentence expressing the presence of *probans* in the *pakṣa* and suggesting thereby the necessary presence of *probandum* by showing the positive concomitance afterwards (Maj. 1, S 52). A Bhikkhu named Sāti entertained a wrong view of *viññāna* and thought that only one *viññāna* runs and transmigrates from one birth to another. The Buddha having heard it from his disciples persuaded Sāti to give it up and exhorted his disciples that *viññāna* is *paṭiccasamuppanna*, i. e. produced due to causes and conditions. He further elucidates the idea by saying that when *viññāna* arises depending on the eye, etc. it is styled as eye consciousness, and so also the other, ear consciousness etc. The fire, e. g. being produced on account of wood, it is termed wood fire (*kāṭṭhagṇi*), so also *sakalagṇi*, *tinagṇi*, *thusagṇi*, *sankāragṇi*. Then this concomitance is also shown : *bhūtam*

idam āhārasambhavam, āhāranirodhā nirodhadhammam He further exhorts one should not cling to this statement because dhamma has been preached as a boat to reach the goal and not the goal by itself. It is quite probable that the later logicians like Vasubandhu and Dīṇāga taking the above example as a specimen explain the term *pratyakṣa* with more appropriate examples.

Therefore it appears that the days of Buddha were fully rife with logical, philosophical speculations and debates. It has also been recognised that there were many other philosophical schools, such as Ājivakas, Nighanṭas and Parivṛjaks, etc who were fully adept in such an art. I may add one more instance in this period, viz Yaska, the renowned author of the Nirukta (c 500 B C) He uses a formal logic just like a good logician of later days to disprove the whole structure of the argument set out by Kaṭṭa, who argues that the Vedic hymns are meaningless with sufficient proofs. Yaska refutes all one by one putting his own view in a syllogistic form : *Mantrā arthavantaḥ, śabdāsamānyat* etc. So it is not proper to contend that the period of Buddha was not familiar with formal logic or some such method of logic.

Now it becomes evident that the tradition fathering upon the Buddha the logical theories of Buddhists is not without foundation. It is also stated that until the time of Vasubandhu logical theories and rules of debate were uncertain (cf Kwel-ci, Comment on N Praveśa, p 2b) Then Dīṇāga systematized every thing connected with logic and made it a scientific system. Of course he took his stand on *Vijñāna* as the basic principle so much so his school came to be known as Nyāyānusāri *Vijñānavāda*. It does not, however follow that he propounded that system for the first time because we have already in Vasubandhu's *Vimśikā* the system, ably discussed and established.

4. What Dīṇāga did for the *Vijñānavāda* Bhāvaviveka did in the cause of the *Mādhyamaka* doctrine. He is as much reputed in the field of logic as Dīṇāga. Little is known about his personal history except what the Chinese travellers speak of him. Yuang Chuang tells us that he was a native of South India and a junior contemporary of Dharmapāla (Watters, II, p 222) According to Hsueh's Life, in a great stone mountain not far to the South of the capital of the Dharmakapaka kingdom Bhāvaviveka rests in the palace of Asuras awaiting

the time when Maitreya Bodhisattva shall reach perfect wisdom and explain some difficulties in his way (Life of Yuang Chuang Seal, trans p 137) I ching also mentions him as one of the Ācāryas in the middle age (Record, p 181) His name is variously pronounced He is known in Chinese as Po pi fi-cia—Bhāvaviveka and in Tibetan as Bhavya or Bhavyakara The following informations are gathered by Prof L V Poussin —

a Divākara Indian monk translator in the convent of Ta-Yuan, gives this account Recently in India in the convent of Nālandā, there are two masters Śīlabhadra and Jñānaprabha by name The first follows the tradition of Maitreya and Asaṅga at distance and of Dharmapāla and Nanda immediately which asserts that only the Dharmalakṣaṇa Mahāyāna is the ultimate and definite teaching⁴ (*nīṭārtha*) The second tradition supports the views of Mañjuśhoṣa and Nāgārjuna at distance and of Pingala and Bhāvaviveka directly It considers the *nīṭlakṣaṇa Mahāyāna* as *nīṭārtha*⁵ (This view is fully demonstrated in the M vṛtti Prajñāpradīpa of Jñānaprabha Note the same title as that of Bhāvaviveka's comment)

4 According to Sūtras like the Sandhinirmocana and Sāstras like the Yoga sāstra of Asaṅga Śīlabhadra establishes three teachings 1 Little Vehicle, against Ātman of Tīrthikas, 2 Prajñā school recognises that the imaginary is void of its proper nature but does not pose the being of dependant perfect 3 Sandhinirmocana etc real doctrine of Mahāyāna three lakṣaṇas three absences of proper nature To affirm reality of things produced by causes is to fall in the extremity of existence to say that all things are void is to fall in the extremity of the void In fine to say at the same time vacuity of imaginary and the existence of dependant and perfect is the middle path *nīṭārtha*

5 Jñānaprabha establishes three teachings in this order —

1 For those gazelles, thought and object are real, 2 Dharmalakṣaṇa Mahāyāna the object is void but thought is real the system of Vijñānavāda, because bearers of still feeble faculty are not capable entering into equal true void 3 In the third per of Mahāyāna without Lakṣaṇas thought and object all the two are void equally of the same savour In other words the Buddha broke at first the proper nature', substantialism of Tīrthikas in teaching the existence of things produced by causes Then he broke adhesion to the existence of these things teaching that they have only existence of designation (*prajñāptisatā*) In fine he says these things are void of proper nature equal of unique savour The second system admits one perceptible (*upalabhya*) It is not really of definite sense

b According to Fa tsang treatise on Lañkāvatāra Taisho 1790 p 430 3 7 24 there have been four systems Diarmatrāta Nāgārjuna and Deva Asaṅga and Vasubandhu Aśvaghoṣa and Śāramatī These masters of the South and the North of the country admit some things void and others existence and are not capable to harmonize In the country of West the master Bhāvaviveka according to the Sūtras of Prajñā supports himself on the system of Nāgārjuna etc and makes treatise Prajñāpradīpa and Karatālaratna, and establishes one reasoning showing the *paratantra* void The master Dharmapāla relying upon the system of Asaṅga etc makes the treatise Vijñaptimātrā [siddhi] and establishes one reasoning showing the dependent (*paratantra*) not void Their disciples Jñānaprabhā and Śīlabhadra adopt these systems and the tradition is not interrupted The account goes further that there is no conflict in fact between the two systems because Asaṅga⁶ has interpreted Nāgārjuna (Nanjio 1243) and Vasu (= Vasubandhu) has commented on Āryadeva's Śatasāstra (Nanjio 1188) But men of posterior days do not understand the intention and they attach themselves to these words and contradict themselves (v Joyau Introductory)

5 As previously stated Bhāvaviveka has pleaded for a new method the method of independent reasoning to prove vacuity as against the *prasaṅga* method of Buddhapālita which falls well in line with Nāgārjuna's thinking For the reason of this innovation he is put above the Mādhyamikas by certain Tibetan authors It is stated that the Svātantrikas are classified by certain Tibetan writers into two branches the Svātantrika Sautrāntika and Svātantrika Yogācāras Bhāvaviveka is said to be of the former group and Śāntarakṣita of the latter The distinction⁷ rests not on the conception of absolute truth but on the theories of relative truth The first branch adopts in relative truth the position of Sautrāntikas (the existence of the exterior world and the negation of *asamskṛtas*) while the second the Yogācāra position (inexistence of exterior world) (v Obermüller Sublime Science p 63 Stecherbatsky Short treatise 31 34 293 328 370 cited by L V

6 However he sometimes criticises that the Mādhyamika ill comprehends vacuity

7 This distinction though it is claimed to be highly authoritative cannot be taken to be an accurate one

Poussin op cit) Poussin in support of the statement says that Bhāvaviveka teaches the doctrine of intellect receptacle reservoir of seeds (cf. below, text p 75) which doctrine distinguishes the Yogācāras from the Sautrāntikas So his metaphysics is Mādhyamika and his psychology is Yogācāra. Poussin is wrong in saying that his psychology is Yogācāra It may not be far from truth if Bhāvaviveka is styled as Svātantrika Sautrāntika For the Sautrāntikas are credited to have postulated a subtle consciousness which survives in Nirvāṇa (Th Stecherbatsky Nirvāṇa p30 J Masuda Vasumitra s Bud Sacts p 63 No 3 of the Sautrāntika school and n 1) The author of the present treatise seems to echo the same view when he says (on pp 29 87) that after effecting the elimination process in a prescribed manner the Yogin enters finally into the flow of knowledge which is now in its own self nature ' It may be evident from this passage that the author distinctly sides with the view that there is a pure knowledge flowing inwardly and immune from contamination of any sort and which shines forth in the ultimate state of Yogic Career So it is quite apt to call him a Sautrāntika in his psychology

I may incidentally add here that the forerunners of the subtle knowledge theory of the Sautrāntikas are the Mālāsanghikas who have likewise entertained some 'original consciousness' (*Mūlavijñāna*). The Sautrāntikas have given it the designation of *cetasaśkaṇḍha* which is more or less similar to the purified Jñanasvalakṣaṇa of Bhāvaviveka. According to the Sautrāntikas it is the substance of transmigration from which the current five skandhas are evolved (Masuda Vasumitra p 68 n 1). The same view is held by Śāri Bhikkhu amongst the earlier Buddhists. He professes that the Master has taught that one consciousness runs from birth to birth. There are very many clear indications in the Pali Nikāya works to prove that the Master has assigned some prominence to Vijñāna though it is placed on a par with other skandhas. In his discourse to Kassapa the Master speaks of three possessions (*sampadā*) in order *ajitasampadā cetasā* (= samādhi on later occasions) and *pañña*. This last possession is explained thus :

माण्डूक्यनाय चित्तं अभिनोदहति, अभिनिष्कामेति । सो एव पञ्जनाति 'अयं मे कायो रूपी चानुष्महाभूतिको... । इदं पन मे विप्र्याण एत्य सित्त एत्य पटिबद्धं ति ।

The passage goes further that this is *paññā*, and there is nothing more to gain in this life. According to this discourse, *ñānadassana*, insight into knowledge is the final *sampadā* for monkhood, i. e. *Samāñña*. This *ñānadassana* has been gradually relegated to the background, and *cetovimutti*, mind-deliverance has instead come to the forefront, cp Maj 1, Sutta 29, p 197.

इदं ब्रह्मचरियं न याणदस्स न निवसत, या च खो अयं भिक्षवे भवुप्पा चेतीतिवुत्ति,
एतदत्थ..... ।

Sometimes four dhyānas and four ārūpyadhyānas are said to be of greater importance than *ñānadassana*. So this insight into knowledge, which has been eclipsed in the course of centuries is duly insisted on several times and the precise process to retrace it is also prescribed by Bhāvaviveka by devoting his present entire work to this subject. He is even inclined to remark that if a yogin attains a perfect insight (*samyakdarśana*) into adamantine knowledge in its true perspective, he may be taken to have fulfilled all other six perfections and eight constituents of the Āryan path, even though he is not engaged in their actual performances, see p 98 where he relies for this view on the Bodhisattvapīṭaka and Brahmāparipreśā. The attitude of our author is quite in contrast with some perhaps later Mādhyamika Ācāryas like Maitreyanātha who emphasise both prajñā and pāramitās as equally important (o Bhavasankrānti, Introduction XXV, XXXVI). Some similar balanced attitude appears to have been maintained by earlier Buddhists. Sopadanda, for example argues on behalf of the Master Śīla and Pajñā are mutually purifying and make one a true Brāhman. Dig Sopadandasutta.

संयथा पि गोतम इत्येन वा इत्य धोषेय्य पादेन वा पाद धोषेय्य एवमेव
शीलपरिधोता पन्था, पन्थापरिधोत शील ।

to which position the Master accords his consent. One may take notice here of a Brahmanical parallelism in the idea of *ñānakarmasamuccaya* in Pre Sāṅkhya Vedantic thought. We should not however, mistake that Bhāvaviveka desires there to discard all the preliminary acts. What he seems to hint is that a correct grasping of things in accordance with the true ultimate knowledge is more fundamental than anything else.

has succumbed to the error condemned by the *Laṅkāvatāra* (154, 155) of taking to the letters (*pañhāruta*) this declaration "which does not wish to say what it says" He has created *Mahāyāna alakṣaṇa* (devoid of three lakṣaṇas) admitting *paratantra* and *pariṇiṣpanna* in the relative truth, considering them void in the absolute truth . (*Siddhi*, 188 189) He is "a total negator", he mistakes *Sūnyatā* and destroyed scripture and reason (*Siddhi*, 432) He thinks that all dharmas are only one existence of designation (*prajñaptisat*)—an untenable opinion (*Siddhi*, 554 555). However his doctrine is not in contradiction with "Middle Path", for he admits existence in relative truth (*Siddhi*, 4). *Yogācāras'* middle path on p 419 of the *Siddhi* Kōse ki condemns that *Bhāva-viveka* has pushed *Mādhyamika* towards Nihilism which *Nāgārjuna* ignored (*Joyau*, Introductory)

7. There are numerous works claiming *Bhāva-viveka*'s authorship, of which the following are noteworthy .

- 1 *Prajñāpradīpa-mūlamadhyamakavṛtti*, comm on *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* of *Nāgārjuna*, Chinese translation, Nanjio, 1185, Tibetan, Mdo 18 Cordier 399 The first part of Tib version is published by Walleser, *Biblio Indica* 1913
- 2 *Jewel in Hand*, *Karatālaratna* Nanjio, 1237 No Tibetan translation is known
- 3 *Madhyamakahrdayakārikā* with auto comment, *Tarkajvālā* Mdo 19, Cordier 300 is an independent work, very valuable for historical studies of his contemporary philosophical thoughts Its Sanskrit original is recently brought from Tibet by Rahula Sankrityayana
- 4 *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa*, Mdo 18 Cordier 299
- 5 *Nikāyabhedavibhaṅgavyākhyā* is a description of the 18 schools of Buddhism translated into English from the Tibetan, Mdo 90 Cordier 414 by Rockhill in his *Life of Buddha* Its authenticity is doubted by L V Poussin
- 6 *Madhyamakārthasaṅgraha* is a short treatise in 10 verses on double truth and its sub truths translated into Sanskrit and English and published with Tibetan version by N Aiyaswami Sastrī in the *Journal of Or Rese Madras* Vol V pp 41 ff
7. *Tattvārṇāvatāra* twice referred to in the present treatise,

pp 58 76, and the Siddhānta of Mañjunghoṣaśāstra speaks of it as the comment on Madhyamakahrdaya (v p 58, n 112)

The exact title of the present treatise is not ascertained it has been translated into Chinese *Chang Cheng lun*, *Chang* means 'palm' and *Cheng* jewel, 'gem', etc So I have put into Sanskrit *Karatalaratna* Karatala for palm is quite familiar in the expression like *Karatalā-malaka*, etc The simple word *kara* is also sometimes used for palm for the sake of metre in the expression like *karabadara samānam* etc I have, however, retained the form *Karatala* having in view the Sūtra passages like *Karatalasamsthānam* cited in the M vṛtti p 476 ll 11, 13 Cp also the expression *arīḥmalakam karatalagatam* in the Kalpa nāmaṇḍatikā p 149 (xxvii)

The *raison d'être* of the treatise as the author says, is to provide persons of keen intellect with proper guides to enter into the Truth (Dharma) for which purpose some persons persistently take to the codes of traditional interpretations of much complicated scriptures Listening reasoning and concentrating are the three main factors to achieve the goal After listening to the scripture one should concentrate on the true nature of things with the aid of proper reasoning *yuktimādhyaṃs* which is the same as *anumāna* according to Bhavya He has also instructed the man of Bodhi career how he should reply to all objections he may confront with in the course of his reasoning This gives the author an opportunity to review all the possible arguments that his opponents both contemporary and ancient could offer against the proposition The treatise is therefore doubly interesting to us Almost all philosophers of his opposite camp are given a place in it to pronounce their views on the proposition A majority of them are mentioned by name Yet there are many others who are mentioned in vague terms as *anye kecit*, etc whom we can hardly identify The most interesting one of such references is that he distinguishes the advocates of Prakṛti and Puruṣa from proper classical Sāṃkhya Their main differences appear to be that Prakṛti and Puruṣa are imperceptible for the latter while they are otherwise for the former We know that Āśvaghoṣa has described a form of Sāṃkhya system which may be very nearer to the Prakṛti-Puruṣavāda of Bhavya Prakṛti of Āśvaghoṣa's account (Bud carita XII, 18) is the same as the five great elements,

etc and hence it is perceptible. It has been well pointed out elsewhere that the *Suvarṇasaptati* the standard text of the classical Sāṅkhya system must have been familiar with *Bhāṣaviveka* (v pp 79 80 no 77 79 80 and my Further Notes on the *Suvarṇasaptati* in the Jour of S V O Institute Tirupati Vol VI No 2 p 84 85)

8 It was in 1938 1939 when I was appointed Professor of Buddhist Studies Chinabhadra that I undertook to study this work of Bhavya a brief account of which I presented to All India Oriental Conference Tirupati 1939 under the title *Bhāṣaviveka* and his Method of Exposition. When I was again appointed in 1945 Chinese Research Fellow under a new scheme of studies sponsored by the National Government of China I took opportunity to revise and publish the work in the *Visvabharati Annals* newly started under aforementioned scheme. Meanwhile I came to know that the work has been translated into French and published by Prof Louis de la Vallée Poussin in his *Mélanges Chinois et Bouddhiques* Vol II a copy of which I procured on loan from the University of Bombay by the kind office of the Director Chinabhadra. In revising I compared Poussin's French translation with my Sanskrit rendering and improved where he left doubtful. The work being of technical character requires a handling specially trained in the technical branch of Indian Studies. I have also made an endeavour to incorporate all his useful references and notes into my present publication in order that mine may serve to be an up-to-date one. Besides I have also consulted an anonymous commentary in Chinese which is unfortunately incomplete and available only on the second chapter. My foot notes and additional notes will testify to what extent I have improved and interpreted the text and succeeded in my task. I hope that the learned readers will themselves see how lucid and elucidative Bhavya's method of argument is even in the translation of so linguistically unfamiliar language as Chinese and how much more useful purpose would have been served if the Sanskrit original of the work were recovered. The Chinese text I have made use of for my Sanskrit rendering is that published along with incomplete commentary aforementioned by The Sūtra Engraving Institute Nanking 9th year of the Chinese Republic *gan shen* first month of autumn preserved in the Chinese Library of Chinabhadra, Santi Niketan.

Now it behoves me to offer my sincere thanks to the authorities of the Visvabharati, more specially to *Sri* Ratindranath Tagore, General Secretary, Visvabharati and Prof Tan Yun Shan Director Ch nabhavana who were responsible for giving me an opportunity to make my work complete and accessible to the learned public. My thanks are due to Dr P C Bagchi Director, Research Studies, Visvabharati for his kind suggestion to issue the book separately as *Vistabharati Memoir*. Our Press at Santiniketan also deserves our thanks for speedy execution of the printing work of the book. As no Chinese types are available in our Press I have all the Chinese words cited in the foot notes printed elsewhere and added as Appendix for the convenience of Scholars' references. I have also prepared a Chinese Index of all the technical and other authorized terms with their Sanskrit equivalents, with a hope that I may have occasion to publish it in future.

1st Feb 1948
Santiniketan

N Ariswami Sastri

KARATALARATNA OF BHAVYA

SUMMARY OF THE TREATISE

CHAPTER I

The author, at the outset of his treatise, narrates the main purpose of his composition as follows . When one (Bodhisattva) realises the supermundane and indiscriminating knowledge, he can conceive the moral faculties of all living beings which are varied in regard to aspiration, temperament and conduct, and can destroy all the passions that are operating either in one's own self or in the self of others which may be latent or potent, and which would cause a great number of miseries . And he can take up for the benefit of others the vow of practising the secret duties of a holy man . In order to realise such supermundane knowledge, one ought to apply constantly the collyrium of unperverted view of *Sūnyata* which destroys the film (or eye disease) of all the wrong views . In order to have it one should resort to Prajñā, supreme knowledge consisting of learning which expels the objective nature of all objects .

Now some persons by dint of right interpretation determining the sense of the wider and complicated texts, enter into the Truth (*dharmata*), and practise constantly and diligently the meditation followed by progress , but in such interpretation they get very much tired mentally . There are other persons who are of very keen intellect, although they have not entered into the Truth . In order to offer facilities to the latter for entering into the Truth by realising the *sūnyatā*, the author says that he composed in brief this *Sāstra*, *Karatalaratna*

As this treatise is intended for the most part to prove the validity of inference for establishing the Madhyamaka Truth, *śūnyatā* independently, and to reply to all objections to it put forth by opponents, the author sets forth in this verse his main thesis in a formal syllogism

- I a Thesis The composite (*samskṛta*) elements are void from the standpoint of Absolute Truth
- b Reason Because they are originated through causes and conditions
- c Example Just like things magically created (*māyavat*)
- II a Thesis Uncomposite (*asamskṛta*) elements are unreal from the viewpoint of Absolute Truth
- b Reason Because they are non products
- c Example Just like flower in the sky

Now the author offers the following remarks by way of explaining the first thesis

I There are number of speculations regarding the classification of things both in the Buddhist and non-Buddhist philosophical systems, they are to be divided in brief into two categories, viz composite and non composite. The worldlings without understanding their real nature attribute some reality to them and entertain manifold wrong views. An ignorant painter, for example, paints some terrible forms of Yakṣas and Piśacas, or paints an image of a beautiful lady or person and imagining that those forms exist in reality becomes either terrified or attracted. But when men realise the real nature of the composite and uncomposite things according to Absolute Truth, they just like a wise painter do not imagine that the objects so painted do really exist, and not being caught into the net of wrong views like a silk worm which is envelopped itself in

its cocoon, are capable of entering into the supermundane knowledge

In order to elucidate this meaning (the real nature) of the composite element which is already disputed, the author sets forth the first thesis Further, he says that all men in the world equally accept it as *bhava*, he also admits it as such empirically In the worldly experience the origination through causes and conditions is accepted as real and hence all the people including shepherd and cowherd know that the composite elements, eye, etc that are brought under category of the Empirical Truth are as substantially existant (*dravyasat*) The author therefore qualifies his proposition as "from the standpoint of Absolute Truth", lest it should contradict the actual experience of the world What is real and proper character is called real nature (*tattva*), it is only the Absolute Truth The above proposition is made from the viewpoint of this Absolute Truth, not of the Empirical Truth

Things that are produced through concatenation of conditions are called composite elements, i e twelve bases omitting some parts of the *dharmāyatana* Things magically created and illusory in appearance are also accepted as such by opponents, the author says that if his proposition relates to those illusory things, it will incur a logical defect called *siddha-sādhana* So his proposition is directed to those composite things which are accepted by opponents as really and substantially existent, e g the composite element, in regard to the base of eye it is discussed whether it is really substantial or void It is void The term void is a synonym of what is bereft of its own nature and is 'illusory in appearance' such is the proposition of the author

Things that originate through causes and conditions,

which are empirically true, my statement does not go against the experiences current amongst common people

Again three kinds of contradiction are raised and answered (3) It does not contradict our sacred texts, because it has been accepted by our scriptures (4) It does not contradict the sacred text of other philosophers since all the systems of thought are intended to criticise others' systems and to establish their own (5) Nor does it contradict the experiences of the ordinary folk because no philosophical discussions and investigations will follow closely the experiences of the worldlings in determining the true natures of things, e g Buddhists hold things to be momentary and of no soul, Vaiśeṣikas, *rūpa*, etc are other than *dravya* etc, and Sāṅkhyas, *buddhi* is *acetara*, what is extinguished and what is not yet originated are all real This is why I qualified my proposition as "from the standpoint of Absolute Truth"

2 To an objection that there is no subject (*dharmin*) for him who maintains that the eye basis is really void and hence it is a logical defect called *paksadosa*, and also it is *hetudosa*, there being no receptacle of the reason, the author replies that the eye, etc in general as current amongst common people are accepted as subject, and some attribute pertaining to it as reason, so the defect that you stated is only an apparent and fallacious one

3 The crooked (Brahmanic) logicians raise an objection of mutual contradiction of the proposition and reason in this syllogism If eye, etc are void, how can they be produced by causes and conditions? If they are so produced, how can they be void? If however that objection is removed, then your proposition involves either absence of a parallel example or unproving of the reason, e g sound is eternal,

because all things are non-eternal. This syllogism exhibits the reason 'because the sound is not all things' and hence indicates the defect of the reason since the sound is also included in the category of all things. There is no parallel example. How can a thing be eternal and non-all? The author replies that the reason and example are well proved as they are very well understood by every ordinary man.

4. Svabhāvavādins say : the organ of eye is endowed with its own nature, because it discharges its own function. Things devoid of *svabhāva* do not discharge the function just like a son of barren woman. Bhavya says : If you establish thereby the apparent nature of the eye, etc. known to all common people, conventionally, then it will incur the defect of *siddhasādhana*. If you do so from the view-point of reality, there will be no parallel example. Nor may your object be proved from the absence of non-parallel example ; e. g. the advocate of the eternal sound says : sound is eternal, because it is audible ; pot, etc. are non-eternal and not audible ; sound on the other hand is audible and hence eternal. Your reason has been contradicted by its opposite reason, viz. *kṛtakatva*, being a product, which exists in all parallel examples known to the world. This contradictory reason proves that all things, eye, etc. including sound are to be brought under the category of common parlance of the world ; because they all possess the same false nature. So far the author replies to some fallacies relating the subject (*pakṣa*).

III. Now some fallacies relating to the reason are met with. 1. Some (logicians) object that the proposition : all composite elements are void, includes also your reason and example, as they all are of the same category ; so your inference is imperfect. The author replies that if his propo-

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sition goes : the eye is void because it is void of its nature, then it may entail an *asiddhidoṣa* for reason. *Māyā*, etc. are given as example, not as subject for demonstrating therein our *probandum* in which case there will be an unnecessary attempt on author's part of proving a thing which is already admitted (*siddhasādhana-gaurava*).

2. Some low-witted (logicians) pass the following criticism : The proposition proving non-substantiality of the composite things also proves the same for the reason which becomes therefore *asiddha*, non-existent. This criticism, says the author, is only apparent and not valid ; because similar defect may be pointed out with all other logicians. For example, (ancient) followers of Jina establish that all *samskāras* are of no soul, because they are products of causes (*sahetuka*). Though this reason also comes under *samskāra*, yet it was admitted as a valid reason. Sāṅkhyas hold the evolutes (*vyakta*) as constituted of three *gunas*, because they are different from *cetana*. This reason too is *vyakta*, but not considered to be invalid. Vaiśeṣikas also maintain that the sound is non-eternal, because it is produced. The formulation of this reason is constituted of words and so it becomes non-eternal. No dialectician would admit this kind of objection as valid. If they do so, nobody can establish any proposition.

3. Some other (logicians) say that your reason, *pratitya-samutpannatva*, will not prove your *probandum*, as it is itself devoid of its own nature just like the word uttered by the son of barren woman. The author answers : The reason in your syllogism is *asiddha* for you ; if you formulate it as accepted by your opponent, you should explain it in more definite terms. If it means total non-existence, there will be no reason at all. Or if it means a false appearance, then

it lacks a parallel example ; since the word uttered by the son of barren woman is absolutely non-existent. Further it becomes inconclusive with *nirmitatābda*, word of Buddha's created persons because it educates and does benefit to innumerable beings even if it lacks its own nature. And a reason that is accepted only by one party, will not at all prove *probandum*. And again your reason is made invalid by contradictory reference, and involves also a logical defect called *atiprasaṅga*. Here the author gives some illustrations to demonstrate that reason would be valid only when it is accepted by both parties.

4. Some crooked logician again says : If *svabhāva śūnya* is *probandum*, no *probans* will be established just like the word uttered by the son of barren woman. *Probans* is also included into the *śamskrta* category, so it becomes *sādhyasama*, equal to *probandum*, i. e. devoid of its own nature. Author's reply goes : This so-called defect in thesis has been pointed out by the implied argument of the previous opponent the futility of which has been fully demonstrated.

IV. Some more fallacies of proposition are answered : some (ancient Buddhist logicians) say, that the meaning of your proposition is not clear. (1) All the composite elements are in reality non-existent substance ; if that is the sense of the thesis, this sentence itself destroys your *probandum*, and incurs a defect of *pakṣa*, called *svavacananirodha*, contradiction by one's own word, just like a proposition establishing that all words are false. (2) If the sense of your proposition is that all composite elements are totally non-existent, then you, denying every thing completely, fall into the wrong view of *apavāda*.

(1) With regard to the first alternative, the author

remarks that Buddha has freely used in the verse, e. g. *ātmā hi ātmano nātha*, etc. the word *ātmā*, soul, which is nothing but *mind*, *citta*. However, in reality no-soul theory is established ; his utterances are not blamed as *svavacananirodha*. Similarly I also accept the eye etc. as existent in the worldly activities ; however I establish it as void from the view-angle of reality of saints. The author has cited some three more utterances of the Buddha which may be charged with similar logical fallacy ; yet they are accepted by our opponents as quite valid and logical. The Sāṅkhyas also have to adopt the same procedure. They maintain that the evolutes are endowed with three *guṇas*. This formulation of proposition too falls into the category of *vyakta* and is constituted of three *guṇas*. If it is not of three *guṇas*, *vyakta* also will not be of that nature. Though there is such defect, yet their proposition is not at all regarded as blame-worthy.

Our disputant, without making his own thesis free from the said fallacy, tries to frame some more charges, such as : all the composite elements being in reality non-substances, the sentence of this proposition becomes non-substance. The disputant who directs such charge against other's proposition without removing his own defect is just like a man who, when he is charged by you as a thief, replies that you are also a thief. This procedure of discussion should not be adopted in a critical and logical investigation.

(2) As to the second alternative, my meaning of the proposition has already been explained ; void does not mean a total non-existence, but it is only a synonym of non-substantial, and illusory appearance. And I do not deny that all things never exist in all aspects. So your objection is no more valid.

2. Some other Ācāryas raise this objection : If things as you said, are non-substantial like the *māyā*, etc. they are non-existent, hence you fall into the wrong idea of non-existence. This objection, says the author, is raised lest only the desired object of the *Sūnyavāda* should be accomplished, though both parties are confronted with the same fallacy. To deny the Absolute Truth evolves a greater sin. This negative expression denies what is current in the world. However you attach greater importance to its injunctive aspect. But I stress more on its negative aspect. This negative expression could indicate only one idea—the negation of the existences ; its force of expressing the idea is fulfilled and nothing more comes out into operation to express another idea, e. g. the expression “there does not exist a piece of white cloth” would denote only the absence of white cloth and not necessarily the existence of red cloth, or blue cloth.

In this branch of science we disprove the supposed real nature of all things in order to remove the wrong idea of Eternalism ; we also deny the unreal nature in order to shun the wrong belief of Nihilism. Again both these natures, real and unreal combined, are also disproved so that these two beliefs combined may be avoided. With a view to put an end to all other false beliefs, all the mental phenomena are negated. All such phenomena being stopped, the mind automatically ceases to operate any longer. An utterance of Buddha has been cited to this effect.

3. Somebody else says that the advocate of the *Sūnyatā* doctrine, although he is desirous of acquiring discriminative wisdom, always discriminates things composite and uncomposite as void, and thus he nullifies this cherished object. This objection too is not valid as I have already replied to it fully and fittingly.

V. One more objection relating to the argument. Some other (logicians) say: the reason for proving *sūnyatā* is unproved either conventionally or in reality both from the viewpoint of one's own system or that of others'. The author meets this remark thus: All the logicians have agreed on the fact that a reason is to be employed which is valid for both parties and with general attributes, not taking into account all other particulars. For example, (1) The Vaiśeṣikas prove that sound is non-eternal because it is product of effort. 'The advocate of the eternal sound' with a view to disprove the reason, questions whether it is produced by throat, etc. or by stick, etc. (2) So also the Sāṅkhyas prove that five organs of living beings are not products of matter, because they are faculties (*indriyatvāt*) like the faculty of mind. 'The opponent who advocates that human organs are material products, criticises whether the reason (*indriyatta*) is endowed with the nature of great elements, or with three *gunas*. All such criticisms are futile and indicate only a false disproving of reasons. The same is the case with your criticism.

VI. (1) Some objections on the example are met with. Some Ācāryas who are self-posed as very intelligent, blind of love for their own system, and incapable of assessing the value of the gem, like scriptures—raise objection as to the example: Things such as flower, fruit, lump of clay, etc. which by force of magic power turn into different objects like elephant, house, etc. are devoid of their own natures. This we do not accept. There is no parallel example, because your example lacks *probandum*. If you say that those magically created things are spoken of as void in so far as they lack the nature of the real elephant, etc. then the eye, etc. are said to be void only in the sense they lack the

nature of others. In this case your thesis becomes *siddha-sādhana* proving what is already proved.

The author replies : The objects like elephant, etc. which are created depending upon things like lump of clay, etc. are devoid of their natures, as accepted even by you, hence my example is proved and *probandum* also proved. If you say again that those magically created things, though they are devoid of the nature of such other real things, are not however devoid of their own nature, you must then explain satisfactorily why they lack the form and character in which they appear. But you have accepted that things like fruits, flower, and others do not lack the form and character in which they appear. So you must admit that those magically created things, elephant, etc. are also possessed of the nature of such real things, since they appear in such forms. But in fact they are not real. So it follows that all magically created things are devoid of their own nature. Thus my example is proved correct and my *probandum* is also accomplished.

(2) Some others having a different view of *Sūnya*, argue that the magically created persons are not real persons and are hence void ; yet they are not devoid of their own nature since they exist in the form of a person of illusory appearance. So your example is again unproved. The author retorts whether those illusory persons are dependent products or otherwise ; if they are dependent products, why do you call them illusory ? Is it for the reason that they do not exist as they appear to us ? Do you not see that the eye etc. are dependent products not existing as they appear to us ? Therefore they are proved as devoid of their nature.

Again they argue that it is alright with illusory persons, but the case with eye, etc. is different. Because there is no

manifest in one and the same place. Nor can it be possible by way of unmanifesting (hiding) process, because when one process of pot is hidden, other process of basin will also be hidden. So your thesis that everything is in the nature of everything is absurd.

(3) You also must admit that the place where the manifestation of illusory person is at work, is devoid of the manifestation of real person. Therefore my example is proved and my proposition is also established. Your theory of omnipresence of sense organs is not admissible, because each of them is always assigned to and associated with a fixed place.

VIII. The Yogācāras argue the following : (1) If your proposition is meant to express that all composite elements are void in as much as they originate through causes and conditions, not by selves, and hence are devoid of the nature of origination, we do not dispute it and it falls in line with our opinion. (2) So says our Master—"that aspect of which a thing is devoid is unreal ; this aspect which serves as a receptacle of the false imputation is real". Intention of the saying is this : the imputed aspect of the dependent aspect is non-existent. There is nothing speakable corresponding to our speeches and there is no speech corresponding to the speakable. Therefore the imputed aspect that abides in the dependent aspect is originally unreal. What is void (of the imputed aspect) and is of dependent origination is existent in its nature. All the worldly conventional talks as to the matter, feeling, ideation and others are based upon and emanated from this *paratantra* aspect. If this aspect also is said to be non-existent, all the said conventional talks would be baseless and senseless. You will then deserve to be excommunicated from the fold of co-religionists.

other real eye, in contrast with which you may say this eye is illusory Bhavya says—Yes, it is so, yet we experience in the world that the absence of one's own nature and dependent origination—always behave as *probandum* and *probans* This fact has been illustrated by the said example simply as a sort of pointer to the general principle If you again analyse the particulars of example and argue on that basis, you will fall into the pit of a logical fallacy called *vikalpasa majati*, which shows clearly your light mindedness This fallacy is further illustrated by some disputes between Vaiśeṣikas and Mīmāṃsakas regarding eternity of the sound

VII The Sankhyas object to the validity of the reason and example They hold (1) that things are evolved and transformed from Mahat, etc and so the reason the dependent of origination is unproved, (2) that everything may be possessed thenature (*triguṇa*) of everything, and (3) that the sense organs may be present everywhere, even in the illusory person its nature is present and so your example also is unproved Bhavya replies (1) You must admit that a cognition of visual object is produced by causes, but not manifested Things like pot, etc are produced by different causes, lump of clay, wheel etc Manifesting factors are not material causes, e g a lamp, etc are not the material causes for the ornaments like bangle, etc just as the cognition is produced by different causes not manifested so also are the eye, etc Hence there is no question of reason being unproved

(2) Your second proposition that everything is in the nature of everything is untenable It cannot be possible by way of manifesting process for the following reason Since there is present a manifesting process of pot in a place where a basin exists Again one and the same pot may extend to so many leagues of space A pot and a basin would

manifest in one and the same place. Nor can it be possible by way of unmanifesting (hiding) process, because when one process of pot is hidden, other process of basin will also be hidden. So your thesis that everything is in the nature of everything is absurd.

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Now the author retorts on the above remarks : (1) If you hold that composite elements like the eye, etc. are void because there does not exist in the *paratantra* any nature like the eye, etc. which is not originated by causes and remains always unextinguished, then you are proving what is already proved. You are no better theorists than the Sāṅkhyas and Vaiśeṣikas who also maintain similar theories (viz. absence of the nature that we actually perceive). You said that the eye etc. are non-products and devoid of their natures, because they are void by themselves. So you must state that they are void by absence of the nature of non-origination (*anutpattiniḥsvabhāvatā*), not by absence of the nature of origination as you stated. If composite things while in the process of origination, have really the nature of origination, how can you say that they are devoid of the nature of origination? If they do not have it really, their nature does not at all exist; so you need not proclaim that there is nothing but mind. If you however adhere to it, you will have a defect of proposition. If the *paratantra* aspect is devoid by itself of the nature of origination and is non-existent, it is said to be void; then you will be proving what is already proved. Similarly what is originated through causes and conditions is in reality not void for you and it will be deprived of the term *Sūnya*. As regards my contention, you cannot frame any such charge. Therefore your remark that my proposition falls in line with your (*Yogācāra*) opinion is only a delusion.

(2) As to the passage above quoted, *jena sūnyam*, etc. I may say that if you accept as real entity things like the eye, etc. which are originated by virtue of causes and conditions and which all people know as such, even ordinary men will be in possession of knowledge of the enlightened men

(Buddha) Worldly things appear to us as if they are created, from the viewpoint of knowledge of the enlightened persons who have realised the Absolute Truth. Therefore it is declared that, that which is devoid of this dependent aspect is unreal in order to guard against falling into extremity of eternalism. Similarly this dependent aspect is said to be real in order to guard against falling into another extremity of Nihilism. Things like the eye, etc. which are originated by virtue of causes and conditions, and which are included into the category of the empirical truth, are real and not totally unreal like the flower in the sky. We, however, prove them to be void only from the standpoint of the Absolute Truth. It is therefore said that this aspect which serves as basis of false imputation is real. In this manner non substantiality of things has been proclaimed in conformity with Truth by the Leader of men and gods. Being granted that the dependent aspect is real in this sense, your words become a good doctrine and I also accept this kind of reality. As two kinds of accumulations of virtue and wisdom are brought under the principle of *lokānūvartana*, following the world, and as the basic principle upon which all false things are imagined is established to be real by way of worldly convention (*samvṛty-upacāra*), all things that are talked of in the world (*prajñaptidharma*) are empirically real. That I do not dispute. Therefore there is no room for the charge you made against me that I deserve to be excommunicated from the fold of co religionists.

If you say that the magically created things are of indescribable nature, they cannot prove your thesis, I do not see any reason why they should be of indescribable nature. If you adhere to it again, no intelligent person can

disprove the soul and others that are styled to be of indescribable nature by Tirthikas

If you accept all dependently originated things as real, objects like magically created persons will be all real. Nor is it possible to say that one thing is in the possession of the nature of some thing else, e.g. a cow does not possess the characteristics of an ass.

Nor do we dispute with you with regard to your remark that there is nothing speakable corresponding to our speeches, etc., so your negation on this account incurs a *siddhasadbanadosa*. If you insist that the negation is necessary because many defilements become operative by virtue of one's attachment towards the aspects imagined on account of speeches and the speakable, you are thoroughly mistaken. No animal kingdom is in the possession of speeches. The main factor for defilement is only the absence of correctly grasping things in their right aspects. There are many arguments and principles that may be quite pleasing and satisfactory and there are many varied, holy and subtle teachings. Amongst them the teaching relating to the imputed aspect is only partly profitable, not universally. Therefore there is no need of further arguing the imputed aspect as void.

IX. Some other Ācāryas offer the following criticism. If the eye is for you real substantially, then follows a loss of your proposition and the reasoning becomes inconclusive. If it is unreal, it would be devoid of its nature and your negation becomes baseless. The author observes in replying. It is not so. According to Buddha's saying there is nothing that is true and there is nothing that is false. I have nothing in reality to establish whether true or untrue. As there is nothing to be denied in your opinion by the said reasoning there is no necessity for negation. But my

negation points out after investigation *pros* and *cons* that the thing to be negated is originally devoid of its own nature, but does not destroy its nature into pieces. It is not proper to argue that because there do not exist things to be illuminated, the illuminating factor also does not exist. Nor is it possible to state that things that are illuminated are created by illuminating factor. Therefore even in the absence of things that are to be negated, my own negation may exist. According to my conception *probandum*, *probans*, deniable, denial, criticism and all other means of logic may exist empirically. I accept the inference as a proving factor because you have accepted its validity. I for one admit that every thing is possible empirically. Thus my proposition has been proved quite logical and reasonable as there is no room for any criticism against my syllogism stated above.

Then the author in conclusion points out that the *pratityasamutpannatva* is not the only reason to prove our proposition. There are also other reasons, such as perishability, etc. and they are to be employed as the case may require. After meeting an objection raised by somebody that the eye is substantially real on account of its having definite function and profit, by saying that such reasoning could not be provided with parallel example, the author instructs a yogin as follows :

X. Yogin should meditate that all the other eleven bases, ear, etc. are devoid of their own nature just like the eye-basis and penetrate and enter into the non-substantiality of all their natures. Then he should repeat the same process of meditation over all other dharmas, skandha, dhātu, doctrine of dependent origination, *smṛtyupasthāna*, *samyak-pradhāna*, *radhipāda* upto *sarvajñajñāna*, and enter into the non-

substantiality of their natures By virtue of meditation in this manner, the meditator, though entered into non substantiality of all natures, is still deficient in Bhavana, force of meditation So he should repeatedly practice it and acquire the power of meditation Having acquired it in a short time he dispells all impurities, doubts, and ill conceived ideas about the composite elements

A yogin, at the moment of entering into *Adhi mulā*, the sixth of ten stages of a Bodhisattva, feels immense joy As he is far away from any attachment towards the characteristic marks of all the separate composite elements of existence and as he is far from conceiving any idea, during the performance of charity, (1) of the object, donor and receiver, and also (2) of the donor, receiver and the result of charity, he becomes purified in respect of two fold three spheres and acquires immeasurable accumulations of virtues and wisdom Furthermore not being resolved to wards any fruit of this world or of that world, worshipping his desired, virtuous and honoured gods, not having any wrong ideas regarding agency of gunas, Ātman, Maheśvara or atoms, he performs charities on a grand scale. It has been pointed out here by giving citations that only the person that is absolutely free from any wrong idea of entities (*bhaiadbharma*) is capable of walking along the path of Bodhisattvas

Now he should meditate that what is devoid of its own nature is unborn what is unborn is not bound by three limitations of past, present and future, having meditated in a manner that is pure for all three times, and being pure in respect of two fold three spheres, he walks into the Maha Bodhi which is not bound by any limitations of past, present and future

CHAPTER II

I. The author in this chapter seeks to establish non-substantiality of uncomposite things, ether, etc. and therefore takes up the discussion of the second proposition set forth in the second half of the first verse, viz. -

Thesis . Uncomposite (*asamskṛta*) things are unreal
(from the viewpoint of Absolute Truth).

Reason : Because they are non-products,

Example . Just like flower in the sky

After explaining the import of each term in this proposition, the author points out that the above-mentioned argument is not only one ; there are also many others, *akṛtakatva*, *akāśratva*, etc ; but the *anupāda* 'non production' is mentioned as argument by way of particularisation (*upalakṣana*)—just as one says 'Guard these curds from crows' with the intention that it should be guarded also from others, cats, rats, etc , because the curds are to be protected in all events.

II. Now Bhāvaviveka commences to meet one by one the objections raised by his opponents, the Vaibhāsikas, Sautrāntikas, Yogācāras, Sāṅkhyas and Vaiśeṣikas and others

1. The following is the objection made by the Vaibhāsikas : The uncomposite thing is non-substantial, i. e. a non-entity ; such being your proposition, the ether-base-attainment (*ākāśāyatanaśamāpatti*) becomes objectless , in the absence of its object, the ether, how is it possible to say that it exists ? And it has been defined as *anāvṛtti*, absence of any obstructing element.

The author replies . If you formulate this syllogism : the ether-base-attainment is endowed with a real object, or with a substantial entity, because of this attainment, or

because this attainment has something as its object, just like other attainments or their objects. This syllogism is defective in respect of the homogeneous example, because all other attainments and their objects are declared to be void in as much as they are composite things.

We examined the nature of ether from the standpoint of Absolute Truth. My proposition can be established empirically also. Therefore the positive character of the ether held by the opponent cannot be maintained, since the argument : 'because the attainment has something as the object' has invariably been met with its opposite argument just mentioned.

2. The followers of our sect and of others' sect say this : It follows from your syllogism that whichever is originated is substance. If you contend that a thing originated is also non-substance, then your argument loses its value, as it does not pervade all the homogeneous subjects. This is only an apparent objection, says the author. It may be taken for certain that all non-originated things are non-substances, and not that all the non-substances are non-originated. The reason, *prajātnānantarijakatva*, is accepted as a valid argument, though it is not present in all homogeneous subjects.

3. Some realistic thinker argues : The ether and flower are both well-known in the world ; hence they are not non-substances though they are not experienced as being associated together. So the proposition cannot be proved with the aid of the example, sky-flower. The author replies that the word, *kbapuspa*, should be taken as, a genitive compound, meaning 'a flower pertaining to the ether'. The flower as such being non-existent, the example is not lacking.

The Yogin, by these reasonings, should enter into the

non-substantiality of the ether. The same method of reasoning is to be applied to the non-substantiality of other three uncomposite things, *Pratīśankhyānirodha*, etc.

4. The Vaibhāṣikas say : Buddha has declared that there is a destruction by means of knowledge which serves as antedote to the removal of the idea of composite things. If you deny that, you will fall in the contradiction to your own doctrine. The author says : This is not right. The Master has declared so empirically in order to instil in the mind of disciples a feeling of disgust for the composite things and also to kindle a feeling of joy for the uncomposite things. The Master stated the unconditioned Nirvāṇa as existent just in the same manner as he stated that apparitional beings exist. The denial of *Pratīśankhyānirodha* is made from the absolute standpoint. The Master has also declared to this effect : I declare as ignorant those who consider the Nirvāṇa as something of a real entity. Thus my denial does not incur any contradiction.

5. The wicked logicians put the objection : Because an uncomposite thing is non-entity, your proposition lacks the subject ; because the sky-flower is also a non-entity, there is no parallel example. Thus your *probandum*, *prohans* and instance become defective. This objection is not admissible ; for, the uncomposite things, ether, etc. are empirically accepted as existent by virtue of their talks current in the world.

6. The Vaibhāṣikas again say that *Pratīśankhyānirodha* is a real entity, as it serves as object for the path and an antedote to defiling things. No non-entity would do this act. This is also not admissible. If you hold that having a function and being a real entity are concomittant, that concomittance is vitiated in the case

of an apparitional being which possesses some specific function even though it is a non-entity.

7. The Sautrāntikas remark that this syllogism is defective and proving what is already proved. If we say that it is characterised by the absence of some obstructing elements, the said defect will be removed because this character is disputed as such. However, my proposition disproves not only the current notion of its substantiality, but its non-substantiality also.

8. The Tāmraśāṭīyas say that the ether is constituted of some matter in the intermediate space, and it is a composite thing. So your denial of uncomposite thing evolves the defect called *Siddhasādhana*. This theory is incorrect and has already been refuted in the previous chapter.

9. The Vātsīputrīyas agree in many points with the Vaibhāsikas and need not be taken for refutation.

10. The Yogācāras remark that there does not exist another truth upon one truth. Suchness is only the ultimate truth of all things (*dharma*), hence it is proper to say that suchness is truly void, but it is improper to say that it is non-substantial. How can the supramundane and indiscriminative knowledge be reasonably stated to be endowed with an object which is non-substantial? It is not indeed reasonable, says the author. Just as you hold that the supramundane knowledge cannot be stated to be endowed with a non-composite object, so also it cannot be of a composite object. Nor is it logical to conceive suchness as substance. It is hard to prove the substantiality of suchness. If you adhere to it, knowledge with it as object cannot be supramundane, because it becomes conditioned in as much as it is endowed with some object just like any other ordinary knowledge. The author cites passages to this effect from some sūtras.

He further points out that suchness is not an ultimate truth in so far as it becomes an object of some knowledge. If you explain it as *Sūnya*, because it is devoid of something else, its knowledge will be only an ordinary one. So suchness is an end to and suppression of all discriminations, and it is not substantially existing. If you say that suchness is substantially existing, even though it is beyond our common parlance, then you are advocating only the soul theory of Tirthikas in the modified name of suchness.

II. Some co-religionists and followers of the Small Vehicle remark that all the elements that are brought under twelve bases, both composite and non-composite are indeed substances ; because a man realising the four noble truths with sixteen aspects and training himself in the two paths of *darśana* and *bhāvanā*, removes all the defiling elements of three spheres of existence that are removable by means of the path of insight and the path of meditation, and thus becomes free from all kinds of ills. If one does not elucidate that all the elements of existence are only non-substantial, who would give up this delusion and gain this benefit. If you do not accept non-substantiality of all the separate elements of existence, there will be no scope for removing the veil of knowable things, and then our master would have been only partly released.

III. Thus a yogin should penetrate and enter into the non-substantiality of other uncomposite things postulated by Tirthikas, such as Prakṛti, Puruṣa, atoms, Supreme Lord, time, quarter, some living beings and others,

1. Now the advocates of Prakṛti and Puruṣa put this objection. According to our conception, three elements are transformed into sky-flower, so it is not a non-entity. In that case you are denied a homogeneous example because

the sky-flower, a real entity goes in contrast with your *probandum*. The author meets the objection by putting these counter-questions : Do you accept the sky-flower as existent or non-existent ? If you accept the first alternative, your thesis contradicts the common sense. If you accept the latter, your contention that there is no homogeneous example for my thesis is wrong. Nor is it proper to say that because the three elements are real entities, their product, sky-flower is also a real entity. This will show your low-wittedness !

2. The Sāṅkhyas advocate the following : We do not try to prove that Prakṛti or Puruṣa is experienced by senses; yet we can prove it by means of inference thus : The evolutes are caused by some substance, e. g. some pieces of sandal wood. Similarly they are intended for some enjoyer, because they are enjoyable things. All the enjoyable things are intended for some enjoyer, e. g. prepared food and drink. Thus your proposition goes in contradiction to our common experience.

Now the author replies : If you try to establish your proposition in a general manner, and do not particularise that substance, then it evolves a fallacy of *Siddhasādhana*. If you particularise it and say that it is pleasure-element, etc. there will be no homogeneous example for your proposition. And your argument is also constituted of different matters. So your acceptance of Puruṣa as argument falls to the ground.

3. The Vaiśeṣikas argue that the signs, breathing etc. are always concomittant with the possessor of signs, because they are signs, just like the sight of smoke. The author meets this in the same manner as in the previous case. He says : If it is meant to prove the possessor in a general way, it incurs *Siddhasādhana*, and if the possessor is qualified as eternal, pervader, etc., there is the absence of homogeneous example.

By the same method of reasoning time, quarter, ether and others are to be disproved

4 Again the Vaiśeṣikas plead that atoms and mind are uncomposite things Your argument—the lack of origination, cannot be proved by itself If you say that these two things are included in the category of composite things, then the reason to prove non substantiality of things, because of their origination through causes and conditions, becomes unproved for us, your opponent, and hence the sphere for applying non substantiality will be limited The author retorts to these remarks that such defects may be removed, if we accept the mind and atoms as uncomposite things even in the sphere of empirical experience You may prove the mind but not as an uncomposite thing, because it serves as a factor for effecting knowledge just like the material things There are also other reasons to prove its composite nature Similarly atoms are not uncomposite elements, because they serve as productive factors just like any other material cause, e g threads

5 Just as the categories postulated by the Sankhyas and Vaiśeṣikas are refuted, so also those of the Naked-bodied Tīrthikas, etc are to be understood as non substantial by appropriate reasonings

IV Thus Yogin should refute all the objections, and by the aid of rightful inference should penetrate and enter into non substantiality of the uncomposite elements postulated by one's own school of thought as well as by others

Though he has in this manner entered into the principle of non substantiality by virtue of knowledge acquired through learning, he is unable to cut at root the veil of the removables (1. e *jñeyavarana*), so he should try to develop the strength of meditation of higher type

1 Then the author explains the method of acquiring the wisdom constituted of meditation

When, again the image of the composite and uncomposite things appears as one aspect before the mind's eye of the yogin, he should suppress it by looking upon it as void of its nature, and thus he enters into its original non substantiality on the plea that all elements of existence are aloof from any nature, and then he gradually enters into the principle of non-duality by dwelling upon things as bereft of any aspect By process of meditation on this model he is able to suppress the image of either composite or uncomposite things in such a way as it will never arise again

Though the yogin does not dwell on it, he is not yet absolutely free from flow of consciousness which is stained with a tendency of running towards an object in as much as the discriminative thought of non substantiality, etc are still operating As he is yet not in the possession of unshakable knowledge, he is removed from supramundane undiscriminative knowledge by persistence of discriminative thought In order to remove this handicap he should reason thus when things are void of their own nature, the thought
 7 discriminative of non substantiality is also not a real entity, as it has been conditioned by causes like the magically created things Meditating in this manner, he suppresses the thought which discriminates non substantiality etc By suppressing it he avoids the two extreme points of 'void' and 'non void', and no more looks at things in the aspect of voidness etc Then a long passage is cited from the *Sata sabastrika prajnaparamita* in support of this statement.

The yogin, when he avoids the two extreme points, moves in the path of moderation This path is termed 'form

less' as it is free from the grasp of composite and non-composite things ; 'matchless' as there is nothing that may be compared with it , 'supportless' because there is neither supporter nor supported , 'imageless', because there persists no image whatever of either composite things or uncomposite things, etc , and it is named also 'consciousless' since no consciousness of any kind is at work there . Then follow two citations which reveal the true character of this middle path

Yogin who is trained in avoiding the twin extremes and is walking in the concept of non duality, entertains the thought of non-duality concept . Being aware of this also as an obstacle to acquire supramundane indiscriminative knowledge, he suppresses that concept also . Therefore he enters into the realisation of never functioning and running-towards an object, and stays in the flow of knowledge which is now in its own nature

2 . Though he practises meditation on unperverted non substantiality he should not do it with the sole aim of perceiving it with his mind's eye , now his meditation is called 'absolute object meditation' . Then a long passage is cited to substantiate the above idea

3 . The Yogācāras determine that the supramundāne indiscriminative knowledge is also free from the grasper and the grasped . Yogin keeping up the idea of reality (*dharm*) in it, should take to meditation

Others critically analysing it declare that such type of knowledge cannot be called extra supramundane knowledge in as much as it is still coloured with the thought of some discrimination . A passage is here cited to elicit the true nature of Absolute Truth which forms the wisdom eye, and by this wisdom eye he acquires neither composite nor

uncomposite things. On account of reasoning and scripture yogin should put a stop even to such determination.

The wise men again declare that extra-supramundane knowledge is not in reality an entity, as it is caused by causes like some magically created things. So he should suppress that knowledge too. So also he should suppress that knowledge which destroys the said determination as it is similarly yet defective of its being caught into the idea of an entity.

4. When all such notions are stopped, there arises no further intellection (*pratipatti*) as to the imageless objectivity because of the absence of causes and conditions. No other notion whatever can possibly arise in the absence of intellection. That is called knowledge in accordance with Truth. Some scriptural passages are cited to make the said premises further clear. Then yogin, abiding neither in heart or mind, nor in consciousness or knowledge, is spoken of as a good farer in undiscriminating wisdom. When he fares not being caught in any sphere (of mental activity), he obtains from Tathāgata, well-awakened, the instruction regarding the Truth. A citation from some Sūtra goes to strengthen the statement. Thus wisdom-faring is termed a status of Āryan silence. To make further clear that silence a quotation has been drawn from a Sūtra.

5. (a) When examined through these reasonings and scriptures, all the composite and uncomposite things do not constitute either the mind or wisdom, and again either discriminative thought or undiscriminative thought in its objective nature. For him who knows things in this manner, rays of wisdom-sun dispel all the darkness of ignorance.

(b) The wise, by not grasping the object images of the mind and wisdom, fares in a wisdom undiscriminating, and lacks any sphere of faring, but fares

6 Having explained the above verse in detail, the author describes the nature of the wisdom result yogin, because of his faring in an undiscriminating wisdom, though not faring fares, and though faring, does not fare. He is aloof from thoughts of all objects whatever and abides in an absolute negation of all things just like the ether. He, just like one entered into the *samādhi* (or *samapatti*) of complete suppression, views all things in their original nature.

Dharma body of Buddhas is unthinkable, unlimited, non dual, abodeless, imageless, unperceivable, etc. Thus yogin viewing it, though he sees, does not see in fact; and though he does not see anything, he sees, and though he is seeing does not see.

7 Yogin having taken to a rightful view of things accumulates immense store of merits, and increases the unlimited resultant happiness. He is intent solely on self-purification and puts an end to all unhappiness of all beings, and like the *Bhāṣayyārāja* he abounds in multifarious rightful aspirations.

Then the author furnishes in the light of above discussion an interpretation of the Aryan eightfold path. It is the rightful view which is correct insight into the norm body of Tathagatas, having no image of *ens* and *non-ens*. To suppress all discursive thoughts is rightful thought. Rightful speech is to realise inwardly saying that all things are beyond speeches. Rightful act is not to commence any act bodily, vocally and mentally. To live on that all things are bereft of origination and destruction which are also devoid of

their nature is rightful living. Not to commit oneself to any effort and device on the plea that all things are not brought up by efforts is rightful effort. The rightful memory is an absence of any brooding or reflection of *ens* or *non-ens*, and that all things lack any objectivity for any intellectual perception. The rightful meditation is not to make any resolve this or that way by not grasping all things in all aspects. The man who views in this manner is said to practise the eightfold Aryan Path.

The man who views things thus fulfils also six perfections. Perfection in charity consists in doing away with all objects (*nimitta*) in all aspects, and in removing all defiling elements. Perfection in observing is to suppress all the supporting things of knowledge, and an attention to the attitude of nonperceiving. Non-forbearing any feeling of the knowledge-supporting things is perfection in forbearance. Perfection in energy consists in expelling all movements by not taking or giving up anything. Perfection in meditation is constituted of an absolute negation of abiding anywhere by virtue of lack of attention whatever towards anything. Perfection in wisdom lies in aloofness from the twin images (of *ens* and *non-ens*) and not giving rise to any description of anything. Further detailed exposition of these six perfections is to be found in the Discourse of *Brahmapariprecchā*.

The author then concludes : Well abiding^{*} in the manner just described becomes the source of 'unbound things' (*apramāṇa*) as has been stated by Buddha in the Discourse of Unbound Things : These are a great goal, great benefit and immense advantages. So the wise man knowing things in accordance with Truth and being attentive, should take to the course of training.*

* The arrangement into different sections and subsections in this chapter is based on the commentary which will be studied later on in full.

महायानकरतलरत्नम्

[सस्यतपरीक्षा]

सर्वसत्त्वानामर्थाय समारब्धानुत्तरमहाबोधिप्रणिधानः सन्तत-
कृतप्रतिधासद्वितर्कविचारसक्षुभ्यदुद्वेजप्रवण्डमाहृतसक्षुभितचित्तसन्तानान्
मिथ्यादृष्टिजालजालतान् ससारपञ्चपञ्जरितानप्रमाणदुखक्षौर्मनस्यसि-
दिग्धशल्यव्यथितान् लोकान् समग्रलाक्य भयवर्तितानि^१ सर्वाणि
प्रहाग्निनिर्मुक्तानि इत्यतः त्रिशुद्धाकाशवत् शान्तसर्वप्रपञ्चं शिव शान्तं सुखं
परमाथेसत्यनयमाश्रये^२ । करुणाप्रणिधानं पयसास्थितचित्तं तद्वत्समुद्भू-
तं न क्षमे । स्वपरसन्तानफलेशदृढगन्धमुमुक्षया अनित्यत्तिपरिभूते अति-
क्रान्तरज्जघननक्रयाले^३ अध्याशयसुखे विहरन् अपारससारमहाणये वस्तु-
प्रणिहित^४ तत्रा [F 16] प्रमाणदुखस्कन्धविपत्तिपरशयेदन्तोयनिर्मात यज्ञ-
सदृशममङ्गुरं धौयमारसे ।

सम्योऽधप्रतिवेधाय ईदृशो परीक्षा । लोकोत्तराविकल्पज्ञानसाक्षात्कारे^५
एव हि अतधिगतपूर्वान् सत्यसत्त्वानामिन्द्रियाधिमुक्तिधातुचर्याभेदान्
प्रजानाति । स्वपरसन्तानोत्पन्नसर्वसत्त्वाननिर्यासनाति दुखसमुदय-
मूलान् फलेशजालानि च भिनत्ति । पराथञ्च महापुरुषव्रतचर्यादृढसमा-
दानप्रणिधानञ्चोत्पादयति । एवं लोकोत्तराविकल्पज्ञानसाक्षात्काराय सर्व-

1 = *Chu yü so hing* Poussin takes the phrase to mean *dhāra-
caritas* and compares *Koba* 1 47 See also *Mad vṛtti* p 523, 8-10

2 *Is naya* "principle", law' etc = *Tathāgatagarbhaśāstra*, cf. *Bod.*
Pañjika p 315 15 This is *phalaśāstra* *prajñā* Ibid

3 *Yu* 'to pass over', 'get over' 'exceed' etc

4 *Lat* — *śāntam ākṣat karoti tada* etc

मिथ्यादृष्टि कामलध्वंस्यविपरीतशून्यतादर्शनाञ्जनोपधमयस्य⁵ सञ्चिन्त्य
प्रयुज्यात् । एवमविपरीतशून्यतादर्शनाञ्जनोपधप्रयोगाय सर्वालम्बन-
स्वभावापसारिणीं ध्रुतमयीं प्रजामाश्रयेत् ।

ततः⁷ केचित् त्रिपुलकनाथेनिर्धारिव्याख्याद्वारसमाधयेण धर्मता
प्रविश्य पुनः पुन विशिष्ट⁹ प्रयोगभावनामारभन्ते । विपुल्यतार्थनिर्धारि-
व्याख्यायां प्रत्युपग्रमहाधमकोसीचचित्ता भवन्ति । केचित् पुनः अप्रविष्ट-
धर्मता अपि तीक्ष्णेन्द्रियाः । तेषां [f 2^a] सुखेन शून्यतासाक्षात्कारेणाशु-
धर्मताप्रवेशाय इदं करतलरत्नशास्त्रं¹⁰ संक्षिप्तं विरच्यते ॥

तत्त्वतः संस्कृताः शून्या मायावत् प्रत्ययोद्भवात् ।

असंस्कृतास्त्यसद्भूता अनुत्पादाः खपुष्पत ॥

स्वपरपक्षयोस्तर्कविशेषयो र्यद्यपि बहव परिकल्पिता वादा भवन्ति ।
तथापि प्रमेया विषयाः सक्षिप्य द्विविधाः संस्कृता असंस्कृता इति ।
मूढाः परमाथसत्त्वनयेन संस्कृतासंस्कृतानामविपरीतस्वभावं सम्यग-
प्रजानन्तो धर्माणा स्वभावविशेषान् मृषा गृहीत्वा विविधमिथ्यादृष्टि-
जालानि संवर्धयन्ति । यथा लोके पामरध्वित्रकारः¹⁰ भवानर्कं यक्षपिशाच-
विष्यं स्त्रीपुण्यविष्यं वा रचयित्वा व्याकीर्णनेत्रः [सन्] वस्तुतः अस्तोति
संश्रुतमनस्को भवति । वस्तुत्वेन प्रहणात् स्वयं चकितो भवति ।
संख्येयं वा तेषु विषयेषु बहूनि गणनासीतानि त्रिपुलानि विवक्ष्य-

5 Or *kāca* = Eye disease

6 The first of three aspects of *prayāsa* effected by *āptopadeśa*, see
Sthiramati *Trimāikābhāṣya*, p 26 and Haribhadra *Abh. Āloka*,
p 392 3

7 Lat *anena-asmāt*

8. *ya ya* "Having entered"

9 Or *viśeṣaprayogabhāvanā* as Poussin suggested

10 Lat *catrācārya* *Abh. Āloka* p 392. *māyāśāstra* *Vigrahavyāk-*
artī 23 27 with *vṛtti* : the same simile, *māyāśāstra* Poussin com-
pares *Mahāvākyābhāṣya*, (*Eastern Bud* 1926, 56, 1927, 163).

दृष्टिजालानि उत्पादयति । यदा परमार्थसत्यनयेन संस्कृतासंस्कृतानाम-
विपरोतस्वभावं सम्पक् जानन्ति । [f. 2 b] तदा श्लोके पण्डितचित्रकार-
पत् तान् वस्तुस्यभागतोऽस्तोति न गृह्णन्ति । नापि यथोक्तः संस्कृता-
संकृतविषयः विभिन्नमिथ्यादृष्टिजालैः स्वशब्दनेन कौशेयक्रिमिवत्¹¹ दध्यन्ते ।
तदभावात् निर्गिरूपप्रज्ञाप्रवेशः¹² सिध्यति ।

इममर्थं त्रिरादित्तरं संस्कृतं प्रकाशयितुं लौकिकैः विषयेऽस्मिन्
विकल्पस्य बहुश उत्पापितत्वाद् इदं वचनमाह ।

तत्त्वतः संस्कृताः शून्या मायावत् प्रत्ययोद्भवात् । इति ।

तत्र लौकिकाः सर्वे भागमभ्युपगच्छन्ति । अहमपि संवृतिसदभ्युप-
गच्छामि । सावृतप्रत्यक्षेण प्रतीत्यसमुत्पादस्य चाभ्युपगमात् संवृति-
सत्यान्तर्गतं चक्षुरादि ससृष्टं गराजपालादयः सर्वे साधारणं जानन्ति
चक्षुरादि संस्कृतं द्रव्यसदिति । अत एव स्वपक्षाम्युपगमः प्रत्यक्षप्रमाण-
साधारणज्ञानं मा विरोधीदु इति तत्त्वावच्छिन्ना¹³ प्रतिज्ञा । तात्त्विकाथे-
स्वभावस्तत्त्वमुच्यते । तदेव परमार्थसत्यम् । परमाथतः संस्कृताः शून्या
न संवृतिर इति प्रतिज्ञा ॥

प्रत्ययसामग्रीसिद्धा मायाः कृतकत्वात्¹⁴ संस्कृता इत्याख्यायन्ते [तानि]
एव द्वादशायतनानि त्रिहाय [f 3 a] धर्मायतनैकदेशमानम् । आकाशः
प्रतिसंख्याऽप्रतिसंख्यानिरोधौ तथता चात्र पुनर्यद्विष्टताः । परसंमतो
मिथ्याप्रतिभासो मायादिसंस्कृतः, स शून्य इति चेत् प्रतिज्ञा, सिद्धसाधन-

11. Cf. Lakṣṇavāṇa, 163 (L V P)

12. Lat āśupraveśacaryā

13. So also by Haribhadra, Abh. Āloka, p 386

14. Or abhisamskṛtatrūṭi.

दोषः¹⁵ । यः¹⁶ परपरिकल्पितः संस्कृतः परमार्थतः¹⁷ सत्त्वमावः [स] पक्षः¹⁸ स्थाप्यते । तद्यथा चक्षुरायननमेकः संस्कृतः परमार्थतो यस्तु वा शून्यं चेति विचार्यते ।

शून्यः नि.खमावःमिथ्याप्रतिभास¹⁹ इति पर्यायाः । इयं प्रतिज्ञा ।

प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नाः स्त्रीपुरुषाजमृगा मायावस्त्वादयोऽप्रकृतितत्त्विकस्वभावा भावाभासाः ।

[प्रसिद्ध] साध्यसाधनधर्माणः²⁰ सर्वे संस्कृता साधर्म्यदृष्टान्ताः । अतो मायावदिति²¹ इत्युच्यते [दृष्टान्तः] । यथासंभवं²² साध्यसाधनधर्मसाम्यं²³

15 Lat *doṣāt*

16 Lat *yadā*

17. Or, *dravyaśāśna*.

18 Vig vyāvartini, 29, *vṛthi · yathā trayoktam bhāṣāh, tathā mama syāt* : *na mama kācid asti pratyaśā* । So also Dharmapāla comment on Śataśāstravaipulya, VIII, 6 : *bhavatā abhyupagatatvāt siddhyati mama pakṣaḥ*.

19 Or, *utatha*- or *abhūtapratibhāsa* Dharmapāla also takes *śūnya*, *nirastabhāva* and *natrātmya* as synonyms by using expression *natrātmīyāśūnya* frequently. Ibid, VIII

20 Here the author seems to hint at the definition of *drṣṭānta*, viz. *prasaḍihasādhyaśādhanaadharmatva* which agrees with one given by a later Naiyāyika Dīnākara : *anvaya-drṣṭāntaḥ sādhyasādhanaobhaya-tattvāniscaya v* Nīlāyakośa Cf Abh Āloka p 395 · *drṣṭāntaḥ ubhaya-dharmānugatāḥ* Bhāmaha, Kāvyaśālikāra, V, 26 · *Sādhyasādhana-dharmābhyām siddho drṣṭānta ucyate* । N Vārtika, 139 (Cal ed.) : *Siddho drṣṭānta ityanye* ।

21 Dharmapāla also uses *māyā* as example in this connection, (Śata vaipu comm ad2) A more logical explanation of *māyopama* is given by Haribhadra Abh Āloka, p 143

22 Lat *yathāyogam*

23 -*drṣṭānta* See Upāyabhrdaya Tucci, p 5 *drṣṭānto dvividhaḥ । sampūrṇo drṣṭāntoḥ āmāhadr* The author seems to mean the latter variety here, cp Bhāmaha, V, 24 . . . *sāmānyād upacaryate* । N. Vārtika, p 122 (Cal. ed.) . . . *tat tulyaḥ sa eva ityucyate* ।

प्रज्ञाप्यते । प्रतिसाम्यात्²⁴ न सर्वे सदृशद्वयान्तधर्मा दुःसंभवाः²⁵ संभवेयुः ।
तद्यथा यदन्ति चन्द्रवत् स्वोमुपं चारु इति । न सर्वे दुःसंभवाश्चन्द्रधर्मा
मुपे संभवेयुः । श्लोकव्यवसनुष्यत्य²⁶ एतत्सदृशद्वयान्तकथनस्य पथक्रमः ।
धनेन श्लोकार्थं संक्षिप्य²⁷ [कथन] मूलकमित्यतो न दोषः ॥

24. *Kia shuo tong ku*—Poussin remarks : Je ne vois pas le sens des quatre mots que je saute * *kia choue tong kou* * parce que nous parlons conventionnellement de similitude . ?? Now as I rendered them, there is no difficulty with regard to these characters.

25. *-nan ling na l sambhavyuḥ pu ko pu* The same repeated in the next sentence. Cf. Nāṭyaśāstra II, 9 with Tīkṣ, where *sapakṣa* is explained almost to this effect.

26. Here Poussin remarks thus : Ici une ligne et demie qui présente des difficultés. On peut traduire: *Ślokanubandhartham sādharmyaśrīṣṭanta ucyoṣṭe | etam kramena ślokaḥ dhena mūlasihānāsamkṣepaḥ | na doṣaḥ |* "Pour des raisons métriques, l'exemple pareil est dit [avant l'argument] C'est dans cet ordre [anormal] que, par la demi-strophe, l'essentiel est résumé, il n'y a donc pas faute"—La règle est de dire l'argument d'abord, l'exemple ensuite, mais la métrique exige un autre ordre.

According to the N Sūtra V, 2, 11 (*avayavaviparyāṣṭo vacanam aprāptakālam*) to formulate syllogism in an order other than the fixed one entails a *nigrahaṣṭhāna* called *aprāptakāla*. This is the reason why the author takes pains to justify it. Note Udyotakara's remarks here : *Śāstravākyaṇāḥ arthasāṅgrahārtham upādīyante |* etc which intend to insist on the necessity of the fixed order of syllogism. Our author appears to refer to some such remarks of an earlier author in the sentence : *anena . . . na doṣaḥ |*

27. Lit. *samkṣepamtilāspadam*.

[f. 1 b] प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नः साध्यधर्मो । इदं स्थापयितुं हेतुरुच्यते प्रत्ययोद्धराद्²⁸ इति । हेत्वादित्यर्थः सम्भूय जायमानत्वात् प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्न इति नाम्ना उच्यते । [यः] प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नः [स] प्रत्ययाभिप्यक्तः²⁹ ।

विपक्षे प्रतिषेधाय³⁰ बंधम्यद्वयान्तः स्थाप्यते । विपक्षाभावात् प्रति-

28 Nāgārjuna establishes *śūnyatā* on the argument of *asrabhātava*, Vig vyāvartini 1 21, 22 Haribhadra uses as reason *clāṇekasvabhāvarahitaton*, Abb Āloka, p 384 However on p 556 he adopts a similar *prayoga* as herein which may be worth notice here :

ये प्रतीत्यमुत्पन्न इति परमार्थतोऽविचारमणीयाः । तदथा मायाकारनिमिताः कर्मादयः । तथा चागो सर्वे रूपादयो भावा इति स्वभावहेतुः । यथादर्शनं प्रतीत्योद्देशदर्शनाज्ञासिद्धो हेतुः । सपक्षे भावान्न विरुद्धः । पूर्वप्रसन्धेन (p. 385) विपक्षे बाधकप्रमाणदर्शनात् धर्मेकान्तिकथं न भवति ।

29. The author has made some distinction between *abhiṣyakti* and *utpatti* of *kārya* on f 13b below. But here we find *utpatti* and *abhiṣyakti* as synonyms I doubt concetness of the Chinese text here

30 Lit *vipakṣapratishedhaya* cf Pramāṇavārtika vṛtti, III, 18 - *vasadharmyavacanena vipakṣe hetvabhāvaḥ kathyate* ! Poussin has made these remarks : Le sens de l'expression *tcho yī p'in*, *vipakṣapratishedha* (?) [Dans Tucci's Index, Pre Diānāga, *pratishedha* est traduit en Tibétain par l'équivalent de *asattva*] est déterminé par notre texte, 269 3,3 Même expression 274,2 18 qui n'est pas clair.

According to Dharmottara *pratishedha* is an equivalent of *abhāta*, his comment on Nyāyabindu, II, 19 But *vipakṣapratishedha* on f. 6a (Chin) below must be taken into *vipakṣe hetupratishedha*, not *pratishedha* of *vipakṣa* itself

पेधार्थः सिद्ध इति नोच्यते³¹ । विवादकाले³² प्रजप्त्या त्रिपक्षमुक्त्वा अनुमान-
व्यवस्थापनेऽपि नास्ति दोषः ।

कथमत्रानुमानं व्यवस्थाप्यते । उच्यते । चक्षुरायतनं तत्त्वतः स्वभाव-
शून्यम् । प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नात् । प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नाः सर्वेऽपि तत्त्वतः स्वभाव-
शून्या इति गद्याजपालाङ्गनाजनानामपि³³ ज्ञातम् ।

यथा फञ्चिद्विष्टिमन्त्रोपधिपलाधिष्टितैः³⁴ तृणवृक्षमृत्पिण्डादि-
पदार्थैः प्रत्ययद्देश्यानि स्त्रीपुरुषद्वैत्यध्वराजकुलारामजनजलाह्न्यादि-
लक्षणानि मूढजनमोहनानि नानामायावस्तूनि सृजति । यदि तेषां स्वभावः
कश्चिन् धस्तुस्तत्र, न त्रिपर्ययः स्यात् । अतो भगवानाह । सर्वे धर्माः
अचक्षुर्दृश्यस्वभावाः प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नाः निस्स्वभावाः । यः पण्डितः³⁵
प्रतीत्यसमुत्पादं पश्यति स धर्मतां पश्यति । यः पश्यति धर्मतां [f 4a]
स पश्यति शून्यताम् । यः पश्यति शून्यताम् स पश्यति बुद्धम्³⁶ ।
अथाघोचत ।

31. *Dīnāṅga Nyāyasmukha ad 5 - yadā antīya ita pakṣah l
akāśādyaśatīva vādinam prati nāsti vipakṣah l yadā nāsti sah l tatra
na vartate ita sūtarām asandigdha ityadoṣah (Sanskrit is mine) Tucci,
Eng trans p 27 Pra vārtika III 25 Tadabdhāre ca tanneti vacanādapi
ladgatah l Vṛtti aratīnā tu vasiṣatīā nirudhyate nityatā tu yuktā l
atah sa dharmīnam antarenāpi rūpāmātrātōpi gamyata eva l Ślokaṅkār,
Nirālam 27 Vipakṣābhāsatānātva vyatireko na kathyate l Haribhadra,
Abh Āloka p 385 makes clear how the reason is not sandigdha vyatī-
reka in the absence of vipakṣa Vyaktiviveka Kāśī ed p 395*

32. Nāgārjuna distinguishes *viprahakṣā* and *vipākhyānakṣā*, *Madh.*
IV, 89

33. *M Vṛtti pp 260 14, 418 12 Madhyamakavatāra, my Skt
text p 22 Abh Āloka p 387*

34. Read in Chinese *pe* (R 145) for *pe* (R 60) as in p 11b, l 2

35. —*Jhānta*

36. Śāhatambasūtra my Sans text, p 2 cited also in Vig
vyāvartant, 22, ad 55, *M vṛtti*, p 160

यः प्रत्ययैर्जायति स ह्यजातो न तस्य उत्पादुः स्वमाद्यतोऽस्ति ।

यः प्रत्ययाधोनु स शून्य उक्तो यः शून्यर्ता पश्यति सोऽप्रमत्तः⁹⁷ ॥ इति

अत्र सर्वे अशून्यार्थिनो दूषणमाहुः । सर्वे संस्कृताः शून्या इति यदि साध्यते तदा रूपादिर्न स्यात् । शशष्टङ्गालम्बनप्रत्यक्षज्ञानोत्पत्तेर्न्यायतो-
ऽसिद्धिः रूपाद्यालम्बनाकारप्रत्यक्षमुद्धिरपि⁹⁸ नोत्पद्येत । स तु वस्तुसन्
इति प्रत्येकमनुभूयते । तस्मात् तत्र पक्षः धर्मतात्रिलोमकः⁹⁹ प्रत्यक्षप्रमाण-
वाद्यदुष्टः साधारणप्रतीतिवाद्यदुष्टश्च¹⁰⁰ । सर्वगयाजपालादिभिः सर्वमायमानं
चक्षुरादिरूपं नास्त्योत्पत्तिरुच्यते ।

पण्डिते. पक्षपातत्रय¹¹ मुत्तुञ्जय तदस्यप्रतिभिः सञ्चिन्तनीयम्-मम
प्रतिज्ञा किं स्वसन्तानोत्पन्नप्रत्यक्षप्रमाणवाधिका किं वा परसन्तानोत्पन्न-
प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणवाधिका । [f 4b] यदि स्वसन्तानोत्पन्न प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणवाधिका ।
प्रत्यक्षमुद्भवः परमाद्यतः स्वमाद्यशून्याः, प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नत्वात् अवस्तुप्रत्यक्ष-
स्वप्नप्रत्यक्षमुद्भवत् । अतो मम प्रतिज्ञा न स्वसन्तानोत्पन्नप्रत्यक्षवाधिका ।

37 This semi prakrit verse from the Anavataptahṛdaya (Nanj'o No 437) is cited by Candrakīrti in his M. Vṛtti pp 299, 491, 500 504 (*svabhāvanūtpattim sandhāya sarvadharmāḥ śūnyāḥ*) in the M. Avatāra p 229 in Catuṣṣataka (Vidyasekhara) p 294 Bodhi-caryāvatāra IX, 2 and Su'bhāṣita saṅgraha, fol 28 (Le Muséon) (L. V P). Some similar verse from a Śāstra is also cited by Maitreya in his comment on Bhava Sankrānti, p 37 with notes Poussin further points out that in the above ver second pāda reads according to Tib *utpāda-svabhāvatā stis* meaning that which is not originated by causes is *utpattinīsvabhāva*

38 *Ssu* = *abhāsa*, also *ākāra*, the latter term is more suitable here

39 Bod pañjikā, p 431 *dharmataḥ ca na viśamayaḥ tad Buddha-vacanam*

40 Haribhadra also raises some similar three fold *bādha* to this proposition - (1) *Pratyakṣabādha*, (2) *Anumānabādha*, (3) *Pratibhābādha*, Abh Aloka p 397.

41 *Lit pakṣagrahana*

यद्युच्यते परसन्तानोत्पन्नप्रत्यक्षवाधिकेति । अविशुद्धवक्षुष्कस्य⁴² त [स]
द्वदुप्रतिभासः—[यथा] तैमिरिकस्य दृष्टोऽसत्केशोण्डुकचन्द्र [द्वयः] दिग्दिग्वा-
प्रतिभासः प्रत्यक्षं बाधते इति न्यायतो युज्यते । अतो न मम प्रतिज्ञा पर-
सन्तानोत्पन्नप्रत्यक्षवाधिकापि ।

यदि सामान्यत उच्यते यथा मूढजनाविसर्पव्यवहारोत्पन्नं प्रत्यक्षमिति ।
इदं सांवृतं न बाधते इति न बाधप्रसङ्गः⁴³ । साधारणप्रतीतिबाधदुष्ट
इति वचनमपि न युक्तम् ।

यद्युच्यते स्वशास्त्रसाधारणज्ञानविरोध इति । [तदपि] न न्याय्यम् ।
स्वशास्त्रसंमतत्वात्, स्वशास्त्रविरोधे स्वप्रतिज्ञाविरोधेऽपि नैव साधारण-
प्रतीतिविरोधदोषः ।

परशास्त्रसाधारणज्ञानविरोध इत्युच्यते चेत् [5a] न युक्तम् । सर्व-
शास्त्रार्था परसाधारणज्ञाननिराकरणार्थत्वात् ।

गवाजपालादिसाधारणप्रतीतिविरोध इति चेत् तदपि न न्याय्यम् ।
जिनौरसाः साधयन्ति क्षणिकाः⁴⁴ सर्वसंस्काराः अनात्मका निस्तत्वाश्च
सर्वधर्माः इति । घृशेषिकाः⁴⁵—द्रव्यभिन्नो रूपादिः भावमेदो द्रव्यादिरिति ॥
साङ्ख्याः—युद्धिरचेतना, निरुद्धमसृष्टञ्च सर्वं द्रव्यसदिति । पयमादिप्रकारेण
सयिस्तरं स्वपक्षप्रतिपादनं सयुक्तिकमपि साधारणज्ञानबाधकं नाम

42 It appears that Poussin's text differs from ours, since he has translated *estimira* for *avindha*.

43 The same reply in Abh. Āloka, p. 338. Note on p. 86 the verse :

निर्मासते हि यत् नैव तत्प्रतिविष्यते । विद्यमानस्य नो युक्तं कस्य विप्रतिषेधनम् ॥
इति न्यायात् ।

44. Lit. *āṇamavuddha*.

45. Poussin translates : rūpas etc sont des espèces de dravya. Les dravyas, etc. sont des espèces des bhāva. They say that rūpa is a separate category. So I put it accordingly.

वक्तव्यम् । तथा तु नाभ्युपगम्यते । नह्यत्र परमार्थसत्यत धर्माणां परोक्षा
आगोपालादिसाधारणानुयन्धिना⁴⁶ । प्रतिज्ञायाञ्च परमार्थसत्यावच्छेदस्य
साधितत्वाच्च यथोक्तविरोधदोषप्रसङ्गः । ततश्च नास्ति स्वप्रतिज्ञा-
विरोधदोषः⁴⁷ ॥

अन्यः पुनराह । परमार्थतत्त्वचक्षुरायतनं शून्यमिति स्वभावशून्यतावादिनो
धर्मो न सिध्यतीति पक्षदोषः । आश्रयो न सिध्यतीति हेतुदोषश्चेति ।
एतन्न युज्यते । आगोपालादि [5b] [जन] साधारणप्रतीतिप्रसिद्ध-
चक्षुरादिसामान्यस्य पक्षत्वात् तद्धर्मस्य हेतुत्वेनोक्तत्वात् धर्म्यसिद्धिपक्ष-
दोषाभासोऽयम् । आश्रयासिद्धिहेतुदोषाभासश्च ॥

असन्नेयायिका इदं रूपेण कुर्वन्ति । यदि चक्षुरादि परमार्थतः
शून्यम्, प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नत्वाद् इति । चक्षुरादीनां शून्यत्वे कथं प्रतीत्यसमु-
त्पन्नत्वम् । प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नत्वे कथं शून्यत्वम् । एव प्रतिज्ञाहेत्यो-
र्विरोधात् पुनः प्रतिज्ञाविरोधदोषः⁴⁸ सिद्धः ।

एतत्प्रतिज्ञादोषव्युत्थाने⁴⁹ प्रयोगः हेतोः साधर्म्यदृष्टान्ताभावम् असिद्धि-

46 Op Candrakīrti's remarks *Tattvacavicāra-kāle tu lokasya
apramāṇatvāt na tena bādhaḥ lakṣyate kartum* । M vṛtti p 153 13

47 Ibid p 27 7ff where this argument has been criticised
by Candrakīrti

48 See N Sūtra V 2 4 N Vārtika ad 1 2 6 Kumārila raises
this objection against Vijñānavādin Śloka Nirālam 154 5 with
comment p 254

49 This is an obvious reference to Dinnāga who holds the same
view Nyāyamukha ad 1 Tucci p 8 All three commentators on
Śloka attribute this *prayoga* to Sāṅkhyas and its criticism to
Buddhists to Dinnāga See Nirālam 154 5 It is sometimes attributed
to Śābdikas Tucci Nyāyamukha n 12 A long discussion on this
prayoga see Pram Vārtika IV 173 188 with vṛtti pp 475 491

दोषं वा व्यापयति । यथा शब्दः नित्यः सर्वानित्यत्वाद् इति ।⁵⁰ अयं प्रयोगः
 "असर्वत्वादिति हेतुं व्यापयन् (न) प्रत्यापयति⁵⁰ हेतोरसिद्धिदोषम् । शब्दस्य
 सर्वस्मिन् संप्रदात्⁵¹ । समद्वयान्तोऽपि [वा] नास्ति फलमन् नित्यम-
 सर्वश्चेति । इति ।

नेतद्युज्यते । प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नत्वादिति हेतोः मायावदिति द्वयान्तस्य च
 सर्वसाधारणं ज्ञातत्वात् हेतुद्वयान्तौ सिद्धौ । तस्मात् भवतां दूषणं न विदुषां
 मनस्तर्पयेत् ॥

[6a] स्वभावादिनः पुनर्दूषणमाहुः । भवता प्रत्येतव्यं [यत्] चक्षु-
 रिन्द्रियं सस्वभावं सकारित्वात् । निःस्वभावा न सकारिणः यथा
 यन्ध्यापुत्रः । चक्षुश्च सकारिणं यच्चक्षुर्विज्ञानजनकम् । यथोक्तसकारित्व-
 हेतुना चक्षुस्सस्वभावं निश्चीयत इति । यदीदं साधयति तं यः विना शिक्षां
 सिद्धः गवाजपलादिमतिज्ञातः स्वमात्रः, संवृत्तितः साधयति चक्षुरादिसंस्तुतं
 सस्वभावमिति । तदा सिद्धसाधनम् । यदि परमार्थतः, नास्ति साधर्म्य-
 द्वयान्तः । फलं विपक्षप्रतिषेधेन इष्टार्थसिद्धिर्न युज्यते । यथा नित्य-
 शब्दवादिनो वदन्ति—शब्दो नित्यः ध्रावणत्वात् । घटादिरनित्यः अध्रावणः,
 शब्दस्तु ध्रावणत्वात् नित्यस्वभाव इति । तथापि लोकसाधारण्येन ज्ञाते
 समद्वयान्ते सन् कृतकत्वादिति विरुद्धहेतुः साधयति चक्षुरादि सर्वं लोक-
 व्यवहारसंगृहीतस्वभावमिति ॥

50 *ming iao* Roussin says that the phrase is normally *pañu v. Kośa*,
 XXII, 362, XX, 10a 2, *Buddhi*, IV, 17b 7, 20b 6. But I have put it
pratyāyaya, or *prakāśaya*, which is also met with a Chin texts. Our
 Chinese text adds here a negative particle *pu*, before *ming iao*
 which is unnecessary and incorrect. It appears Poussin's text does
 not have it.

51 *Dīnāga* adds : *sādhyaśakadehivāt asiddhīr nāma hetudoṣaḥ* ।

अन्ये⁵² पुनर्दूषणमाहु । ससृजता शून्या इति हेतुं वा दृष्टान्तं वा [सर्वं]
अन्तर्मात्रयति तुल्यजातायत्वात् [6b] इत्यनुमानन्यूनतादोष⁵³ इति । श्लोकेऽ-
स्मिन् प्रमाणफले⁵⁴ सामान्यत उक्ते । परीक्षायां⁵⁵ प्रमाणे साध्यमाने च चक्षु-
रादि एकैक पक्ष पृथक् स्थाप्यते । अतो नाय दोष । सर्वससृजतस्य पक्षन्येन
सामान्यत स्थापनेऽपि नाय दोष । प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नत्वादिति हेतुष्वपक्ष-
सम्मत इति नासिद्ध । यद्युच्यते चक्षु शून्यं स्वभावशून्यत्वादिति * [तदा]

52 Poussin has noted that the following objections have been put by Buddha himself Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra 166 167 Le Bodhisattva ne doit pas établir la proposition (*pratyākṣā*) Tous les dharmas sont non produits vides sans nature propre (*anutpanna s'nya asrabhāva*) Il y aurait *pratyākṣāhāns* car le proposition fait partie de tous les dharmas car la proposition a pour raison d'être les dharmas Le Bodhisattva doit enseigner que les dharmas existent à la manière des magies et des rêves (*māyāsvapnavat bhāvopadeśa*) Cp Bod avatāra IX 139 141 Grousset *Philosophies Indiennes* 263 273 298 Garbe *Sāṅhya-philosophie* 203 (ad 1 44 47 refutation des Mādhyamikas) etc

53 *nyūnatā* a nigrahasthāna N Sūtra V 2 12

54 = *yathādarśanam*

55 An answer to the above objection seems to be this Though the distinction between the source of knowledge and its result is not possible for the advocate of *Sartasūnyatā* yet it may be possible if we take things in general as current in common parlance Such distinction can be made when we are engaged in a logical discussion and in ascertaining the source of knowledge The author has stated more than once that things should be taken into account in their general sense as current in the world when one is to formulate syllogism see p 42 l above *ad* and 11b 12b below We may read profitably here Kumārila's line *sāmānyasya ca hetutvam na syāt pakṣaskadeśāt* l (Śloka Nirālamb 27) with Kāśikā

55a As stated in Vig vyāvartini , see note 28 above

अस्य यथोक्तहेतोरसिद्धिः स्यात् । नापि दृष्टान्तो नास्तीति । मायादे-
[दृष्टान्तस्य] सत्त्वात् । यदि यथोक्तं दृष्टान्ते साधयितुं मायादिः पक्षः
स्वीक्रियते । तदा सिद्धसाधनदोषगौरवं स्यात् ॥

केचिद्व्यभा इदं दूषणमाहुः । सर्वं संस्कृतं स्वभावशून्यमिति यदि
स्थाप्यते । हेतोः संस्कृतत्वात् तत्स्वभावोऽपि शून्यः । तदा हेतुरसिद्धि-
दोषवानिति । अयमसिद्ध्याभासः न तात्त्विकासिद्धिः । यथा जिनपुत्राः
साधयन्ति सर्वसंस्कारा निरात्मकाः सहेतुकत्वादिति⁵⁶ । अयं हेतुः संस्कारे-
ष्वन्तर्भूतः निरात्मकत्वाच्च असिद्धिदोषवान् इति दूषणमस्त्येव ।

साध्याः पुनः स्थापयन्ति व्यक्ताः सत्त्वरजस्तमस्त्वभावाः चेतनमिन्नत्वाद्^{56a}
इति । अयं हेतुर्व्यक्तेष्वन्तर्भूतः [7a] सत्त्वादिस्वभावस्त्वाच्च असिद्धि-
दोषवानिति अस्त्येव दूषणम् ।

घंशेषिका अपि स्थापयन्ति शब्दः अचित्यः शतकत्वाद्वात [अग्राप]
अयं हेतुः शब्दप्रयोगात्मकः अनित्यत्वाच्चासिद्धिदोषवानिति दूषणमस्ति ।
पद्यमादिप्रकारेण प्रतिवादिनः महतापि यत्नेन वादिनि दोषं स्थापयितुं
यतन्ते । यथोक्तन्यायो नात्यन्तं परवादं भङ्गं कृ शक्नोति । अस्ति चेदयं न्यायः,
कुत्र फः स्थापयेदनुमानं स्यामीष्टमुक्तयुक्तिभञ्जकम् ॥

पुन केचिद्दूषणमाहुः । प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नत्वादित्ययं हेतुर्न साध्यार्थं साध-
यितुं शक्नोति । स्वभावशून्यत्वात् । ग्रन्थ्यापुत्रोच्चरितशब्दवदात् ।
अयं हेतुः⁵⁷ स्वतोऽसिद्धिदोषवान् । यद्युच्यते परपक्षाभ्युपगतो हेतुर्मवतीति ।
तदपि न युज्यते । परपक्षत उक्तस्य स्वभावशून्यत्वादित्यस्य⁵⁸ कोऽर्थः ।

56. *Nāstīha satva ātma vā dharmāstveva sahetukāḥ* | cited in
Vimśika bhāṣya, p 5, M. vṛtti, p 355, 4

56a. The same prayoga is mentioned in Pram. vār. vṛtti ad III,
186, p 353.

57. = svapakṣataḥ.

58. Lat. *anvārtārtah*

यद्यविद्यमानार्थक इति हेत्वर्थः [तदा] नास्ति हेतोरसिद्धिः । [हेतोरेव]
अविद्यमानत्वात् । यदि मिथ्याप्रतिभासमानार्थक इति हेत्वर्थः । तदा
वन्ध्यापुत्रोच्चरितशब्दस्यात्यन्तमसत्त्वाद् अयं दृष्टान्तः [7 b] साधनधर्म
विकलः । निर्मितशब्देनानैकान्तिकदोषश्च । स हि अप्रमाणानां सत्त्वानां
शिक्षकः हितकरत्वात् । किञ्च न परपक्षमात्रसम्मतो^{58a} हेतुः परपक्षासंमत-
हेतुवत् साध्यं साधयति अन्यतरासिद्धत्वात् । विरुद्धानुमानवाधितत्वाद्
अतिप्रसङ्गदोषानुगतत्वाच्च⁵⁹ ।

यथा साध्यते⁶⁰ प्रज्ञादयो न चित्तसंप्रयुक्ताः संस्कारस्कन्धान्तर्भावात्
नामकायादिवत् । आकाशदयोऽनित्या गुणाध्वयत्वात् पृथिव्यादिवत् ।
आत्मा अचेतन अप्रकाशवृत्तित्वात् प्रधानवद् इति । सर्पपक्षघिनाश्रयं
प्रकारो दोषानुपाती । अत उभयपक्षसम्मतो⁶¹ हेतुरास्थेय इति स्थितम् ।
अनेन न्यायेन यथोक्तो दोषो न प्रसज्यते ॥

अन्यः पुनरसन्नैयाधिकः पक्षदोषमाविष्कुर्वन्नाह । यदि स्वभावशून्यं
साध्यं, साधनं न सिध्यति वन्ध्यापुत्रोच्चरितशब्दवत् । साधनं [8 a]
संस्तृतेऽन्तर्भूतमिति तत्साध्यसमं स्वभावशून्यम् । सर्वशून्यत्वात् साध्यं
साधनं सर्वं न सिद्धम् इति । [यदेव] साध्यसाधनधर्मनिराकरणं तदेव
धर्मिस्वलक्षणनिराकरणमिति पक्षदोष आविष्टः । तस्य⁶² हेतोः स्वपरयो-
रसिद्धत्वात्, अनेकान्तिकत्वात्, दृष्टान्तदोषात् समनन्तरपूर्वोक्तयश्च न

58a Cf *Pramāṇa vārtika*, IV, 1-2 with *vṛtti*

59. Int *Mahadōṣa*

60. This *prayoga* seems to have been made by *Sautrāntikas*

61. Theory of *Dinnāga*, *Nyāyamukha ad 2*, *Pramāṇav vṛtti*
p 293, n 5, M *vṛtti* p 35 n 2

62 This refers to *svabhāvaśūnyatva* mentioned in the previous
section.

युज्यते [इदं दूषणम्] । इदं [दूषणम्] परमान्तरमपि न स्वपक्षदोषं निगूहते ॥

अन्य. पुनः प्रयोगान्तरमभ्युपगम्य स्वपक्षदोषं निगूहमान एवमाह । परमार्थतः संस्कृताः शून्या इत्युक्तप्रतिपादनस्य कोऽर्थः⁶³ । यदि परमार्थतः सर्वेऽपि संस्कृताः अभावद्रव्याणि⁶⁴ इति प्रतियोग्यः । इदं वचनमपि पुनः संस्कृतेऽन्तर्भावात् संस्कृतसममभावद्रव्यं स्यात् । इदं वचनं स्वसाध्यार्थं मनस्वीति स्ववचनविरोधो नाम पक्षदोषः । यथा सर्वमुक्तं मृषा⁶⁵ इति साधनम् । यदि तत्त्वतः सर्वे संस्कृता अत्यन्ताभावरूपा⁶⁶ [8b] इति प्रतिज्ञार्थः । तदा सर्वमविद्यमानमित्यपवादः । एवं च साध्यं मिथ्याद्वष्ट-
पतनम् । इति ।

अत्र यथोक्तम् ।

आत्मा हि आत्मनो नायः को नु नाथः परो भवेत् ।

आत्मना हि सुदान्तेन स्वयं प्राप्नोति पण्डितः⁶⁷ ॥ इति ।

तत् व्यवहारतश्चित्तमात्मा⁶⁷ इत्युच्यते । परमार्थतस्तु नैरात्म्यं साध्यते

63 *Lat artho na jñātaḥ*

64 *Or asad bhūtāḥ* Some similar objection by Udyotakara, N. vārtika, p 481

64a *Of Nyāyamukha ad ver I.*

65 *Or atyantāvidyamāna pu-wu so-yu*

66 Quoted in *Bod Pañjikā* p 483 (*Ġāthayām uktam*) Poussin compares *Dhammapada*, 160, *Udānavagga* XXIII, Kośa, I 74. See M. vṛtti, 354, along with one more verse to the same effect, is proving the existence of an empirical soul even for Buddhists

67 *Op Bod Pañjikā* p 484 *cittam evāhankārāśratayā asyāś-
monadeśena uktam*

इति न स्वयचनविरोध प्रतिज्ञादोषः । इदमप्येवम् । सांनृतस्वभावत अक्ष-
रादिकमस्तीत्युच्यते । परमार्थतस्तु तच्छून्यं साध्यते । अतो नास्ति दोषः ।

किञ्च यथोक्तम् । सर्वे उत्पत्तिधर्माणो मरणप्रतिशरणा इति ।
मुनिनोक्तं न मृषा । आभ्यन्तरं बाह्य औत्पन्नं मरणप्रतिशरणं युज्यते,
अव्यभिचारित्वात्⁶⁸ । सा साध्यप्रतिज्ञा स्वप्रत्यायिकापि मरणप्रतिशरणा
इत्यभ्युपगमान् नास्ति स्वयचनविरोधः प्रतिज्ञादोषः । एवमिदमपि ।
परमार्थतः संस्कृताः शून्याः प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नत्वादिति प्रतिज्ञायचनं प्रतीत्य-
समुत्पन्नं सन् स्वभावशून्यं⁶⁹ युज्यते अव्यभिचारित्वात् । इदं प्रतिज्ञायचनं
स्वप्रत्यायकमपि स्वभावशून्यमित्यभ्युपगमात् न स्वयं [9 a] प्रतिज्ञा-
भङ्गदोषः ॥

यथा ब्राह्मण आह । सर्वं भगवन् मे न क्षमते⁷⁰ इति । भगवानाह ।
इदं वस्तु ब्राह्मण ते क्षमते न वा । अत्र ब्राह्मण आह इदं [चेत] वस्तु क्षमते
[तदपि] सर्वं मे न क्षमते इति । तद्वचनं⁷¹ स्वप्रतिज्ञातवस्तुविरोधीति
स्योक्तगाधदोषो भवेत् । न तु सवशायं दोषोऽस्ति ।

अन्यत्र चाह भगवान् । अनात्मकाः⁷² सर्वसंस्कारा इति । पुनरन्यत्राह ।
अनित्याः सर्वसंस्कारा उत्पादव्ययधर्मिण^{72a} इति । तथा नो चेन् बुद्धोऽपि
संस्कारान् “अनात्मका” “अनित्या” इति वदन् यथोक्तदोषवान् स्यात् ।
न तु स दोषोऽस्ति । यथा संस्काराणामात्मत्वानित्यत्वप्रतिषेधकं प्रति-
ज्ञायचनं⁷³ तद्वदेवानात्मकमनित्यम् इष्टत्वात् । एवमिदं संस्कृताः शून्या

68 pu hsiang la Poussin has suggested *avyāvṛtta* for this.

69 See Vig vyāvartan, ad 22 for similar answer

70 M Nikāya, Vol I Dighanikāya Sutta p 497. II 8 10.

71 Or abhyupagata = so hst

72 Anātmānaḥ sarvadharmaḥ styāgamāt M vṛtti p 65, 9, M.
Sūtrālaṅkāra XVIII. 101

72a Cited in M vṛtti, p. 39 11

73 tung pi = tatsama

इत्यभिधायकं प्रतिज्ञावचनमपि स्वभावशून्यमिष्टम् । तत्तु स्वाभ्युपगतार्थ-
मनुकूलयेत्⁷⁴ । तस्मात् भवदुक्तः “इदं वचनं स्वसाध्यार्थं भिनत्ति” इत्ययं
हेतुरसिद्धः ॥

किञ्च यथा सादृश्याः म्यापयन्ति व्यक्ताः सत्त्वादिस्वभावा इति ।
व्यक्तं सत्त्वादिस्वभावञ्चेत्, प्रतिज्ञावचनेना [9 b] पि तत्सत्त्वादिस्वभावेन
भवितव्यम् । साध्यप्रतिज्ञावचनं न तत्स्वभावञ्चेत्, व्यक्तमपि तत्स्वभावं
न स्यात् । इति दूषणे सत्यपि प्रतिज्ञा नैवं दुष्टा । यथा संस्कृता अनित्या
अनात्मका इति साधनं न तयोक्तप्रतिज्ञादोषयत् । एवमिदमपि नोक्तदोषयत् ।
इत्याशयस्य इष्टत्वात् ।

किञ्च स यादी साध्यमप्रसाध्य पुनर्दूषणमाह । यदि परमार्थतः संस्कृता
अवस्तूनि, उक्तं संस्कृतावस्तुत्ववचनमपि अवस्तु स्यात् । इति । इदं
दूषणं न स्वपक्षदोषमपाकरोति । किन्तु मिथ्या षडसि परपक्षः तथादुष्ट⁷⁵
इति । यथा लोके कश्चिन्मुग्धस्तेन आवृतसूक्ष्मेक्षिक आत्मशोधनासमर्थः
परस्मिन् दोषमारोपयितुं युक्तिं स्थापयति त्वमपि स्तेन इति वदति । नायं
परीक्षोद्धितो ग्रन्थः ॥

अपि चोक्तं तेन । यदि तत्त्वतः सर्वे संस्कृता अत्यन्ताभावरूपा इति
प्रतिज्ञार्थः । तदा सर्वमविद्यमानमित्यपवादः । एवञ्च साध्यं मिथ्यादृष्टि-
पतनमिति⁷⁶ । तत्र प्रतिज्ञार्थः यथा पूर्वं विस्तरश उक्तः शून्यश्च निस्स्वभावः-
मिथ्याप्रतिभास इति पर्यायाः⁷⁷ इति । न सवधा [10a] पि नास्त्योपयोगते ।
तस्माद् भवतेवं दूषणं कार्यम् ॥

अन्ये पुनः केचिदाचार्याः ग्राह्यमन्याः इदं दूषणमाहुः । यदि परमार्थतः

74. Vig. vyāvartanī. p. 11. ad 22

75. This is a kind of *nigrahasthāna* called *matānigraha*, N. Sutra, V, 2, 20, with Bhāṣya. N. Kōśa

76. See p. 48 above, the second alternative under *pratyākārtha*.

77. See p. 36 above.

संस्कृताः मायादिवत् शून्याः निस्स्वभावाः, तदा न सन्ति । असत्त्व-
स्वीकारात् सुतरामभावाद्दृष्टिर्भवति । इति । ते स्वपक्षदोषप्रच्छादनेच्छया
अपवादं नाटयन्ति उभयोर्दुष्टत्वेऽपि मा शून्यवादिनः साध्यं प्रमाणेन सिध्यतु
इति । परमार्थसत्यापवादस्य अतिदुष्टत्वात् । इदं नास्तीति घवनं
प्रसक्तार्थप्रतिषेधकम्⁷⁸ । तद्वचनं विधिप्रधानं गृह्णासि । अहन्तु यदामि
प्रतिषेधप्रधानमिदं घवनम् । अस्य नास्तीति घवनस्य केवलसत्ताप्रतिषेधेन
शक्तिरवसिता, नार्थान्तरप्रकाशनव्यापारः । यथा लोक आह । नास्ति
शुक्लः पट इति । न ग्राह्यमिदं घवनं कृष्णं पटं प्रकाशयतीति । [येन] वक्तुः
प्रतिज्ञादोषं कुर्यात्⁷⁹ । नास्ति शुक्लः पटः इति घवनस्य शुक्लपटप्रतिषेधे-
नैव शक्तिरवसिता, नास्ति व्यापारान्तरं कृष्णपटं रक्तपटं नीलपटं वा
प्रकाशयितुम् ॥

शास्त्रेऽस्मिन् परमाद्येतः संस्कृतधातौ शाब्दतद्द्वयन्तपरिहाराय [10^b]
भावस्वभावः प्रतिपिध्यते । एवमन्यत्र उच्छेदद्वयन्तपरिहाराय⁸⁰ अभाव-
स्वभावस्य प्रतिषेधः । अन्तद्वयपरिहाराय च भावाभावस्वभावौ युगपत्प्रति-
पिध्यन्ते । अवशिष्टमिथ्याग्रहदोषपरिहाराय यावत् सर्वचित्तगोचराः प्रति-
पिध्यन्ते । यदा गोचरा निरुद्धाः, चित्तं समनुनिरुध्यते ।

अन्यत्राह [भगवान्] आनन्दम् । यदा भावस्वभावग्रहः तदा
शाब्दतान्तपातः । यदा अभावस्वभावग्रहः तदा उच्छेदान्तपातः । एव-
मन्यत्राह काश्यपम् । अस्तीति [काश्यप] अयमेकोऽन्तः, नास्तीति

78 Or *abhiṣāpita* = *prasaṅgyapratishedha* The same is repeated in the Chap. II, f. 7b, l 10. Cf. M. vṛtti, p 393, 10-13 ;

na caṣam asyāsattvam pratipādayāmaḥ ।

kim tarhi, paraparikalpitaṁ sattvam asya nirakurmayi eto.

79. Or *raktari* *pratiśādoṣakaram*...*racanam*. ।

80. Cf. M. vṛtti, p 427, 10 : *Tataśca bhāvaḥśyupagame sati sa-
ra kṣatocchedaprasaṅgo durnivāro bhavaśam*...

[फाश्यप] अयं⁸¹ द्वितीयोऽन्तः । एवमाद्यागमात् उक्तवद्व्याप्याद्य मम प्रतिज्ञा यथादूषितमभाषद्विदोषान्व्य [मपि] न स्पृशति ॥

केचित् [अन्ये] स्वपक्षे न्यायदूषणसमुदायमविभाव्य⁸² निपुणमाच्छादयन्तः पुनरेतच्छब्दन्ति । स्वमात्रशून्यतायादां नित्यमविकल्पज्ञानं⁸³ प्रार्थयमानोऽपि सदा विकल्पयति सवं संसृता असंसृताः स्वभावशून्या इति । एवं परिकल्पितमिध्याधिक्यस्यापनेन स्येष्टप्रतिज्ञा दन्तीति । ईदृशस्यापि [दूषणस्य] प्रतिषेधाग्रायं दोषः ॥

[11^a] अन्ये पुनराहुः उक्तः शून्यहेतुः यदि वा संवृत्तः अथवा परमार्थतः स्यतः परतश्च हेतुरसिद्धः⁸⁴ । इति । उभयपक्षसाधारणान्युपगतः उत्सृष्टविशेषणसामान्यलक्षणधर्ममुनेन⁸⁵ हेतुरिति नेवापिबैरन्युपगतत्वात् भयता साधितं दूषणमसिद्धिदोषामासः⁸⁶ न तात्त्विकामिद्धिः । यथा वैशेषिकाः साधयन्ति शब्दोऽनित्यः एतन्न्यादिति । शब्दनित्यत्वपादी तं दुष्टं यदन् हेत्यर्थं विकल्पयति कण्ठादिना एतः उत दण्डादिना एत इति । एवं विकल्पिता हेत्यसिद्धिः ॥ यथा वा साहूया यदन्ति धोत्रादीनि पञ्च

81 Cf. Sam N. II. p. 17. *sabbam atthiṭṭi kho kaccāyana ayam eko anto sabbam natthiṭṭi ayam dutiyo anto, eto M vṛtti, p. 270, 7 and Kāśyapaparivarta, p. 90, § 60 : asiṭṭi kāśyapa ayam ekantaḥ | natthiṭṭi ayam dutiyantaḥ | (L. V. P).* Cp M vṛtti, p. 358, 10.

82. I.e. *ksamaya adyate*

83. Or *nirvikalpakaprajñam*.

84. I.e. *yadā samvṛtataḥ, parato 'siddhaḥ | yadā paramārthataḥ, parato 'siddhaḥ |*

85. Candrakīrti refers to what our author intends to convey in this passage, M. vṛtti, p. 28-29, where the reference is made in connection with the proposition (pratijñā) It is also equally to be applied to *sādhana* and *dṛṣṭanta*. Cf. p. 54 with note 95 below.

86. See Nāṣyamukha ad 2.

सत्त्वानामिन्द्रियाणि न रूपारब्धानि⁸⁷ इन्द्रियत्वात् मनइन्द्रियवत् । चक्षुरादि-
पञ्चेन्द्रियाणां रूपारम्भवादी तं दुष्टं वदति । इन्द्रियत्वादिति हेतुः यदि
महामृतस्वभावः उत सत्त्वादिस्वभाव इति । पथं विकल्पितो हेतुः स्वतः
परतश्च असिद्धः । तद्विविधमपि वचनमसिद्धिदोषाभासदोषो न तात्त्विका-
सिद्धिरित्यतो न युज्यते । एवमिदं [मस्मद्वचन] मपि ॥

अन्ये पुनराचार्याः प्राज्ञमन्याः स्वपक्षस्नेहान्धीकृतप्रज्ञावशुष्काः [11^b]
सदुपदेशरत्नस्यवाद्⁸⁸ क्षुद्रवीरणयोर्लभहानिविशेषमविवेचयन्तः मृपाप्रकटित-
साध्यदृष्टान्तदोषा आहुः । मन्त्रौपधियलाधिष्ठिताः पुष्पफलमृत्पिण्डादि-
पदार्था विविधहस्त्यभ्वशशादिरूपनिमित्तोपदर्शकाः स्वभावशून्या इति
नास्मत्पक्षाभ्युपगतम् । तदा समदृष्टान्तविकलः [तव पक्षः], साध्याभावात् ।
अथ यदि मायाहस्त्यभ्वादिनिमित्तानि [तद्] न्यवास्तविकहस्त्यभ्वादि-
स्वभावयुक्तानि न भवन्ति इत्यतः शून्या उच्यन्त इति । चक्षुरादिकमपि
तथा अन्यस्वभावरहित्यात् स्वभावशून्यं भवेत् । तदा पक्षदोषः, सिद्ध-
साधनत्वात् । इति तदूपणं न युज्यते । मन्त्रौपधियलाधिष्ठितान् पुष्पफल-
मृत्पिण्डादिपदार्थान् प्रतीत्य समुत्पन्नानि हस्त्यभ्वादिनिमित्तानि [तात्त्विक]
हस्त्यादिस्वभावशून्यानि दृष्टान्तत्वेन उच्यन्त इत्यतः साधयार्थः सिद्धः ।
अथ यदि पुनर्वदसि मायाकृतहस्त्यभ्वादिवस्तूनि यद्यपि अन्यतात्त्विक-
हस्त्यभ्वादिस्वभावादिनिमित्तानि न भवन्ति, तथापि न वक्तव्यं तत्स्वभावशून्यत्वात्
एतत्स्वभावोऽपि शून्य⁸⁹ इति । [ये] तल्लक्षणाकारा⁹⁰ दृश्यन्ते [ते]
तथाविधपदार्थस्वभावाः कथं न भवन्ति । यथा भवताभ्युपगताः पुष्प-
फलादिपदार्थाः । तथा चेत् मायानिमित्त [12^a] हस्त्यभ्वादिवस्तूनि

87. *anārambā*. Poushan suggests, *anārambā*.

88. Dirty weeds

89. This part of objection is made clear in the next section.

90. More convenient expression : *ye yallakṣaṇākārāḥ* etc.

तात्त्विकतथाभूतहस्त्यश्वादिस्वमानि स्युः । किन्तु न तात्त्विकानि इत्यतः
सर्वाणि मायाकृतहस्त्यश्वादिवस्तूनि स्वभावशून्यानीति शायते ।
तस्माद्यथावद्यथोक्त⁹¹ दृष्टान्तेन साध्यायेः सिध्यति । नापि सिद्धसाधनदोषः ।
चक्षुरादिसंस्क्रुतानां स्वभावशून्यत्वेन शून्यत्वस्थापनात् ॥

अन्ये पुनः केचित् शून्यान्तरमतयो⁹² दृष्टान्तदोषं प्रत्यवस्थापयन्ति ।
यद्यपि मायापुरुषा न तात्त्विकपुरुषा इत्यतः शून्या उच्यन्ते । तथापि ते
मायापुरुषा न स्वभावशून्या अभूतप्रतिभासिपुरुषलक्षणरूपेण सत्त्वात् ।
अतया युक्त्या साध्यपदार्थोसिद्धिः, दृष्टान्तासिद्धेः इति । इदानीं ते प्रष्टव्याः
किमिमानि अभूतप्रतिभासिमायापुरुषलक्षणरूपाणि प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नानि
उत ने ति । ते प्रतिवदेयुः प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नानीति । तथा चेत्कस्मात् पुनर-
भूतानि नाम । यतो यथा प्रतिभासोनि न तथा सन्ति । न चास्ति ननु चक्षुरा-
दिकमपि प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नं, यथा प्रतिभासि न तथास्ति चेति । [एवं]
समदृष्टान्तस्य सिद्धत्वात् स्वभावशून्य [12^b] ता सिध्यतीति
भयतास्थयम् ॥

ते यदन्ति नास्थेय [मिद] म् । यतो मायापुरुषा न तात्त्विकपुरुषवत्संभा-
षनीयाः⁹³ । तान् तात्त्विकपुरुषानपेक्ष्य इमे अभूता इत्यतः शून्या उच्यन्ते ।
न भयतां सिद्धं पूर्वोक्तचक्षुरादिसंस्क्रुतान् विहाय अन्ये चक्षुरादिसंस्क्रुताः
सन्ति इति यान्⁹⁴ सम्यक् संभाषनीयान् अपेक्ष्य इमे चक्षुरादिसंस्क्रुताः

91. *vastubhūta, vastutah or yathāvat śhik-yu.*

92. *= i-kung-hus-che* Or *esparita* Poussin gives *tsiao* for *kung* and says that *i-tsiao* = *vidagdha* (*i* = *vi*, *tsiao* = *dagdha*, a translation of Tib. word); and giving a variant *kung* for *tsiao*, he suggests to correct into *hōes*, intelligence. But our text has *kung hus* both together making the suggestion inadmissible.

93. I follow here the Chinese punctuation. Poussin has done " differently.

94. *Lit. tsu-pi.*

स्वभावशून्या इति वचनमास्योयेत इति । यद्यपि उक्तानिमान् चक्षुरादीन् विहाय अन्ये चक्षुरादयो न सन्ति । तथापि ईदृशस्वभावशून्यत्वप्रतीत्यसमुत्पादयो साध्यसाधनभावो सिद्धौ । केवलमनेनोदाहरणेन उदाहार्यार्थं प्रदर्शयितुमलम् । यदि दृष्टान्तधर्मान्तर विकल्पयसि तदा ⁹⁵विषयसमजाति दोष सिध्यति [य] प्रतिधादिन स्वप्रजालाघय प्रदर्शयेत् । यथा वैशेषिक आह शब्द अनित्य कृतकत्वात् घटादिवत् इति । [तत्र] घटादि मृत्पिण्ड-चक्रादिना निष्पादित एव उभयभ्यते मुसलनाशयोऽनित्यश्च । शब्दस्तु न तथा, नानित्य इति वचनं न दूषणं स्यात् । [एव] मस्यापि दृष्टान्त धर्मान्तरविकल्पत्वात् विकल्पसमजातिदोष सिध्येत् । अतः [13 a] आस्थेय चक्षुरादयः स्वभावशून्या इति । स्वभावशून्यतायाः प्रतीत्यसमुत्पाद हेत्वव्यभिचारात् । यथा दृष्टलक्षण प्रतिपिद्धपूर्वस्वभावम्, तथा इदमपि स्यात् । तस्मात् भयता वचनं न स्वपक्षदोषोपालम्भान्निवर्तितुमलम् ॥

साङ्ख्य एव दूषयन्ति । अस्माभिः स्याज्यते महदादिपरिणामा व्यक्ता [अतः] प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नत्वेहेतोरसिद्धिः । सर्वस्यापि स्वरूपत्वात् इन्द्रियाणां सर्वायतनव्यापित्वात् तस्मिन् मायापुरुषेऽपि ⁹⁶एतद्रूपमस्तीति स्वभावशून्यमिदमिति स्थापनस्य नास्ति साधर्म्यदृष्टान्तः । इति ॥ अत्र रूपबुद्धिरादाय परोक्ष्यते । तथाहि रूपबुद्धयः न प्रत्ययाभिव्यक्ता तदन्य प्रत्ययाननुसृत्य विवृतत्वात् । यथा मृत्पिण्डदण्डचक्रकुलालमनइच्छा

95 N Sutra V 1 4 N Kōśa p 630 It is now clear that in setting forth any proposition no particulars should be taken into account of the *sādhya* *sādhana* and *dr̥ṣṭānta*. This is what is meant by *utsr̥ṣṭavatskṛṣṇa* stated previously see p 51 above with note 85 Nyāyamukha gives the same example for the *jāti* see ad 32

96 A similar objection viz reality of this example is raised in the Abb Āloka p 385 from the view point of Viśiṣṭavādīn Op Pram vārtika III 162 f where the Sāṅkhyas are said to plead for the fact that many exist in the form of one *bhāva* = *pradhāna*

सत्त्वादिविमिश्रप्रत्ययाननुसृत्य घटकपालादयो महान्तोऽल्पा वा भवन्ति । एवं [ये] चक्षुरादिनानाप्रत्ययाः, ताननुसृत्य रूपबुद्धयो नाना विक्रियन्ते । यतः चक्षुषस्तमःप्रकाशादनुसृत्य बुद्धेस्तैर्दृश्यं मान्यं वा । नीलादिरूप-विषयविशेषाननुसृत्य [13 b] नीलाद्यामासबुद्धिः स्पष्टविक्रियते⁹⁷ । दृश्यते हि लोके पदमिभिव्यक्ताः⁹⁸ पदार्थाः न तत्प्रत्ययविशेषविरुद्धाः । यथा विविधाः कङ्कणकुण्डलादिपदार्थाः प्रदीपौघधिरत्नसूर्याद्यभिव्यक्ताः । न तथा रूपबुद्धिः । यथा रूपबुद्धिः परीक्षिता । तथा चक्षुरादिरपि । अयमर्थं सिद्ध इति वस्तुतो लोकसाधारणं ज्ञायते । अतः उक्तहेतोर्ना-सिद्धिदोषः ।

किञ्च भवता उक्तं सर्वं सर्वरूपामत्यादि । किमाभिव्यक्तिवृत्त्या⁹⁹ किंवा तिरोहितवृत्त्या । यद्यभिव्यक्तिवृत्त्या सर्वं सर्वस्वरूपं गृहीष्यसि । यथा घटप्रदेशे घटमिव्यक्तिवृत्तिरस्ति । तथा कपालप्रदेशेऽपि एतद्वटमिव्यक्तिवृत्तिः स्यात् । विभुस्वरूपत्वात् । योऽयमुक्तो घटः सोऽप्रमाणशत-सहस्रयोजनान्यपि व्याप्नुयात् । घटादिप्रदेशेऽपि कपालाद्यभिव्यक्ति-र्युगपत् स्यात् । न च घटमिव्यक्तेस्तिरोहितत्वात् कपालाद्यभिव्यक्तिरपि तिरोहिता । महत्परिमाणत्वात् । महत्परिमाणं [वा] तिरोहित-महत्परिमाणं परिणतं स्यात् । घटाद्यभिव्यक्तेः कपालाद्यभिव्यक्तिरिच्छत-त्वात् सर्वदेशकालयोर [14 a] नुपलम्भः स्यात् । तस्मादभिव्यक्ति-वृत्त्या सर्वं सर्वात्मकमिति भवत्पक्षो न युज्यते ।

यदि तिरोहितवृत्त्या सर्वं सर्वात्मकमिति ग्रहीष्यसि । एवं गृहीतं विस्तृतविचारेण¹⁰⁰ परिज्ञेयमिदं सत्यमसत्यं वेति । ग्रन्थपरिक्लेशमयेन¹⁰¹ न विस्तराः परीक्ष्यते ।

97 *Hsten-hsten* : "To become modified perceptibly"

98 *So-hsten*.

99 *Ohn* "According to"

100 *Lit. vicāram apekṣya*

101. *Wen fang* "Trouble of composition"

भवत्पक्षेऽपि अभ्युपगम्यते मायापुरुषाभिव्यक्तिप्रदेश तात्त्विकपुरुषा-
भिव्यक्तिश्च इति । मया स्थापितदृष्टान्तस्य नासिद्धिदोषः । तस्मात्साध्या
स्वभावशून्यता सिद्धा ।

भवान् साङ्ख्याचार्योऽपि नोत्सृष्टाश्रयः,¹⁰² नेन्द्रियाण्यपि सर्वायतन-
व्यापीनि ।¹⁰³ साधिष्ठानत्वहेतोः । यथा इन्द्रियमाश्रयाश्रितम् । तथा
सत्त्वरजस्तमोमोहा भ्रजन्ति बुद्धिकारकत्वहेतोः¹⁰⁴ इत्यादिना बहवो
विशिधनापकहेतवः सविस्तरं वक्तव्याः । इन्द्रियाणां सर्वायतनव्यापित्व-
भङ्गात् । मायापुरुषे नेन्द्रियरूपाणि [इति] न साध्यशून्यता साधर्म्य-
दृष्टान्ताभावाच्च । तस्मादेवं भवान् वितथविकल्पं कृत्वा पञ्चावपीडितचेष्टां¹⁰⁵
करोति ॥

¹⁰⁰योगाचारा एवमाहुः । भवान् साधयति तत्त्वतः संस्कृताः शून्याः
प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नत्वादिति । [14 b] संस्कृतधर्माः प्रतीत्य-
समुत्पन्नाः न स्वयंभावाः, उत्पत्तिनिःस्वभावा इति तै शून्याः साध्यन्ते
इत्ययमर्थः, तदा प्रसिध्यति योगाचाराणामर्थः न्यायसंवादीति । तथा चाह
“येन हि शून्यं तदसद्भावात्, यच्च शून्यं तत्सद्भावात् इति¹⁰⁷ । एवं शून्यता
शास्त्रा देवमनुष्याणां यथाभूतमुक्तम् । अस्थोपदेशस्याशयः परिवात्पित-

102. Chu place, *ten ch*: "to throw and transmit" Poussin connects this sentence along with the previous one My punctuation is according to the Chinese one

103. Yu so So is to be taken in the sense of place, *adhishthāna*

104. Poussin interprets quite differently these sentences

105. Wang ling demon à la forme d'un petit en fant de couleur brune, aux yeux rouges et aux longues oreilles (L V P.)

106. *Idt yogasūtracārya.*

107. This is from *yogasūtra*, Wogihara, p 47.—says poussin.

गृहीतः परतन्त्रस्वभावो मूलतोऽसन्, अतस्त्वभावात्वात् । ययामिधान¹⁰⁸ -
ममिधेयस्वभावाभावात्, ययामिधेयश्चामिधानस्वभावाभावात् परतन्त्र-
स्वभावे परिकल्पितगृहीतस्वभावः प्रकृतितोऽसन् । येन शून्यं [तत्र] मिथ्या-
कल्पितं वस्तु तद्वत्स्वभावः । यच्च शून्यं प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नं वस्तु तत्स्व-
त्वभावः । यदीदमसत्, तदा नोच्छेदो निरोधो वा, किं केन ¹⁰⁹शून्यं
भविष्यति । [यत्] प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नं वस्तु तदेव परतन्त्रस्वभावं नाम ।
ततो रूपदेनासांशादिस्वभावविशेषोपचारात्मिका प्रवृत्तिर्भवति ।¹¹⁰ यदीद-
¹¹¹मसत्, प्रवृत्तिधर्मोऽप्यसन् । [15 a] [तदा] नास्तिकः अकथ्यो भवति
असंवात्यः [सप्रज्ञाचारिणाम्] । स्वयं दुर्गतौ पतति । परानपि पातयति ।
एवं परिकल्पितगृहीतस्वभावः शून्यः परतन्त्रस्वभावश्च सन् इति सिद्धि-
निपुणं न्याय्या ।

परतन्त्रस्वभावोऽप्यविद्यमानत्वात् शून्यं साध्यते । इति यद्ययं
वचनार्थः, तदा यद्योक्तदोषपाते पतितोऽसि भगवदुपदेशापवाददोषश्च
साधितमानसि । इति ॥

तत्र अन्ययानप्रत्यनिकैः तीर्थिकश्च सद्बचनाकांक्षिभिः निर्मत्सरैस्सह
भूयसा विनाह । क पुनर्याद परुयानप्रस्थितैराचार्यैः । वादस्य प्राप्त काल-

-108 Astitva with regard to *paratantra* aspect and *nāstitva* with regard to *pārikalpita* aspect M vṛtti p 274 5

109 Lit *kutra kim śūnyam ucyeṭa* !

110 *Oha-ls-hsin = upacāraśāstra* The phrase is suggested by Poussein

111. Partly identical with these passages of *Yogaśāstra* (Wojihara p 46) .

तेषां प्रज्ञापयिष्यतस्य वस्तुभावस्याभावात् सैन प्रज्ञातिः सदेण सर्वं न भवति ।...
प्रज्ञातितत्त्वापवादश्च प्रधानवास्तवो वेदितव्यः । स एव नास्तिकः सन् अकथ्यो भवति,
असंवात्यो विज्ञानी सप्रज्ञाचारिणाम्... (cited by Poussein)

तदा सिद्धसाधनदोषः । तथा परेभ्यः 117 प्रत्ययेभ्य उत्पन्नस्य [परतन्त्रस्य]
वस्तुतः अशून्यत्वात् न शून्यता नाम स्यात् । मम तु न तथा । कथं
118 प्रलपसि योगाचाराणामर्थः 119 सिध्यतीति ।

किञ्च यदोक्तम् । “येन हि शून्यं तदसद्भावात्, यच्च शून्यं तत्सद्भावात्”
इत्यादि । यदि हेतुप्रत्ययबलेनोत्पन्नाश्चक्षुरादयः सर्वलोकसाधारणं
वस्तुसन्तः स्वीक्रियन्ते । 120 चाला बुद्धज्ञानगोचराः स्युः । संवृतं सत्त्वभावा-
भासं प्रदृश्यमानं [16 a] परमार्थसत्यबुद्धज्ञानपर्येषणया मायापुरुष-
वदत्यन्तमसत्त्वभावम् । तस्मादुक्तं “येन शून्यं तदसत्त्वभावात्” इति
शाश्वतान्तदोषपातप्रतिषेधाधेम् । शाश्वतान्तदोषपरिहाराय तदसत्त्वभाव-
वचनवत् उच्छेदान्तदोषपातपरिहारायापि वचनं तत्सद्भावात् इति । तथाहि
हेतुप्रत्ययबलोत्पन्नाश्चक्षुरादयः संवृतिसत्यपरिगृहीताः सत्त्वभावा न खपुण्य-
वदत्यन्तासत्त्वभावपदार्थाः । तत्त्वतः परं तान् शून्यान् साधयामः ।
तस्मादुक्तं “यच्च शून्यं तत्सद्भावात् । इत्येवं स्वभावशून्यता शास्त्रा
देवमनुष्याणां यथाभूतमुक्तं” मिति । एतदर्थकं परतन्त्रः सत्त्वभाव इति
यदि यदसि तदा साधूक्तं भवति । ईदृशस्वभावस्य मयापि स्योक्तत्वात् ।
121 लोकानुवर्तनवचनसंगृहीतत्वात् पुण्यज्ञानसंभारद्वयस्य, संवृत्युपचारत

117. Cp. M. vṛtti, p 444. Viṣṇūśaṅkṛde'pi kalpitastvabhāvasya
śūnyatvam, apratītyasamutpannatvāt, tasmīrśakadotcandrādīdarśa-
navat ।

118. Shu Shanghai ed reads *ms = bhṛāmyati*, which is adopted
in Taisho ed. as Poussin says.

119. This is the remark of *Siddhāntin* against *Pārvaṇakṣin*,
repeating the latter's own words expressed at the commencement of
pārvaṇakṣa, see p. 56, para 3 above. So there is no need of un-
necessary assumption as done by Poussin

120. *Chiao = Buddha = Pratibuddha*.

121. Cp. *Lokānuvartanagāthās* in *Mad. Avatāra*, my Skt. text,
p. 40, and M. vṛtti, p. 548.

आधयस्य सत्त्वस्थापनात् प्रज्ञतिधर्मोऽपि सन् । तथा च “यदीदमसन्,
प्रज्ञतिधर्मोऽप्यसन् तदा नास्तिकः अकथ्य” इत्येवमादिदोषः सर्वो न
सिध्यति ।

किञ्च यदि साधयसि परतन्त्रं [16 b] संवृत्या सत्त्वभावम्,
तदा सिद्धसाधनम् । यदि तं परमार्थतः सत्त्वभावं साधयसि, साधर्म्य-
दृष्टान्तहानिः । यथा ऐकान्तिकसत्त्वभावप्रदः प्रतिपिद्धः [तथा] ऐका-
न्तिकासत्त्वभावोऽपि प्रतिषेधयितव्यः । तस्मात् नोत्कर्षापकर्षाभ्यामुक्त-¹²²
परतन्त्रस्वभावस्यापवादः स्यात् ।

यदि वदसि अनमिलाप्यस्वभावाणां मायादीनां समदृष्टान्तत्वाभावात्
मम प्रतिज्ञा न साधयेत् [साध्यम्] इति । अनमिलाप्यस्वभाव[त्वे]
युक्त्यसिद्धया नास्ति दोषः । तथा चेत् तीर्थिकः परिगृहीतमनमिलाप्य-
स्वभावमात्मादिकं कः प्रतिषेद्धं शक्नुयात् । यतः तेऽपि वदन्ति सत्त्वभाव
आत्माहि, न युद्धे नापि घवसो गोचर¹²³ इति ।

यदि प्रत्ययबलोत्पन्नः सर्वः परतन्त्रस्वभावः परमार्थतः सत्त्वभाव इति ।

122 Poussin compares this with two passages, one from the Bodhi-
sattvabbūmi, Wogihara, p 48 - *na bhūtam aparadati nādhikam laret*
na nyūnikaret na utksipati na prakṣipati 1 and the other from
Nāgārjuna - *Napaneyam atoh liñ cit nīkṣeptavyam na kiñcana*
(*Melanges Chinois et Bouddhiques*, I, p 387, 394) This verse is also
cited in the Buddhagottra of Vasubandhu, see his ad notes, p 145
The source of this verse is now found to be Abh Alankāra of Maitreya,
V, 21, cited in the Āloka, p 499

123 This is a plain reference to the Advaitic doctrine of the soul
of ineffable character. It follows that the Yogācāras hold things
magically created to be of ineffable nature (cp M Sūtrālaṅkāra, XI,
15 30), which theory appears to be similar to the *anirvacanīyākhyāt*
theory of Advaitins. Haribhadra says that the conception of *Śūnyatā*
has been extended even to the Nirvāṇa, lest it should incur a *prade-*
śīkaśūnyatā like that of the Tīrthikas, Abh Āloka, 144. Cf passages of
Prajñāpāramitas cited in Bod pañjikā, p 379.

मायापुरुषस्तात्त्रिकपुरुषस्वभावः स्यात् । [स] अन्यस्वभाव इति चेन्न च युज्यते । गवि गदमेस्वभावायोगात् । कृत्कारुतकस्वभावा सद्भावासद्भावौ सस्वभावनिःस्वभावौ चोभौ युगपत्संगृह्याताम् । एवं [भवतः] साध्यं साधर्म्यद्वष्टान्तविहीनं सिद्धसाधनं वा इति दोषद्वयोपल्लिप्तम् । अतो न युज्यते ।

किञ्च [17 a] प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नान् संस्कृतधर्मान् परमार्थतः सस्वभावान् यद्यभ्युपगच्छसि । कृतकत्वहेतुः तान् स्वभावशून्यान् प्रदर्शयेन् तैर्पा सस्वभावं निराकरोति । अतः साध्यप्रतिज्ञाविरोधोऽनुमान-दोषः । प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नाः संवृतितः सस्वभावाः सर्वसाधारणं ज्ञाताः, यदि परमाद्येऽन्तः परिगृह्यन्ते । अनेन न्यायेन तत्प्रतिज्ञाभङ्गः स्यात् । नेमं वादं ते परिगृह्योयुः । परमाद्येतो द्विविधस्यापि विकल्पस्यान्याय्यत्वात् ।

किञ्च यथाभिधानमभिधेयस्वभावाभावः यथाभिधेयमभिधानस्वभावाभाव इति यथोक्तम्, अत्र न विचिकित्सन्ते प्रतिवादिनः । अतः प्रतिषेध-वचनस्य सिद्धसाधनदोषः । यथोक्तत्वात्परतन्त्रस्वभावे परिकल्पित-गृहीतस्यन्तः प्रवृत्तितोऽसन् इत्यत्रापि परवादिनो न विचिकित्सन्ते । अतः प्रतिषेधवचनस्यापि सिद्धसाधनदोषः । अभिधानाभिधेयपरिकल्पित-स्वभावग्रह्यत्वात् संक्लेशा जायन्ते । अतः प्रतिषेध आवश्यक इति चेत् तदपि न युक्तम् । न हि पशुपश्यादयो जानन्त्यभिधानाभिधेयसंसर्गम् । विषयस्य योनिशोऽग्रहणमेव¹²⁴ हि [17 b] संक्लेशजननम् । अतः सन्ति विविधा अतिमनोरमाः [न्यायाः] । सन्ति च विविधानि सूक्ष्मा-पर्यवचनानि । [तेषु] परिकल्पितस्वभावशून्यतोपदेशः अल्पांशेन हितकरः न सर्वशः । अतो न केवलमहं तं शून्यं साधयामि । [किन्तु

124. = *Ayoniso manaskāra*, cf. *Pratītyasamutpādesūtra* cited in M. vṛtti, p 452, 7.

परतन्त्रमपि ।] इत्यलं प्रासङ्गिकेन ।¹²⁵ प्रकृतं विचारयामः ।¹²⁶ एवं यथोक्तन्यायेन साधितं चक्षुः स्वभावशून्यमिति ॥

अन्ये पुनराचार्या भावस्वभावप्रतिषेधस्यास्यैवं दूषणमापादयन्त आहुः । यदीदं [चक्षुः] वस्तुसत्, प्रतिज्ञाहानिः, हेतोरनैकान्तिकासिद्धिः । यद्यस्तुसत् निःस्वभावमेव, असिद्धं दूषणम् । इति । तदपि न युक्तम् । यथा भगवानाह । जानीहि सर्वं ब्राह्मण यथोक्तं सत्यमसत्यमिति । अहं वदामि न सत्यं¹²⁷ न मृषा इति । अनेन वचनेन उक्तवक्ष्यमाणयुक्तिमिश्र परमार्थतः सत्यमसत्यमिति न व्यवस्थितम् । अतो नैवं यथोक्तदोषः । [182] किञ्च भवदाशयेन उक्तयुक्तिप्रतिषेध्याभावात् प्रतिषेधोऽपि नास्ति ।¹²⁸ न च प्रतिषेधेऽसति प्रतिषेध्यं पुनरस्ति । किन्तु प्रतिषेध्यस्य प्रकृतितो निःस्वभावत्वात् प्रतिषेधोऽपि नास्ति । प्रतिषेधः केवलं विचार्य ज्ञापयति¹²⁹ प्रतिषेध्यं प्रकृतितो निःस्वभावमिति । न नाशयति प्रतिषेध्यस्य स्वभावम् । यथाह । न योधिस्तस्यः शून्यतया सर्वधर्मान् शून्यान्¹³⁰ करोति । अपितु सर्वधर्माः प्रकृतितः स्वभावशून्याः । इति यावद्विस्तरः ।

125 Lat *tiryagyāda*

126 Lat *vicārayama prakṛta* (or *ṛju*) *vādam* The expression is repeated in the second chap on f 7b, 1,7 (Chin. text)

127. Cf. *Vajracchedikā*, 37. *na satyam na mṛṣā*, Ratnāvali in M. vṛtti, p 359 • *Dṛṣṭāśrutādyaṃ muninā na satyam na mṛṣoditam* (L V P).

128 Cf the line in Abh. Āloka, p. 51 : *Niṣedhyabhātataḥ spaṣṭam na niṣedhyo'sti tattvataḥ* (L V. P.) Cf also Vig. vyākṛtinaḥ, 64.

129 Ibid, vṛtti ad 65

130 Kāśyapaparivarta, p. 94, § 63 *na śūnyatayā sarvadharmān śūnyān karotsi, dharmā eva śūnyāḥ*, cited in M. vṛtti, p 248, (L V. P.), M. Avatāra ad VI 34 Cp. Prajñāpāramitā • *Bodhisattva...evam pratyaśekṣate* | *na rūpaśūnyatayā rūpam śūnyam* | *rūpam eva śūnyam* | cited in Bod. pañjikā, p 416, f

किञ्च यथा प्रकाशयित्रा प्रकाशयानां प्रकाशने न वक्तुं युक्तं प्रकाशयानां घटपटादीनामभावात् प्रकाशयितापि नास्त्येति । [तथा] न च वक्तुं युक्तं प्रकाशयपदार्थाः प्रकृतितोऽसन्तः इदानीं सन्तीति ।¹⁸¹ मम च साध्यं प्रतिषेधः प्रतिषेध्यं साधनं दूषणं¹⁸² सविपर्यासमविपर्यासं सर्वं संवृत्तिसत् । यदि साध्यं साधनञ्च प्रतिषेधयसि, तदा स्वप्रतिज्ञाबाधः ।

इदं प्रतिषेधचनमसाधनं युज्यते असत्त्वभावत्वात् चन्ध्यापुत्रो-
चरितशब्दवत् । [इति चेत्] भजनेवानुमानं साधनमिति स्वीकरोति ।
ममापि तथा स्यात् संवृत्तिसत्त्वात् । पूर्वोक्तरीत्या विपुलविज्ञादा निराकृताः ।
विपुलस्तार्था दुर्ग्रहत्वात् भयसंत्रासकाः ।

[18 b] एवं पूर्वोक्तानुमानस्य न दूषणावरणानि सन्तीत्यतः प्रतिज्ञा
तत्त्वतश्चक्षुरायतनं स्वमायशून्यमिति न्यायसंसिद्धा । प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नत्वात्
इति साध्यहेतुः संक्षेपोपलक्षणम् । चक्षुरादीनां वक्तव्यस्वभावप्रतिषेधाय
अन्येऽपि हेतयः सन्ति यदुत विनाशित्वात् अनुप्रत्ययं विभक्तत्वात् अमिनिर्गु-
त्वात् भावे सति मृपाहानोत्थापकत्वात् इति । एभिर्हेतुभि यथायोगं
प्रतिपक्षमनुसृत्य निपूर्णं प्रतिषेद्धव्यम् ।

अन्यः कश्चिदाह । चक्षुः वस्तुतः सत्त्वभावम्, तद्वक्षणेहेतुफलानां
दृष्टत्वात् न स्वभावशून्यम् । [यत्] प्रत्यक्षलक्षणादिकं, [तत्] प्रत्यक्षं
दृष्टम् । चक्षुरादीनां लक्षणादीनि च प्रत्यक्षं सन्ति । तस्मात् चक्षुरादीनि
न स्वभावशून्यानि । इति । अस्य परमार्थतः समदृष्टान्ताभावात् सत्त्वभाव-
[ता]¹⁸³ न सिध्यति । यदि सांवृत्तज्ञानतः सत्त्वभावम्, तदा सिद्ध-

181 Cp. Udyotakara's remarks : *na hyayam vyākhyakārya dharmo
yad vyangyam vastu karyāt I apitu anyato bhūtam hetur vyanakti I na
hi pradīpo' santam artham janyitvā prakāśayati I N' Vārtika, p. 519*

182 Or khaṇḍana.

183 Similar objection and answer have already been made on
p. 43, para 3

साधनम् । समदृष्टान्ते हेतुसिद्धिं विरुद्धा । समदृष्टान्तस्य संवृतिमात्र-
स्वभावत्वात् ।

यथा तत्त्वतश्चक्षुरायतनं स्वभावशून्यम्, तथा श्रावणघ्राणजिह्वाकायमनो-
रूपशब्दगन्धरस [192] स्पर्शायतनधर्मायतनानि च स्वभावशून्यानि । इत्येवं
योगाचारी स्वभावशून्यतां प्रविशेत् ।¹⁸⁴ सामान्यविशेषाभ्यां तत्त्वतः
सिद्धानि स्कन्धधातुप्रतीत्यसमुत्पादस्मृत्युपस्थानसम्यक्प्रहाणञ्जुद्धिपाद-
इन्द्रियबलबोध्यङ्गपारमितासरे समाधिधारणोमुखसवप्रतिसंविद्दशबलवैशार-
द्यावैणिकधर्मादीनि सर्वज्ञानानि¹⁸⁵ च स्वभावशून्यानि इत्येवं योगी
स्वभावशून्यतां प्रविशेत् ।

तीर्थिकपरिकल्पिताः महदहङ्कारतन्मात्रेन्द्रियमहाभूत¹⁸⁶ द्रव्यगुण-
कर्मादयः संस्कृतपदार्थाः सर्वेऽपि द्वादशायतनान्तर्गताः, तद्वक्ष्यन्त्यात् । इत्येवं
योगी स्वभावशून्यतां प्रविशेत् ॥

एवं [योगी] चिन्ताबलात्¹⁸⁷ स्वभावशून्यतां प्रविष्टोऽपि भावना-
बलविकलः¹⁸⁸ । यथा पक्षिणः जन्मारम्भे पक्षं प्रयोक्तुमसमर्थाः
इत्यतः पुनस्त्वरितं प्रयोगबलमभ्यस्यन्ति¹⁸⁹ । यथा वा तमिरिकः तिमिरनि-

184. Wu-yu = pratelā Poussin has rendered it "pénétrer—
comprendre" (avakram, pratiskand)

185. Cf. Bod panykā, p 379 : (*Bhagavatyaṃ uktam*) ... *sa cet
nirvāṇādapi kaścid dharmo viśiṣṭatarah syāt, tam api aham māyopamam
śrapnopamam vadāmi* ! with note thereon

186. *Ken shih* = *Indriya, dravya* Poussin is wrong in taking these
terms for *mālabhūta* and *taṭtra* respectively

187. Second aspect of the Prajñā, *cintāmayi* effected by *yukti-
nidhyāsi* (= *anumāna*), *Sthiramati*, *Trimśikābhāṣya*, p 26

188. Third aspect, *bhāvanāmayi* effected by *saṃādhi*, *Ibid.*
Poussin refers to the *Kośa* VI, 143

189. Or *bhāvanābalaṃ abhyāsyati* [*yogi*]

राकारि मैव ज्यात् प्रतिपक्षात् लब्धचक्षुःप्रसादः महास्यूलकेशमशकादीन्-¹⁴⁰
 पोद्य [19 b] विषयान् सम्पद्य पश्यति । तथा त्वरितं भावनायलाभ्यांसात्
 संसृतनिमित्तप्रहमलविचित्सामिध्याद्धानानि निराकरोति ।

तत्त्वयोगी¹⁴¹ अमिमुष्यारम्भे¹⁴² अपरप्रत्ययं परमप्रीतिमुखं धेदयमानः
 सधेमंरुतनिमित्तप्रहविरहात् सर्वदेयदायकप्रतिग्राहकप्रहविरहात् सर्व-
 दायकप्रतिग्राहकदानफलप्रर्हायरहाच्च द्विविधप्रिमण्डलपरिशुद्धः¹⁴³ अग्रमाण-
 द्वित्रिधपुण्यदानसंभार¹⁴⁴ भारत्संग्रहं समाचरते । इष्टादृष्टफलानध्यवसितः
 हृष्ययस्तु भाविफलानभिरतः पुण्यान् इष्टान् गुणिनो नानादेवांश्च निवेद्यमाणः
 गुणःकर्ता, आत्मा कर्ता मद्देव्यः परमाणुः स्वभावादि [र्वा कर्ता] इति
 मिध्याग्रहरहितः सदा अभ्यस्यति महात्यागम् । इष्टादि यस्तु सर्वं
 उक्तप्रत्यमाणयुक्तिभिः साक्षात्करोति सर्वसंसृतासंसृतवर्णव्यवर्द्धन-
 धर्माणां स्वभावशून्यत्वात् ।

140 Lit *kēśa malaka patāṅga*, cf. M vytti p 350, 8 : *śaṁsīrsko-
 palabdhakēśamalakādī*

141. Or *Tattvayogacārīn*

142 The sixth stage of the ten bhūmis to which the whole 6th
 Chap of *Madh Avatāra* has been devoted

143. Siddhi, 626, 629 Abh Āloka, p 198, Prajñā in 100 000,
 p 92 : *anupalambhāyogena dānasya, dāyakaśya pratigrāhakaśya ca
 trimandalaparissuddhyā dānapāramitā paripūrītā bhavati*, Lalita, p 217
 (Bib. Ind), Śikṣāsāmtucca 183 Bodhicaryāvatāra p 45 With
 regard to second triad, it is not found as such in any text but it might
 be meant by *adī* in this passage *dāyadeyapratigrāhakaśīrīstoyānuvalam-
 bhena* Bod Pañjikā, p 445 (L V P) Op M Sūtrālaṅkāra ad
 XIII, 29 : *pratipattuk pratipattivyasya pratipattēka avakalpanā trim-
 andalaparissuddhir vedīavyā* 1

144 Dāna, śīla and kṣānti constitute *punyaśambhāra* and dhyaṇa
 etc jñāna- which are characterised as *saugatapadaśādhānopayabhāra*,
 Bod Pañjikā, pp 344-5 and 343

यथाह भगवान् । न भवितव्यं बोधिसत्त्वेन दानप्रतिपत्तौ सुप्रतिष्ठितेन¹⁴⁵
अत्यन्ताभावप्रतिष्ठितेन दानं दातव्यम् । [20^a] इति यावद्विस्तरः । किञ्च
भगवानाह । [येषां] बोधिसत्त्वानां सत्त्वसंज्ञा प्रवर्तते न [ते] तात्त्विक-
बोधिसत्त्वव्यपेक्षया । इति । आह च भगवान् । यत्किञ्चनभावधर्म-
विगतः¹⁴⁶ बोधिसत्त्वयानप्रस्थानकुशलो नाम । बोधिसत्त्वा. पुनर्न
परिनिर्वाणाकांक्षया ग्रह्यवयं चरन्ति । परं प्रीताः खलु¹⁴⁷ त्रैधातुके संसारे ।
इति ।

एवं सर्वे संस्कृताः स्वभावशून्या इति सम्यक् भावनां भाषयित्वा
पुनः सम्यक् भाषयेत् यस्य¹⁴⁸ नास्ति स्वभावः तस्य नास्त्युत्पादः । यस्य
नास्त्युत्पादः तन्नातीतानागतप्रत्युत्पन्नम् त्रिष्वध्वसु अप्रतिघम् इति ।
[एवं] श्रव्यविशुद्धलक्षणं¹⁴⁹ सम्यक् भाषयित्वा, पूर्वोक्ताविपरीतयुक्त्या-
श्रयेण त्रिमण्डलपरिशुद्धो महाबोधिमभिगच्छति । यथा पृच्छति । कथं
मञ्जुश्रीः बोधिसत्त्वो महाबोधिमभिगच्छति । उत्तरमाह । यथा ब्राह्मण
बोधिः¹⁵⁰ स्यात् । पुनराह । कथं नाम बोधिर्भवति । उत्तरमाह । इयं ब्राह्मण
नातीता नानागता यावत्प्रत्युत्पन्ना । इति । तस्मात् बोधिसत्त्वः श्रव्य-
विशुद्धलक्षणं भाषयित्वा त्रिमण्डलपरिशुद्धो महाबोधिमभिगच्छेत् ॥

[20^b] महायानकरसलरत्ने प्रथमखण्डः ॥

145 Vajracchedikā na vastupratisthita dānam dātavyam
(L V P) Cp M Sūtrālaṅkāra, extract in the note 143 above

146 Well pointed out in Prajñāpāramitā cited in Bod Pañjika
pp 427-429, M vṛtti p 289 § and Samādhirāja Sūtra Ibid II 5 14

147 Cp M Sūtrālaṅkāra, XVII, 49

148 This is an abridged statement of Kāśyapaparivarta, § 102.
p 149 Cp Ratnacūḍa cited in the Śik Sam p 234, l. 16-17

149 Lit trāṇa adhvāno viśuddhalakṣaṇāṇa or nirmatāṇa

150 Bodhi is given as simile in this line yathā bodhī tathā hyeṣā
kanta buddhā prabhāsevarā । Bod Pañjika p 522, cp. Abh Āloka
p 430

महायानकरतलरत्नम्

II

[असंस्कृतपरीक्षा]

एवमुक्तं योगी सामान्यतः संस्कृतान् स्वभावशून्यान् प्रविशेत् इति । न तु असंस्कृतान् स्वभावशून्यान् प्रविशेदिति । १अप्रदर्शिते प्रवेशो न संभवेत् । अप्रवेशे निर्विकल्पप्रज्ञाप्रवेशो नैव सिध्येत् । प्रदर्शनेनैव पुनराह ।

असंस्कृतास्त्वसद्गुता अनुत्पादाः क्षपुण्यवत् ॥

अत्र प्रतिज्ञापचनव्यवच्छेदकं पूर्वोक्तं तत्त्वत इत्येव । व्यवच्छेदावश्यकता-
तात्पर्यञ्च यथापूर्वं ज्ञेयम् । तत्त्वतः असंस्कृताः शून्याः साध्यन्ते, न संवृतिनः ।
न संस्कृता असंस्कृताः, संस्कृतविपरीता असंस्कृतपदार्थाः । त एवाकाशं
प्रतिसंख्यानिरोधोऽप्रतिसंख्यानिरोधस्तथता च । यदुत निराकृतपूर्वधर्मा-
यतनेकदेशः ।

आकाशस्य स्वभावशून्यताप्रवेशः पूर्वप्रदर्श्यते । [1 b] प्रदर्शनस्य सुकर-
त्वात्, २सप्रतिघट्टव्याभावमात्रस्याकाशनाम्ना लोकसाधारणं स्थापितत्वाच्च ।
३एतद्वशिष्टासंस्कृतस्वभावशून्यताप्रवेशस्य द्वारं भवेत् । लोकज्ञातः
आकाशस्तत्त्वतः शून्यः असत्स्वभावा इतीयं प्रतिज्ञा । एतत्साध्यं तत्त्वत

1. Lit. yad apradarshitam, so-pu-kas-sha

2. Cp. Note 23 below. The theory of Sarvāstivādins on Ākāśa, Poussin's Document d' Abhidharma, BEFO, 1930, p. 274, 2. & 4. Note also Yaśomitra's remark : svamātan tu sapratighadravyabhāvamūtram akāśam ityabhi-prāyo lakṣyate I, 28.

3. Lit. anena.

असद्भूत आकाश इति । अपक्षद्वयान्युपगतः अनुत्पादात्, प्रशंसि सिद्धानुत्पाद-
धर्मत्वाद्वा इति हेतुः । खपुष्पमसद्भूतमनुत्पन्नञ्चेति समदृष्टान्तः सिद्धः ।
विपक्षे प्रतिषेधाय वीधर्म्यदृष्टान्तः स्थाप्यते इत्यतो नोच्यते इति यथा-
पूर्वज्ञेयम् ।

कथमत्रानुमानं व्यवस्थाप्यते । तथाहि आकाशस्तत्त्वतोऽसद्भूतः,
अनुत्पादात् । [ये] अनुत्पन्ना [स्ते सर्वेऽपि] असत्स्वभावाः खपुष्पजत्
इति मूढा विद्वांसश्च समं जानन्ति । अनुत्पादादित्ययं साध्यहेतुरपलक्षणम्⁴ ।
अन्येऽपि हेतवः सन्ति अवृतकत्वात् अकारित्रत्वात् अनिरुद्धयिनाशित्वात्
इति । एवमादयो हेतवः असंस्तृतस्वभावं व्यग्रहियमाणं प्रतिषेधयन्ति ।
तस्माद्यथायोगं हेतुस्येन लभ्यन्ते । यथा [2 a] कावेभ्यो⁵ दाघि रक्ष्यता-
मिति वचनं रक्षणीयस्य [दध्नः] अनुपघातत्वात् तज्जातीयषिडाल-
मृषिकादोनपि प्रतिषिध्यात् ।

पैमाषिकाः सर्वे इदं दूषयन्ति । असंस्तृतोऽसत्स्वभावोऽभावपदार्थ
इति यदि प्रतिज्ञा साध्या । तदा आकाशायतनसमापत्तिर्निरालम्बना⁶ सतो
कथमस्त्योति लभ्येत । तथा “आकाशमनावृति”⁷ इति तु लक्षणमस्ति । इति ।

पथयमनुमानप्रयोगः आकाशायतनसमापत्तिं घस्त्यवलम्बना द्रव्यसत्ति-

4 Poussin wrongly construes this phrase along with Ākāśa. If Sādhyā is admitted by both parties, there is nothing to be proved. Such proving will incur Siddhasādhana-doṣa.

5 *Lueh chū ming-hsiang*. (Lit. Saṅkṣipyā nāmālakṣaṇa uddharaṇa). The same expression is used in the first chap. in the same context. v p 63, para 3, above.

6 This is the well-known example for upalakṣaṇa given in the faṣtāle literature. Chinese will read literally thus: *bhavatā kara* [atha] *mīdam dadhe rakṣyatām kūko mā upasarpaitu ite* 1.

7. The first of the *Śrūpyas*, v Kośa viii, 143, 209, 213 (L. V. P.)

8 Kośa, Tib. I. 5d *Tatra ākāśam anāvṛtiḥ*.

यथा वा । एतत्समापत्तित्वात्, एतत्समापत्तेरालम्बनविषयत्वाद्वा, यथान्याः समापत्तयः, यथा वा तदालम्बनम् इति । अन्याः समापत्तयः तदालम्बनञ्च संसृजतत्वात् स्वभावशून्या विचारिता एव, तदा समदृष्टान्तविरहः ।

अयं परमार्थत आकाशलक्षणविचारः । यदि संवृत्त्यापि साध्यम् आकाश-मसद्भूतम्, अनुत्पादात् खपुष्पवत् इति । अनेनानुमानेन श्वद्वयस्यापितः-सद्भावो न सिध्यति । अनेन च मनुक्तहेतुना भवदुक्तः समापत्तेरालम्बनविषय-त्वादिति हेतुः धिरुद्धाव्यभिचारि [2 b] दुष्टः । तस्मान्मया पूर्वं साधि-तोऽयं सिद्धः । बाधकामायात् ।

स्वपरनिकायिनं इदमाहुः । यदि तस्यत आकाशमसद्भूतमनुत्पादात् इति । अनेन घञनेन उत्पन्नं सर्वं सद्भूतम् इत्यर्थादापद्यते¹⁰ । यदि चदसि उत्पन्नमप्यसद्भूतमिति । तदायं हेतुर्न सर्वसपक्षव्यापोति हेतुत्वा-सिद्धिः । इति ॥ अयमर्थापत्तिसमजातिदोषो [नाम] असिद्धिदोष-भासः । अनुत्पन्नानि सर्वाणि असद्भूतानि इतोऽं निर्धारितम्, न तु निर्धारितम् असद्भूतानि सर्वाणि अनुत्पन्नानिति । श्रयत्नानन्तरीयत्वं सर्वसपक्षव्याप्यपि¹¹ हेतुः स्वोक्तियते । तस्मादयमदोषः ॥

अन्यः¹² काश्चिद्दूषयति । आकाशं सत्यमायम्, लोकासाधारणं ज्ञातत्वात् ।

9. - *Vaiṣṇavika*

10. - *arthāpattiḥ : chun*

11. It does not exist in the *vidyut*, lightning, which is *sapakṣa* to the *pakṣa*. Similarly composite thing is non substance, yet it is originated through causes and conditions

12. Some philosophers like Sabarasyāmin and Kumārila, etc who hold the realistic view of the Universe, v. Śabarabhāṣya I, (*nirālambana vāda*) and Kumārila's *Tantravārtika*, ad *yātyadhikarāṇa*, *Udyotakara*, *Nyāyavārtika*, p 340

पुष्पमपि सस्यभावम् उत्प्लादेर्लोकै¹³ प्रत्यक्षत्वात् । आकाशं पुष्पञ्चोमे
असंयुक्तेऽपि न निःस्यभावे । अतः खपुष्पदृष्टान्तेन न साध्यं सिध्यति ।
इति । इदं दूषणं न युज्यते । अयं खपुष्पदृष्टान्तः पद्मोत्पुष्पाश्रयेण
व्याख्यायते [3 a] अस्य पुष्पं खपुष्पमिति । तस्यासत्त्वात् न दृष्टान्तस्या-
भावः ॥ अनया युक्त्या योगी आकाशस्यभावशून्यतामवतरेत् । [तथा]
प्रतिसंख्यानिरोधादिविधिसंस्कृतानां स्वभावशून्यतानयोऽप्यवतार्यः ॥

वभाषिकाः प्रतिसंख्यानिरोधासंस्कृतस्य [शून्यता] मक्षममाणा इदं दूषणं
पुनः कुर्वन्ति । भगवानवोचत् । अस्ति प्रतिसंख्यानिरोधः संस्कृतप्रतिपक्षः ।
अतो निस्सरणं नाम । यद्यप्यवदासि नास्तीति, तदा भवतां समयविरोधः ।
किञ्च भगवतोक्तम् । नन्दिरागसहगतायाः तृष्णायाः¹⁴ क्षयो निरोधः शान्तं
प्रणीतं¹⁵ निर्वाणं नाम । इति । कथं वदासि नास्तीति ॥

तत्र भगवता संस्कृतविषये विनयानामुद्भवाभावना¹⁶ प्रवर्तोयतु
असंस्कृतविषये प्रीतिमनुकूलयितुञ्च संवृत्तित उक्तम् । अस्ति प्रतिसंख्या-
निरोधो निस्सरणं¹⁷ शान्तं प्रणीतं निर्वाणमिति । यथा भगवानाह सन्ति
निर्मितसत्त्वा¹⁸ इति । तथैवाह अस्यसंस्कृतं निर्वाणमिति । [एवं]
तदस्तित्वस्वाकारात् न प्रतिज्ञाविरोधदोषः ।

तच्चतस्तु प्रतिसंख्यानिरोधः प्रतिपिध्यते । अतो भगवानाह । [3 b]
[ये] सत्त्वा निर्वाणं भावतः पपेयन्ते [तान्] अहं वदामि मोहपुराणान्

13. *Wen. po. lo.* 2.

14. *Taisho ed. reads : vedany (L. V. P.).* So also reads Shan-
ghai Ed.

15. = Wei. (= miso). *Op. M. vrtti, p. 525 : yo 'sya nāndīrāgasaha-*
janīyate śyamyate śyanyate, etc., (15a). I, (64) p. 436, 3.

16. Or nirveda.

17. = visamyoga of Kośa, I.

18. Kośa, IX, 258 (L. V. P.).

तोर्यिकपुत्रान्¹⁹ इति । पेयालम् । किञ्चाह । संसारं तथागत न निर्वाण-
पर्यवसन्नं²⁰ पश्येत् । निर्वाणवचनं प्राप्तव्या स्थापितम् । तत्रात्यन्तं नास्ति
निर्वाणस्यमायः इति । पेयालम् । नाप्यार्यसत्यापवादोपः । सुखदुःख-
योरत्यन्तानुत्पादेन निःसरणं निर्वाणं शान्तं प्रणीतमधिपरीतमिति संबृतिरु-
क्तत्वात् । न तु परमार्थतो वचनं सुखदुःखयोरत्यन्तानुत्पादेन प्रकृतशान्तं
निरुद्धं निरोधसत्यं नाम इति । अनेनागमेन²¹ उक्तयुक्त्या च नास्ति परमार्थतः
प्रतिसंख्याननिरोधः इति वचनस्य नास्त्ययं दोषः²² ॥

अन्येऽसन्नेयायिका एवं दूषयन्ति । असंस्कृतास्त्वसदुभृता इति साध्य-
प्रतिज्ञा । असंस्कृतं असदिति साध्यासिद्धिः, आश्रयासिद्धिः, यपुष्पस्या-
सत्त्वात् [दृष्टान्त] धर्म्यसिद्धिश्च । इति साध्यहेतुदृष्टान्ताः सर्वेऽपि
दुष्टाः । इति । इदं दूषणं न युक्तम् । संज्ञाप्रज्ञासिद्धेन सप्रतिघट्टव्या-
भावमात्रं²³ [4^a] माकाशं स्थापयामः । प्रज्ञया प्रतिसंख्यया उत्पन्नबलेशा-
मायमात्रं प्रतिसंख्याननिरोधं साधयामः । सर्वप्रत्ययवैकल्येन उत्पत्ति-
धर्माणाममायमात्रप्रतिसंख्याननिरोधम् । सर्वप्रज्ञामावमात्रं²⁴ तथताम् ।
संज्ञाप्रज्ञासिद्धेन आकाशादयः संबृतिसिद्धाः²⁵ सन्ति इत्यभ्युपगमात्²⁶ ॥

19 Cf. Sātra cited in M. vṛtti, 541 *Tad ime bhagavaṇ mohapuruṣā*
[ye] *śākhyaṭe dharmavinaye pravrajya tīrthikadṛṣṭau nipatistāḥ nir-*
vānaṁ bhāvataḥ paryeṣante । tad yathā tīlebhyaḥ taṣam kṣīrāt sarpaḥ ।
atyantaparimeroṣteṣu sarvadharmasu ye nirvānaṁ mārganti tān aham
abhiśmānskān tīrthikān ite vadāmi ।

20 Poussin : "Le Tathāgata ne voit pas le Saṁsāra et la Nirvāṇa."

21 Shen-chiao = Āryasāṁsana = āgama

22 = Saṁmayavirodha

23 Cf. Note 2 above

24 Poussin suggests with query : *sarvopalabhyānāstīva*

25 = Chia-lī : Or *auṣadārika*.

26 My punctuation is according to the Chinese text Poussin connects this sentence with the following one

अप्रकाशितविशेष साधारणाभ्युपगमबलेन सामान्यतः सिद्धो धर्मो । विशेषप्रतिषेधः साधारणाप्रतीतः प्रतिज्ञाधर्मः²⁷ । अनुत्पादादयः साधारणं प्रतीताः पक्षधर्माः । तस्मान्नास्ति प्रतिज्ञाहेतुदोषः । उक्तं खण्डिपुंयं असदपि अनुत्पादादिधर्मको धर्मो । निःस्वभावत्वात् । अनेन साध्यसाधनभाजः सिध्यति । अतो नास्ति धर्म्यसिद्धिदोषः ॥

वैभाषिकाः पुनरेवं वदन्ति । इदमप्ययुक्तम् । प्रतिसंख्यानिरोधः वस्तुसन्²⁸ मार्गालम्बनत्वेन बलेश्चिरोधित्वात् । नावस्तुधर्मा एतद्भास्तः स्यात् । इति । साधमात्रवचनमिदं, विषयप्रतिषेधात्²⁹ [4^b] आकाशस्य सत्त्वमावहेतु³⁰ प्रतिषेधयत् पूर्वमेव खण्डितमिति न युक्ततरं ग्राह्यम् ॥

सौत्रान्तिकाः सर्वे³¹ आकाशादयोऽसत्त्वमात्रा इति स्थापने इदं वदन्ति । ईदृशानुमानं सिद्धसाधनदुष्टम् । सप्रतिघरूपाधमावस्यभावात्मका इति यदि वचनम्³² । न सिद्धसाधनम् । [तदभावस्य विनादात्³³ इति । असंस्पृष्टा असदुभूता इति [मम] प्रतिज्ञावचनमिदं सत्त्वमात्रमहं सम्यग्निराकरोति असत्त्वमात्रमहमपि निराकृत्यापवादति ॥

27. = *Sādhyadharmā*, lit *pakṣadharmā*

28. Or *dravyaśān* Cp *Kośa*, V, 8a 1 (L V. P)

29. In criticising the *prayoga* of *Ākāśa* being a reality, lack of *Samaśrēṣṭānta* was pointed out (v p 69 para 1 above), but here in criticising the reality of *pratisankhyānirodha* lack of *vipakṣa* has been revealed. When *probandum* is *sad vipakṣa* will be *asad*, viz *nirmisṛṣṭa* which has a specific function even though it is *asad*

30. Ku which I have taken in the sense of *hetu*

31. This clearly shows that there are some minor divisions amongst the *Sautrāntikas*. Poussin refers their opinions to *Kośa*, I, 279

32. Lit *vacanārthah*

33. *Pien* to argue', "quarrel about".

ताम्रशाटीयाः पुनरेवं वदन्ति । छिद्ररूपमाकाशमुच्यते । तदस्ति संसृतम्³⁴ अतो भवतोऽसंसृतनिराकरणं सिद्धसाधनदुष्टम् । इति । संसृत-
स्वभावस्य यथापूर्वं निराकृतत्वात् न युक्तम् ॥

वात्सीपुत्रीया वैभाषिकेः सह बहुषु वादेषु³⁵ समानाः त इव निराकरणीयाः ॥

योगाचारा इदं वदन्ति । परमार्थं न पुनः परमार्थोऽस्ति । तथैव
[5*] धर्माणां परमार्थ इत्यतः परमार्थतत्त्वयतां शून्यमिति³⁶ वचनं न्याय्यम् ।
नतु पुनस्तथता न सत्स्वभावि इति । कथं लोकोत्तरनिर्विकल्पज्ञानं
॥ तत्पुष्टलम्प्रविशुद्धलौकिकज्ञानज्ञासंसृतविषयालम्बनं युज्येत । इति । नेदं
वस्तुतो न्याय्यम् । यथोच्यते³⁷ इदं ज्ञानमसंसृतविषयालम्बनं न युज्यत
इति । तथा इदं ज्ञानं संसृतविषयालम्बनमपि न युज्यते । न तथता
द्रव्यसती इति श्रद्धो युक्तः । अस्या वस्तुसत्तायाः दुस्साधनत्वात् । तथता-

34 See Kośa, I, 49. (L V. P.)

35 Lit *grāha*, or *grāhya* Of Kośavyākhyā, I, 5 : *Nirodha* is only an *asamskṛta* for *Vātsīputriyas*

36 Poussin remarks : "Dans une étoffe, il n'y a pas une second étoffe". Le sens paraît être : "on peut dire que le Paramārtha (=Tathatā) est vide, parce qu'il n'y a pas une Tathatā de la Tathatā". Les Yogācāras expliquent tout autrement la vacuité du Parinirvāṇa (ou Tathatā), Siddhi, 543, Yogasūtra, 76, p. 719, 3.

37. On the two jñānas and their objects, Siddhi, 583-590, Dharmaśāstra on Centuries, 247, 1, 18, 248, 3. 8. (L V. P.).

38. Shenghai ed. and probably Taisho ed. also read : 'śāśā, -laukika for *īzu* = *īdam*.

लम्बनं ज्ञानं न तत्त्वतो लोकोत्तरनिर्विकल्पज्ञानं, सालम्बनत्वेन³⁹ संसृत-
त्वात् । एतदालम्बनज्ञानवत्⁴⁰ ।

तस्मात् सूत्रमाह । किं मञ्जुश्रोः प्रज्ञाचक्षुः पश्यति । आह । अत्यन्ता-
भाव [रूपं] प्रज्ञाचक्षुर्येन⁴¹ पश्येत् । पुनराह । कतमन्मञ्जुश्रोः परमार्थ-
सत्यम् । आह । यत्र⁴² ज्ञानस्याप्यप्रचारः । कः पुनर्वादोऽक्षराणाम् ।
पुनराह । तथागतो ब्राह्मण न बोधिमभिसमेति । किञ्चाह सूत्रम् ।
कतमन्मञ्जुश्रोः सत्यदर्शनम् । आह । यत्र धर्मस्यादर्शनम्⁴³ । एतज्जातीय-
सूत्राणामाशयगृह्योत्तारो [५०] न स्वीकुर्युर्दिदं निर्विकल्पकं ज्ञानमभिसमेति
तथतालम्बनञ्चेति ।

किञ्च सा तथता न परमार्थेः आलम्बनत्वात्, रूपादिवत् ।

यदुक्तं भवता परमार्थे न पुनः परमार्थोऽस्ति इति । यद्यनेन चचनेन
अस्मिन् तदभावात् [इदं] शून्यमिति⁴⁴ शून्यसमाख्या, पटे न पुनः
पटोऽस्तीति गवाजपालादयोऽपि सामान्यतो जानन्ति । तेऽपि तत्त्व-
दर्शिनः स्युः⁴⁵ । किञ्च मिथ्यादृष्टिविपक्षत्वात् एवं शून्य[तो]पदेशः ।
परमार्थे न पुनः परमार्थोऽस्तीति तज्जातीयमिथ्यादृष्टिसमायोगस्यासंभवात्

39 Or *Sālabanātāt*

40 Same difference of reading as noted in the note 38 above. Poussin says that he would translate the phrase into Skt. *lokālam-
banayānātāt* I would, however, suggest a more idiomatic Skt
laukikālabhāna

41 —So Chan ! See *Śatasāhasrikā*, p. 295 (L. V. P)

42 Lit *atra*

43 See the discourse of Bhagavant to Mañjuśrī in *Āryadharmasūtra*. M. viii, 295-298 in what manner one should see the
truths (L. V. P)

44 Poussin suggests the phrase : *tatra tadabhāvat* [*tat*] *śūnyam
ucyate* . I 'Mais la premier *Kōng* fait difficulté'.

45 *Lañkāvat* sūtra, 282 : *Sarve syuḥ tattvadarśinaḥ* ।

तत्प्रतिषेधको न स्यात् एवं शून्य[तो]पदेशः । ता तथता च न सत्त्वभावा पूर्वोक्तानुमानविरोधात् ॥

न तथागतः पश्यति संसारं यावन्निर्वाणम् । संप्रजानाति च भाव-
विपर्ययोत्पन्नकलेशविगतं प्रदृश्यात्यन्ताजातिस्वभावम्⁴⁶ । एवं संप्रज्ञानस्वरूपं
प्रदृश्यात्यन्तमसंप्रज्ञानं नचासंप्रज्ञानमिति । अनेनागमेन तथता सर्वविकल्पो-
पशममात्रं⁴⁷ [6^a] न सत्त्वभावा इति श्रेयम् । नान्ययतो⁴⁸ न व्यतिरेकतः
सत्त्वभावस्तथता आश्रयपरावृत्तिलक्षणो धर्मकायः⁴⁹ सिद्ध्यति । शून्यता-
दर्शनं⁵⁰ प्रतिपक्षमार्गलाभात् सर्वविकल्पपरिकल्पितवोजाश्रये विपाकविज्ञाने⁵¹
विकल्पादिबीजानि निश्शेषमुपशाम्यन्ति । हेतुप्रत्ययाभावादत्ययन्तानुत्पादः

46. Cp. Satyadvayaśāstra, M vṛtti, p. 374 Mañjuśrī explains to Devaputra : *yatsamā paramārthatah tathatā dhārmadhātuh atyantā jātisā tatsamāni paramārthatah paścānantaryāni...*

47. Or nirodhamūtram

48. *fei-ls-fei-yu. shih-hsin* Poussin translates the first part, *fei ls fei yeou* "Tathatā—non pas à part d'être, non pas être" and connecting the second part *che sing* along with the next word reads *bhātatahatā*. I have rendered it as above following the Chinese punctuation. Further his rendering *fei ls* (= *fei ls yeou*) into "non pas à part d'être" is far from correct. *ls* means simply separation, 'absence of anything', not 'partly separation', etc. since *ls* is used in contrast with *yu*, I have put them *vyatireka* and *anvaya* respectively

49. Siddhi, 606. *Āśrayaparāvṛtīm anūtpādam vadāmi aham—* Laṅkāvatāra, 202 (comp 266, 275, 284, 322, 333, L. V. P.).

50. Poussin remarks : 'Dans Abhidharma, le chemin "contreca-
rrant" qui est la vue des quatre vérités, expulse la passion ; il est suivi
d'un chemin de délivrance, *vismuktimārga* : délivrance qui résulte de l'
expulsion, Kośa, Index, p. 84.

51. Another name of *Ālayavijñāna*, Siddhi, 166.

प्रवृत्त्यानुत्पादं प्रवृत्त्या सदास्थितिः⁶² नाम तथागतः आश्रयपरावृत्तिः धर्मकाय इति । यथोक्तं सूत्रे⁶³ । तथागत इति मञ्जुश्रीः अत्यन्तं प्रवृत्त्याजातिपदम् । नित्यमनुत्पत्तिधर्म इदमुच्यते तथागत इति ॥

यदि वदसि तथता व्यवहारविनिर्मुक्तापि सत्स्वभावा इति । तदा तीर्थिकानामात्मानमेव तथता इति संज्ञाविशेषेण व्यवहरसि⁶⁴ । यथा सा तथता सत्स्वभावाऽपि परमार्थतोऽसिद्धसदादिविकल्पा । तथात्मापि । तेऽपि हि मन्यन्ते-आत्मा विमुर्नित्यं फर्ता मोक्षापि विकल्पमुक्त , अभिलाष-भोचरानास्पदत्वात् विकल्पपुद्गलानाम्भनत्वाच्च विकल्पमुक्त इत्याख्यायते । इति । उक्तं हि तदागमे⁶⁵ । [6^b] [यत्र] वाक् न प्रचरति चित्तं मनश्च न पश्यति स आत्मा इति । तद्वक्षणे आत्मनि पुनर्वदसि तथतालम्बन-ज्ञानान्मुक्तिं लभते नात्मा लम्बनज्ञानात् केन विशेषेणेदम् । सर्वथा⁶⁶ नास्तीत्युच्यते । [उभयोः] सत्स्वभावत्वात् । केवलं पक्षपातेन एवं वदसि । अतो नाहं सध्रदं स्वीकरोमि । एवं तथता आत्मसरूपा घस्तुसती नास्तीत्यलं विवादेन । सत्या विपुलरतार्थोद्विग्रा दुर्महत्वात् । ⁶⁷तत्त्वामृता-घतारे च ⁶⁸विचारितपूर्वम् [इदम्] ।

62 = *Prakṛtisthitya of Siddhi*, 701 (L V P)

63 *Comp Vajracchedikā - Tathatā ity ubhāte bhūtatathatāyāh. anutpādadharmatāyāh dharmocchedasya aliyantānutpannasya etada-dhivacanam 1*

64 *Op. Laṅkāvatāra 77*, where one sees that 'the doctrine of Tathāgatagarbha is similar to Ātmavāda (L V P)'.

65 *Op Kāṭha up VI 12 Naiva vācā na manasā prāptum śakyah*, etc *Kena I, 4 8*, *Bṛhadāraṇyaka III, 7, 17, 20*

66 = *Pin wu* Shanghai ed reads *ping wu*

67 This work is already mentioned by the author, see note 112 in the first chapt p 58.

68 *Lat vikalpitam*

केचित्स्ययूष्याः होनयानिनः पुनरेवं वदन्ति । द्वादशायतनसंगृहीताः संस्कृतासंस्कृता नियमेन सस्वभावाः । यस्मात् कश्चित् दुःखादिषोडशाकारकचतुरार्यसत्यै दर्शनभावनामार्गद्वयं प्रयोगेनाभ्यसन् दर्शनभावनार्थं सर्वत्रैधातुकसंगृहीतान् क्लेशाग्रहोन् निरुन्धानः उपशमितसर्वत्रैधातुकदुःखो मयति । इति । सर्वधर्माः स्वभावशून्या इति यदि न संदर्शयेयम् । कस्त्यजेदिमं⁵⁹ दोषम् । को वा पुनरभ्यसेदिमं गुणम् ।

यानत्रये संभारेन्द्रियस्यभावा- [7^a] धिमुक्तिविमिन्नेऽपि अभिसमयः आर्यमार्गश्चामिन्नः⁶⁰ इति तु सर्वे यथं धृद्धान्ते । क्लेशावरणप्रहाणस्येष्टत्वात्⁶¹ । संवृत्तिनयेन स मार्गो विमिन्नः । यदि धर्मनैरात्म्यावतारमपाकरोपि शेषावरणस्याप्रहाणात् शास्ता प्रादेशिकविमुक्तः⁶² स्यात् ।

ननु⁶³ मुक्तिमुक्तेरभिन्नेति किं नोपदिष्टम् । सत्यमुपदिष्टम् । क्लेशावरणविमुक्तिसाध्यादेवमुक्तम् । न तु सर्वप्रकारेण । यथा रोमरूपो मदाकाशेन तुलितोऽपि नामिन्नः⁶⁴ । तथा नो चेत्⁶⁵ विशिष्टफलक्रियानारम्भिका .

59 Lit *evam*.

60 This is the remark of Hinayānists, Vasumitra, *Traité des sectes*, Masuda, V, 37. IX, 23. X, 3, Siddhi, 702 (L V P.)

61 On the two āvaranās see Siddhi, 564 (L V P.)

62 Poussin translates 'Dans ce cas, le Grand Maître devrait enseigner une délivrance partielle' But *Ok eni* means 'to accomplish', not 'to teach' etc

63 Poussin puts this and the previous sentence in one paragraph under the remarks of Hinayānists. My punctuation is based on the Chinese one in the present edition of the text

64 Cp. *Varpaṇārthavarpaṇa* F W Thomas, Ind. Ant 1903, (vol 32), 346 at Hoernle, MSS Remains, 78 —

रोमरूपमुदचित्प्रेणाकाश प्रतिबिम्बयेत्, etc.

65 See Kośa VI, 197, 277, on *viśeṣamārga*.—Ascetic obtains *vimuktis* successively. (L. V. P.)

प्रकृत्यभिज्ञा⁶⁶ स्यात् । साक्षात्कृतञ्च न तत्त्वपर्यन्तः स्यात् इत्यलं प्राप्तङ्गिकेन ।
प्रकृतं विचारयामः ॥

योगी स्वसमयकल्पितमाकाशादिकं शून्यं प्रविष्ट इव परसमयकल्पितान्
प्रकृतिपुरुषपरमाण्वीभ्वरकालदिग्जीवादिपदार्थान् शून्यान् प्रविशेत् ।

तत्र ⁶⁷प्रकृतिपुरुषवादिन इदं दूषणमाहुः । अस्मत्पक्षे त्रिधातुः सव
[7 b] ⁶⁸खपुष्पवत्परिणता [इति] नास्त्यपुष्पम् । तस्य सत्त्वेन सम-
दृष्टान्तो न सिध्यति साध्यविरोधात् । इति । इदानीं ⁶⁹पर्यनुयोक्तव्यम्
[यत्] त्वयोक्तं त्रिधातव सर्वे खपुष्पवत्परिणता इति । किमेकं त्रिधातु
[मयं] खपुष्पमस्तोति । , तव पक्षस्य साधारणप्रतीतिबाधात् न
युज्यते । यदि वदसि त्रिधातु [मयं] खपुष्पं नास्तीति । तदा न सिध्यति
समदृष्टान्त इति तव मूलपक्षस्य हानिः ।

यदि वदसि न हानिः । खपुष्पमसच्छब्दः⁷⁰ । उक्तत्रिधातूनां

⁶⁶ Poussin construes this along with the next word and translates *Ce qui est réalisé par yddhi abhijñā ne serait pas vraiment définitif*. He further remarks the translation is doubtful. He refers to *Anguttara* II, 274 'la riyā- [na] et vimuktis sont sacchikatavva par l' abhijñā', My translation is based on Chinese punctuation and syntax

⁶⁷ Note this is an early Sankhya school prior to the classical Sankhyas mentioned in the next section

⁶⁸ Or khapuṣākāram, or — ābhāsam

⁶⁹ Or *paryānuvaya* Poussin refers to *Kośa* XXV, 5a 8, *Nyāya-bindu*, 74, N *Kośa*

⁷⁰ See additional Notes for explanation. Poussin taking this word along with the next one translates 'parce que la fleur du ciel & la nature des trois dhātus désignées par la mot *abhāva*, inexistence'. This interpretation stands 'unconnected' with *paryānuvaya* raised in the next sentence. So following the Chinese punctuation I have interpreted it so as to suit with the context.

सस्वभावत्वात् । तदापि विचारणीयम् । किमाह भवान् अहं वदामि
 खपुष्पं नास्ति साधर्म्यद्वष्टान्त इति । किं वा खपुष्पमस्ति
 साधर्म्यद्वष्टान्त इति । यदि आह भवान् अहं वदामि खपुष्पं नास्ति
 साधर्म्यद्वष्टान्त इति । दुष्टो विचारः⁷¹ । खपुष्पस्य साधर्म्यद्वष्टान्तत्वेन
 फथनात् । यदि वा वदामि खपुष्पमस्ति साधर्म्यद्वष्टान्त इति । तदा न
 त्रिधातु [मयम्]⁷² । न यत्कथं त्रिधातूनां भावत्वात् तदपि साव इति ।
 इदं वचनं तव स्यप्रज्ञालाघवं प्रकाशयति ।⁷³ प्रतिषेधप्रधानः
 प्रतिषेध्यं प्रतिषिध्य चरितार्थः⁷⁴ । [8 a] न पुनः प्रतिषेध्यव्यतिरिक्तं
 ज्ञापयितुं समर्थः⁷⁵ । एवं वचनदूषणं⁷⁶ पूर्वमेव व्याख्यातम् । अतः प्राज्ञेनै
 ध्रुयेयम् ॥

साङ्ख्याः पुनरेवं वदन्ति । न वयं यद्यपि साधयामः प्रधानं पुरुषं वा
⁷⁰साक्षात्प्रत्यक्षेण । तथापि साधारणप्रतीत्या विकारगणप्रयोगेन⁷⁷ तं

71. Or *parikṣā*. The sense requires a word which would suggest the idea of *anuvāda*

72. = *prasaṅgapratishedha*, see N. Kōśa, 1st chap. n. 73 above, p. 50.

73. Lit. *Kṣāṇaśaktikah* 1

74. Cf. *Pramāṇavārtika*, III, *Na cāpi śabdō dvayakṛt*, with *vṛtti*.
Tippapaṇi: *na tu ekaś śabdah vidhīpratiśedhakṛt*. See *Ibid*, p. 350 the
 distinction between *paryudāsa* and *pratiśedha*.

75. See chap. I, p. 50, para 1.

76. *Ch'in-hsien* = Intimately showing, etc. *chin* means sometimes
 'one's own self = *sva* : in this case it may be put as *svapratyākṣa*.

77. See *Sāṅkhyākārikā*, *Suvarṇasaptati*, ver. 15, five *prayogas*
 with regard to *Pradhāna*, ver 17 another five *prayogas* for *Puruṣa*.

यस्तु सन्त साधयाम । तथा हि । व्यक्ता ⁷⁸सत्ताहेतुका सजात्यात् । सर्वे सजातीया भावा सत्ताहेतुका दृष्टा । यथा चन्दनखण्डादय ⁷⁹ । व्यक्ताश्च सजातीया इति सत्ताहेतुका । एव व्यक्तानि समोक्तृकानि । उपभोग्यत्वात् । उपभोग्यानि सर्वाणि समोक्तृकानि दृष्टानि । यथा ब्राह्मणोपभोग्यमन्नपानव्यक्तम् उपभोग्यत्वात् समोक्तृकम् ⁸⁰ । इति पूर्वोक्तानुमानः ⁸¹ प्रतिप्रमाणवाधितम् । इति ।

इदं रूढ्या ⁸² यदि सामान्यरूपेण व्यक्तानि सत्ताहेतुकानि साधयसि । न विरोधं विचारयसि । तदा सिद्धसाधनम् ⁸³ । यदि व्यक्तानि [8 b] ⁸⁴सुखादिहेतुकानि साधयसि । तदा नास्ति समदृष्टान्तः ⁸⁵ । हेतुरपि न सिध्यति ।

78 *Sattā pradhānakhyā* see *Pramānavārtika* vṛtti ad III 186 c d. Poussin gives reference to *Siddhi* I 27 (Theory of *Vaśeṣikas*) He also suggests for *sājātiya saiprakāra* with query. Here *sājātiya* is the same as *samanvaya* of the *Sāṅkhyakārikā* 15

79 This whole *prayoga* including the example is the same as *bhedānām samanvayavāt* (= *samasambhāvatāt*) in the *Suvarṇasaptati* ver 15 p 21

80 The same *prayoga* is intended in *sāṅghātasya parārthatāt* *Suvarṇasaptati* ver 17 with comment where the same example is given *Ibid* p 25

81 Poussin has included this sentence in the section of *siddhānta* which fact is due to wrong punctuation in his text

82 Lit *Idam sāmyam* or *Sameyistah* etc

83 *Sattāsamānyasya anisiddhatvāt* Cf *Pramānavārtika* vṛtti III 189 c-d

84 *Sattvādiviśeṣitasattā* of *Pram vār* vṛtti III 188 c d 189 a b

85 = *Heṭuḥ anantayaḥ* *Ibid* also p 353 *Tippaṇi* 6 *Atha sattāyāḥ sāmānye sādhye siddhasādhyaṭā ato viśeṣaḥ sādhyāḥ । tatra anantayaṭ sādhyasūnyo rāṭṭantāḥ ato na sattā ।* The same is the opinion of Vasubandhu and Dharmakīrti, *Ibid* IV 32 39 pp 426 429

सुखादिजाते⁸⁶दभयानभ्युपगमात् । यद्यनुमानेन⁸⁷ हेतुं साधयसि । चत्वारः स्कन्धाः सुखदुःखमोहात्मकाः⁸⁸ । एतत्स्कन्धस्वभावत्वात्, वेदनास्कन्धवत् । इति । उक्तो मोहो न वेदनास्कन्धान्तर्गत इति समदृष्टान्तसिद्धिः ।

किञ्च तव पुत्रो नानारूपाणां सञ्चितार्थ एव [स] एव सद्भाताथे । अनेन पुत्रहेतुसिद्धिरनेकान्तिको ।

तव सुखादिः प्रत्येकमुभयपक्षयो र्न⁸⁹संभवति । एतत्स्कन्धस्वभावत्वादिति हेतुता न सिध्यति ।

⁹⁰यद्य परमार्थतोऽस्ति चन्दनखण्डः सत्ताहेतुक इति । [तत्] न साधारणानभ्युपगतमित्यतो दृष्टान्तसिद्धिः ।

किञ्च संवृत्त्या सामान्यरूपेण व्यक्तानि सोपभोक्तृकानि साधयसि । न विशेषं विचारयसि । तदा सिद्धसाधनम् । भोक्तृभावस्य लोकप्रतीतत्वात् । यदि साधयसि व्यक्तानि नित्यविमुचेतनस्वभावभोक्तृकानि साधयसि । समदृष्टान्तसिद्धिः । एवंरूपब्राह्मणानां साधारणानभ्युपगमात् । यदि परमार्थतः, समदृष्टान्तोऽसिद्धः । अन्नपानभोक्तुः सत्त्वभावस्य [9a] साधारणानभ्युपगमात् । [अतः] पुरोक्तानुमानं न सबाधकप्रतिप्रमाणकम् ॥

86 *Ie Sukhādyātmakasāṅgītyahetuh* This remark is also intended in the *heturananvayaḥ* of Dharmakīrti, see previous note

87 *Pram vār vṛtti ad III 18 b c d* where *acetanatoḥ* is to be employed for the same purpose

88. = *Sattvarajasamas* in the terminology of Sāṅkhyas.

89 *Wu neng* Poussin has interpreted in a slightly different manner "ils (Sukha, etc.) ne peuvent pas, pris à part, [être le sujet de] proposition distinctes, parce qu' ils sont des skandhas" He seems to ignore *er* "two". The author intends to point out the said reason, *etatskandhasvabhāva* is not proved because the character, sukha, etc. can not be existent individually for both parties.

90 *Lat yad*

घंशेषिका पुनरेवं घटन्ति । प्राणापाननिमेषोन्मेषमनोगतीन्द्रियविकारा-
दिलिङ्गानि⁹¹ नियतलिङ्गानि । लिङ्गत्वात् धूमदर्शनादि[लिङ्ग]वत् । इति ।
संवृत्या यदि सामान्यरूपेण तानि लिङ्गानि लिङ्गिनियतानि साधयसि ।
न विशेषं विचारयसि । तदा सिद्धसाधनम् । संवृत्तौ साधारणप्रतीतात्मा-
⁹²भाषस्या भावात् । यदि साधयसि तानिलिङ्गानि नित्यविभुसुखाद्या-
ध्यात्मलिङ्गीनि । तदा नास्ति समदृष्टान्तः । साध्यस्य बाधात् । यदि
परमार्थतः । तदापि दृष्टान्तासिद्धिदोषः । अनेनैव न्यायेन कालदिगा-
काशादयः प्रतिषेध्याः ॥

पुनर्वेशेषिका एवं दूषयन्ति । परमाणून्⁹³ मनश्चासंस्कृतान् साधयामः ।
शून्यसाधनहेतुः अनुत्पादादिति ⁹⁴स्वतीऽसिद्धः । यद्याह इमांशुमी
संस्कृतान्तर्गताविति । प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नत्वादिति शून्यसाधनहेतुः ⁹⁵परतो-
ऽसिद्धहेतुः । इति शून्यतावतारः प्रादेशिकः⁹⁶ स्यात् । इति ॥

यदि मनः परमाणुश्च संवृतावपि अभ्युपगम्यते असंस्कृत इति ।

91. See Vaiśeṣika Sūtras, III, 2, 4, Abh. Kośavyākhyā I, 6, U, Vaiśeṣika Philosophy, p 48 n 1, where he points out this portion of our text. Poussin says that editions, Sung, Yuan, and Ming have ming, jivana for ling of our text, of Taisho and Shenghai eds.

92. It is worth noticing of Vijñānabhikṣu's remark to the same effect in his Sāṅkhyaspravaṇabhāṣya I, 188: *Naivam puruṣasya sūdhanam apekṣtam | Cetanūpalāpe jagadāndhyaprasaṅgato bhoktara ahampadarthe sāmānyato Bauddhānām api avivādat | dharma ita | dharmo h sāmānyato Bauddhāirapi vitkriyate |* (BI. p. 93)

93. See U, Vaiśeṣika Philosophy, pp. 140, 147.

94. Svataḥ by itself.

95. Parataḥ from the Vaiśeṣikas' point of view.

96. Poussin suggests *mandabhāṅgya* which is improbable. The phrase has already been found twice: see, pp. 61. l 21. and 77, l. 3.

भवेदिदं दूषणम् । साध्यतां मनः तथापि नासंस्कृतम् । ज्ञानजनकहेतुत्वात्
रूपादिवत् । एवं पदार्थसामान्यस्वभावत्वात् स्मृतिजनकहेतुत्वात् इत्यादि-
योऽन्येऽपि हेतवो यथोचितं वक्तव्याः । परमाणवोऽपि नासंस्कृताः आत्म-
कहेतुत्वात् तन्वादिवत् । एवमन्येऽपि संयोगवियोगसंख्यासामान्यादि-
हेतवो यथोचितं [हेतुत्वेन] वक्तव्याः । दृष्टान्तं⁹⁷ जन्यं वा स्थूलपदार्थः न
नित्यहेतुः । जन्यत्वात् घटादिवत् । एवमन्येऽपि कृतकत्वात् विनाशित्वात्
सहेतुकत्वादित्यादिहेतवो यथायोगं वक्तव्याः । अनेन न्यायेन परेण मिथ्या-
कल्पिता मनःपरमाणवश्च स्वभावशून्याः । तस्माद्भास्ति यथोक्तदोषः ॥

पूर्वोक्तसांख्यचैश्वर्यपिकाशास्त्रपदार्थप्रतिषेधकनानायुक्तिवत् अचेलत्वादि⁹⁸
शास्त्रकल्पितपदार्था अपि यथायोगं शून्याः साध्यवित्तव्याः ॥

[10*] एवं दूषणानि निराख्य योगी सम्यगनुमानयत्नेन स्वपरोमय-
समयकल्पितानसंस्कृतान् स्वभावशून्यान् प्रविशेत् ।

श्रुतसिद्धान्तद्वाराख्येन स्वभावशून्यतां प्रविष्टोऽपि विशिष्टमाद्यनायल-
चिकलो न हेयावरणं समुच्छेत्⁹⁹ शक्नुयात् । अतः पुनस्त्यरितं विशिष्ट-
माद्यनायलमभ्यसेत्¹⁰⁰ ॥

यद्यत्र संस्कृतासंस्कृतनिमित्तः¹⁰⁰ मेकाकारवत् सान्तरनिरन्तरं वा पुनः

97. Or it may read syntactically *avyanukārabdhās sthūlapadārtho na nityahetukah* ! But I do not think that it is the probable sense intended to be conveyed by the author. It appears that the author tries to prove impermanent the binary atoms which are maintained as permanent by some philosophers, cp Dharmapāla's Comment on *Ālambanaparikṣā*, pp. 23, 60 with note 10. U. Vaidya's *Philosophy*, pp. 129, 131.

98. The commentary says: The naked-bodied Tīrthika is Nirgrantha.

99. The same on p. 64, para 4 of the chap. I.

100. Or. *lakṣaṇa*.

चंशेषिका पुनरेवं यदन्ति । प्राणापाननिमेषोन्मेषमनोगतीन्द्रियविकारा-
दिलिङ्गानि⁹¹ नियतलिङ्गानि । लिङ्गत्वात् धूमदर्शनादि[लिङ्ग]वत् । इति ।
संवृत्त्या यदि सामान्यरूपेण तान् लिङ्गानि लिङ्गिनियतानि साधयसि ।
न विशेषं विचारयसि । तदा सिद्धसाधनम् । संवृत्तौ साधारणप्रतीतात्मा-
⁹²भावस्या भावात् । यदि साधयसि तानिलिङ्गानि नित्यविमुखाद्या-
ध्यात्मलिङ्गानि । तदा नास्ति समदृष्टान्तः । साध्यस्य याधात् । यदि
परमार्थतः । तदापि दृष्टान्तासिद्धिदोषः । अनेनैव न्यायेन कालदिगा-
काशादयः प्रतिषेध्याः ॥

पुनर्वेशेषिका पवं दूषयन्ति । परमाणून्⁹³ मनश्चासंस्कृतान् साधयामः ।
शून्यसाधनहेतुः अनुत्पादादिति ⁹⁴स्वतीऽसिद्धः । यथाह इमाद्युर्गो
संस्कृतान्तर्गतादिति । प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नत्वादिति शून्यसाधनहेतुः ⁹⁵परतो-
ऽसिद्धहेतुः । इति शून्यतावतारः प्रादेशिकः⁹⁶ स्यात् । इति ॥

यदि मनः परमाणुश्च संवृतावपि अभ्युपगम्यते असंस्कृत इति ।

91 See Vaiśeṣika Sūtras, III 2, 4, Abh Kośavyākhyā I, 5, U1, Vaiśeṣika Philosophy, p 48 n 1, where he points out this portion of our text. Poussin says that editions Sung, Yuan, and Ming have ming, jivana for ling of our text, of Taisho and Shenghsai eds

92 It is worth noticing of Vijñānabhikṣu's remark to the same effect in his Sāṅkhyasāraśāstrābhāṣya I 138. *Nāśam puruṣasya sūdhanam apekṣitam । Cetanāpalāpe jagadāndhyaprasaṅgato bhoktari ahampadārthe sāmānyato Bauddhānām api avatādāt । dharma eva । dharmo hi sāmānyato Bauddhasvapī svikṛyate ।* (BI p. 93)

93 See U1, Vaiśeṣika Philosophy, pp 140, 147

94 Scatah by itself

95. Paratah from the Vaiśeṣikas' point of view

96 Poussin suggests *mandabhāgiya* which is improbable. The phrase has already been found twice see, pp 61 l 21 and 77, l 3.

भवेदिदं दूषणम् । साध्यतां मनः तथापि नासंस्कृतम् । ज्ञानजनकहेतुत्वात्
रूपादिवत् । एवं पदार्थसामान्यस्वभावत्वात् स्मृतिजनकहेतुत्वात् इत्यादि-
योऽन्येऽपि हेतवो यथोचितं वक्तव्याः । परमाण्वोऽपि नासंस्कृताः आरम्भ-
कहेतुत्वात् तन्त्यादिवत् । एवमन्येऽपि संयोगवियोगसंत्यासामान्यादि-
हेतवो यथोचितं [हेतुत्वेन] वक्तव्याः । द्व्यणुकं⁹⁷ जन्यं वा स्पूलपदार्थः न
नित्यहेतुः । जन्यत्वात् घटादिवत् । एवमन्येऽपि कृतकत्वात् विनाशित्वात्
सहेतुकत्वादित्यादिहेतवो यथायोगं वक्तव्याः । अनेन न्यायेन परेण मिथ्या-
कल्पिता मनःपरमाण्वश्च स्वभावशून्याः । तस्मान्नास्ति यथोक्तदोषः ॥

पूर्वोक्तसांख्ययैरेपिकशास्त्रपदार्थप्रतिषेधकनानायुक्तिरित् अचेलकादि⁹⁹
शान्त्रकल्पितपदार्था अपि यथायोगं शून्याः साधयितव्याः ॥

[10¹] एवं दूषणानि निराकृत्य योगी सम्प्रगनुमानयलेन स्वपरोमय-
समयकल्पितानसंस्कृतान् स्वभावशून्यान् प्रविशेत् ।

श्रुतसिद्धज्ञानद्वारयलेन स्वभावरून्यतां प्रविष्टोऽपि विशिष्टभावनायल-
विकलो न हेयावरणं समुच्छेत्¹⁰⁰ शक्नुयात् । अतः पुनस्त्यरितं विशिष्ट-
भावनायलमम्यसेत्¹⁰⁰ ॥

यद्यत्र संस्कृतासंस्कृतनिमित्त¹⁰⁰ मेकाकारवत् सात्तरनिरन्तरं वा पुनः

97. Or it may read syntactically *deyanukārabdhas sthūlapadārtho na nityaheṭukah* ! But I do not think that it is the probable sense intended to be conveyed by the author. It appears that the author tries to prove impermanent the binary atoms which are maintained as permanent by some philosophers, cp Dharmapāla's Comment on *Ālambanaparīkṣā*, pp. 23, 60 with note 10. U₁, Vaiśeṣika Philosophy, pp 129, 131.

98. The commentary says : The naked-bodied Tirthika is Nirgrantha.

99. The same on p. 64, para 4 of the chap. I.

100. Or, *lakṣaṇa*.

समुदाचरति । तदा तन् स्वभावशून्यं योनिशो भावयित्वा तन्निमित्तं निराकृत्यानभिष्यत्तं कुर्यात् । धर्माणा विप्रकृतस्वभावात् तत्प्रकृतिशून्य- [ता] प्रविशति । प्रकृतिशून्यत्वात् असिद्धनिमित्ता अनिमित्ता भवन्ति । अनिमित्तत्वात् अप्रणिहिताः सन्तोऽप्रणिधाना भवन्ति । विविक्कनिमित्तमलत्वात् विविक्ताः । विविक्कनिमित्तत्वात् तत्प्रतीत्य जातानां वलेशानामत्यन्तमजातत्वात् शान्ताः । अनुत्पन्नस्वभावात् दनुत्पन्नाः । अनुत्पादात् नानित्या न दुःखा नापि निरात्मकाः । [10^b] अनुत्पादाच्च न सनिमित्ताः । अनिमित्तत्वात् अनिमित्तैकलक्षणचर्यया सर्वधर्मान् भावयित्वा अद्वयेऽचरति । एतल्लक्षणचर्यया 101 भावनाविशेष- भव्यसन् एवमभिवृद्धभावनाविशेषबलत्वात् स्थूलनिमित्तं निराकृत्य अनभिष्यक्तं करोति । अनेन अनाचरितमाकारं करोति यदुत संस्कृतस्या- संस्कृतस्य वाकारग्रहः । यथा तैमिरिकः स्थूलतिमिरमपहाय विशुद्धनेत्रः आगतपूर्वान् ग्राह्यकारान् न पश्यति ॥

यद्यपि अत्र लब्धाप्रतिष्ठानौ [योगी] । तथापि शून्यतादिविकल्प- समुदाचारेण 102 सामो गचित्तसन्तानं पुनर्वर्तते । अलब्धाबलजानः 103 शून्यतादिविकल्पसमुदाचारावृत्तलोकोत्तरनिर्विकल्पप्रसो भवति । सतिपुणं सम्यक्प्रज्ञाणं प्रहातुमेवं प्रत्ययेक्षेत । परमार्थत स्वभावशून्येऽर्थे शून्यता-

101 Similar expression on pp 34, 1 5 83, 1 13.

102 Functioning and running toward an object

103 *Wu tung lao-chih* The first two characters are *akṣobhya*, *amāyā* in the *M Vyutpath* The sense is that the ascetic has not yet obtained the eighth stage, *saṁā bhūmā Siddhi*, 616 (L V P.) But Poussin leaves untranslated the last two characters Ascetic has not yet obtained the motionless state of mind, because it is still *sābhoga*, running towards an object.

दिविकल्पोऽपि न वस्तुसन् । प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नत्वात् मायादिवत् । एवं भावनया पुनः शून्यतादिविकल्पं निराकरोति । तन्निराकरणात् शून्याशून्यताद्यन्तद्वयविविक्तः¹⁰⁴ न पुनः शून्यताद्याकारेण [11^a] धर्मान् प्रत्यवेक्षते ।

यथोक्तम्, ¹⁰⁵प्रज्ञापारमितायाम् समुदाचरन् रूपं¹⁰⁶ न समनुपश्यति नित्यमिति नानित्यमिति, न समनुपश्यति सुखमिति न दुःखमिति । न समनुपश्यति आत्मेति न अनात्मेति । न समनुपश्यति शान्तमिति नाशान्तमिति । न समनुपश्यति शून्यमिति नाशून्यमिति । न समनुपश्यति निमित्तमिति नानिमित्तमिति । न समनुपश्यति प्रणिहितमिति नाप्रणिहितमिति । न समनुपश्यति विविक्तमिति नाविविक्तमिति । एवं... चेदनासंज्ञासंस्कारविमानानि सर्वे रूपशब्दगन्धरसस्पृश्यधर्माः सर्वाणि चक्षुःश्रोत्रघ्राणजिह्वाकायमनांसि, ¹⁰⁷दानशीलक्षमायीयेध्यानप्रज्ञापारमितास्मृत्युपस्थान¹⁰⁸ सम्प्रक् प्रज्ञादिपादेन्द्रियबलयोध्यद्ममार्गा¹⁰⁹

104. See Kośa, VIII, 188, *Śānyatāśānyatā-samādhi* succeeding to *Śānyatā-samādhi* (L. V P)

105 See *Sātasāhasrikā*, pp 765-872 where the formula goes: *Prajñāpāramitāyām caran arāpe carati | na rūpasya nimittē carati | na rūpam nityam itī carati | na rūpam anityam itī carati | na rūpam sukham itī carati | na rūpam dukkham itī carati* etc. The formula is repeated with regard to each of the following items - *vedanā, saṃjñā*, etc upto *mahākaruṇā*. Op passages cited in the *Bodhicar. pañjikā*, p 427: *Prajñāpāramitāyām caran rūpam bhūta itī na bhūtavayati* etc. Op. *Bhūtapratyavekṣā* described in *Kāśyapa* pp 83-85

106. Lat *Rūpe*.

107. *Prajñāp* has also included 18 dhātus, 6 dhātus, *prithivi-dhātu*, etc. and 12 *nidānas*.

108 Ibid. After this 18 *Śānyatas* are mentioned.

109. Ibid. Mentioned as *aśāṅgamārga*.. After this 4 truths are mentioned.

ध्याना¹¹⁰ रूप्यसमापत्त्य¹¹¹ मित्रा¹¹² दशद¹¹³ लवेशारद्यसर्वप्रतिसंघि-
¹¹⁴दावेणिकाबुद्धयर्मसर्वसमाधिधारणीमुखसर्वज्ञानानि¹¹⁵ न समनुपश्यति
 नित्यमिति नानित्यमिति । इति विस्तरः ।

य एवमन्तद्वयविविक्तं स चिरं मध्यमार्गा [प्रतिपदि] साधु चरति ।
 अयमन्तद्वयरहितो [11 b] मध्यममार्गनयः—यथापूर्वमुक्तानुमानद्वयेन
 संस्कृतासंस्कृतरूपराश्याभावात् अरूपो नामोच्यते । अरूपित्वेन भावादि-
 सर्वविकल्पानामभावात् नास्ति कश्चिद्धर्मः यादृशः स, तादृशोऽयमपीति
 मिथो निदर्शनार्हः । अतोऽनिदर्शनो नाम । अभावास्वभावत्वादा-
 श्रयाश्रयिभावाप्रसिद्धया प्रतिष्ठा नास्तीत्यतोऽप्रतिष्ठो नाम । यदि
 संस्कृतलक्षणमसंस्कृतलक्षणं वा, यदि विकल्पितमविकल्पितं वा, यदि
 विकल्पकमविकल्पकं वा इत्येवमादिनिमित्तप्रज्ञानं न समाचरतीति
 अवाभासो नाम । सर्वभावनिमित्ताभावनिमित्तविविक्त्वविषयकविज्ञान-
 स्यानुत्पन्नत्वात् अविवक्षितिको नाम । अरूपत्वादमूर्तत्वादिभगवन्निवेताभावाद्-
 निवेतो नाम¹¹⁶ ।

यथा भगवान् काश्यपमाह । नित्यमिति [काश्यप] अयमेको-
 ऽन्तः । अनित्यमिति [काश्यप] अयं द्वितीयोऽन्तः । यदेतयोर्द्वयो-

110 Ibid After this come apramaṣas

111. Ibid After this come 2 more items : na vimokṣeṣu carati . . .
 nānupāśyaśāstrasamāpattīṣu carati! na śānyatānimittapranthita
 vimokṣeṣu carati .. .!

112 Ibid After this come samādhis and dhāraṇīmukhas

113 Ibid Mentioned as Tathāgatabala.

114 Ibid After comes na mahākaruṇāyām carati.....!

115 Ibid This is not included in the list

116 Poussin draws attention to the last passage in the text not
 identified in the Appendix to Mah Sūtrālaṅkāra (ed S Lévi) where
 the nirvikalpayāna is so qualified as madhyamā pratipat here
 Op Ratnakūṭa cited in the Śikṣā p 234 e 2. Cūṭam hi Kāśyapa
 arāpam anidarśanam apratiṣṭham avijñaptikam apratiṣṭhitam aniketam ।

[नित्यानित्ययो] मध्यं तद्रूपि अनिर्दर्शनमनाभासमविज्ञितिरुमप्रतिष्ठ-
मनिकेतम् । इयमुच्यते [काश्यप] मध्यमा प्रतिपद् धर्माणां भूतप्रत्यवेक्षा ।
[12 a] यावत् अस्ताति [काश्यप] अयमेकोऽन्तः । नास्त्येत्ययं
द्वितीयोऽन्त इति विस्तरः¹¹⁷ ।

किञ्चाह भगवान् काश्यपम् । विद्याविद्या च द्वे न स्तः, द्वयविशेषेऽत्र
न संप्रज्ञानम् । इयमुच्यते [काश्यप] मध्यमा प्रतिपत्¹¹⁸ ।

[य] एवमन्तद्वयविवेककुशलः [तस्य] अद्वयसंज्ञायां विहरमाणस्य
समुत्पन्नोऽद्वयसंज्ञाविकल्पः । [त] मपि जानाति लोकोत्तरनिर्विकल्प-
ज्ञानस्य शान्तिविहारस्याश्रयमिति । [अतो] यथोक्तहेतुमाशु समुच्छेदयति ।
तत्समुच्छेदात्¹¹⁹ इदमेवमिति नास्ति विकल्पः, सर्वो द्वयवचनमनोजल्पश्च
शाम्यति । साक्षात्करोति धर्माणां भूतस्वभावमनाभोगमनाभासमनिमित्तं
प्रपञ्चविनिर्मुक्तम् । एतदालम्बनेऽनाभोगसाक्षात्कारं प्रविश्य स्थूलक्षण-
ज्ञानस्रोतसि विहरति¹²⁰ ॥

अविपरीतशून्यताभावनामभ्यसन्नपि नैव शून्यतां साक्षात्कुर्यात् ।
तदा परमार्थध्यानं¹²¹ नामोच्यते ।

117. Kāśyapaparivarta ed Stael-Holstein, pp 86-90.

118. This passage is not traceable in the Kāśyapapar, as such. I
however, suppose that this may be an adaptation of § 58 : *Bhūtasattam*
iti..... ! abhūtasattam itis ! yatra Kāśyapa na cetana na mano na
vijñānam ! iyam ucyate !

119. Lit. *evam evam*.

120. Or *jñānasrotasvalakṣaṇa viharati or pratisthitaḥ !*

121. Aṣṭasāhasikā, p 370. *na Bodhisattvena Mahāsattvena*
sūnyatā saṅgāt kartavya Op Daśabhūmika, Rahder, 61. (L V. P.)
Op. also passages in the Aṣṭasāhasikā, p 379 : *Bodhisattvo...na*
sūnyatām saṅgātkaroti !
nānamittam saṅgātkaroti..... !

एवमादिग्रे 183 निरुद्धे, 184 ज्ञातव्यानिमित्तविषयतापि 185 प्रतिपत्ति-
विहीना । हेतुप्रत्ययवैकल्यात् । अन्यद् ज्ञान [मपि] न जायते प्रतिपत्त्य-
भावात् । तस्मात् 186 यथाभूतप्रतिपत्तिरित्युच्यते ।

[14^a] यथाह भगवान् । कतमा यथाभूतप्रतिपत्तिः । यद्वर्माणाम-
त्यन्ताप्रतिपत्तिः इयमुच्यते यथाभूतप्रतिपत्तिः । किञ्च यथाह सूत्रम् ।
तथागतो बोधिमत्यन्तं नाभिसमेति 187 । यथा [ह] मञ्जुश्रोपरिपृच्छा ।
सत्यदर्शिमिः कतमद्द्रष्टव्यम् । आह । न को ऽपि धर्मो द्रष्टव्यः ।
कस्मात् । पृथग्जनदृश्यं सर्वं मृषा । 188 यददर्शनं तत् सत्यदर्शनम् । यथा

183 Poussin construes this phrase along with the, previous sentence This is not admissible

184 See above p 89, l 2

185 *Hsing chieh* The exact equivalent of this phrase in Sanskrit is not known I have done it 'pratiṣṭhā' in the sense of *kāraṇa* according to the explanation given in the Chinese Ency Dictionary (Chinese edition) p 1081, col 1 The Dictionary explains by quoting some authority "It is some sort of functioning of the mind," etc (*citta-kriyāśeṣa*, this Skt phrase is mine) It goes further "Function is called *hsing chieh*" Image is called aspect (*pratibimbam ākaraḥ*) *Op Pram vār vṛtti*, IV, 160, p 467 *arthānām apratiṣṭhā* Poussin makes these remarks *Mouvement—intellection, hsing-kias—Expliqué ci dessous comme synonyme de satyadarsana, abhisamaya*, figure dans deux lexiques de Rosenberg, associé aux dix *braddhas* (state préliminaire aux terres), glose de Siddhi, X, 14b 15a : "Avant l'entrée dans les terres le pense fait *hsing kias*, par conséquent distingue le deux vides, à la suit de *hsing-kias*, les images apparaissent. .."—Ci dessous *kias* se place entre *samādhi prajñā*, et *jñāna-sākṣātkāra—kias hing, adhimukti caryā, che-kias, nirūpana, cheng kias, pratipādana, kias ou, sampratiṣṭhā*

186 *Cheng-shih bhūta, satya tattva*, etc

187 Same quotation on p 74, l 6

188. *Int. drīyamāna* See p 74, 3 7, the same idea emphasized

पुनः पृच्छति । कथमभिसमये¹³⁹ योगः करणीय । आह । यद् ब्रानं
नास्ति कोऽपि धर्मः चेतना¹⁴⁰ विकल्पः इति । एवमभिसमये योगः करणीयः ।
पुनः पृच्छति । कतमः¹⁴¹ साक्षात्कृताभिसमयः । आह । ¹⁴²यः सर्व-
धर्मसमतां पश्यति । पुनः पृच्छति । किमस्ति सर्वधर्मसमतादर्शो । आह ।
नास्ति सर्वधर्मसमतादर्शो । यद्यस्ति ¹⁴³यद्दर्शनम् तदसमतादर्शनं स्यात् ।
यथाभूतप्रतिपत्तिः सत्यदर्शनमभिसमयश्च सर्वं समानार्थकम् । इति ।

योगी तस्मिन् समये चित्ते मनसि विज्ञाने हाने[या] अचरन् निर्विकल्प-
कप्रज्ञां सम्यक्¹⁴⁴चरतोत्युच्यते ।

[14^b] यदेव ¹⁴⁵भगोचरं चरति तदा तथागतादर्हतः सम्यक्संबुद्धात्
तत्त्वव्याकरणं लभते । यथाह सूत्रम् । कथं भगवन् बोधिसत्त्वः अनुत्तमां
सम्यक् संबोधिं भावयित्वा तथागतेभ्योऽर्हत्सम्यक्संबुद्धेभ्यस्तत्त्व-
व्याकरणं लभते । बोधिसत्त्वो ब्राह्मण यदस्मिन् समये न जातौ चरति
न निरोधे चरति । न कुशले चरति नाकुशले चरति । न लोके चरति न
लोकोत्तरे चरति । न सास्त्रवे चरति नानास्त्रवे चरति । न सावधे
चरति न निरवधे चरति । न संस्कृते चरति नासंस्कृते चरति । न योगे

139 No case ending in Chinese.

140. *Szu-wei* = *cetana*

141. *It may be done . katham* But the sence requires *kathamah*

142 Lit *Yad*

143 Lit *Yad asti dṛṣyam tadā asamatādarśanam sīdhyet*.

144 Poussin suggests , *samyakpratispanna*.

145. Poussin notes that *so hsin* is normally *gocara*, *Vyutpathi*,
19, 8, *Kōsa*, XVIII, 13 a 8 *grāhya* XXVI, 12bl 'On attrait :'
Il se ment sans avoir de lieu où il se mouve' Comp *Prajñā* en 8000,
p 353 : *Yo bhagavan evam carati sa na kvacit carati*!—Mais
dans *Laṅkāvatāra*, 158 (Suzuki, *Studies*, 404) le *jaṇasamudācāra-*
varjita, est dit "debarassé de *sauo hṃg*, et cet traduction de *sauo hṃg*
"mouvement" *samudācāra*, *pracāra* convient mieux peut être au texte,
ci-dessus p 133'.

सम्यक् प्रज्ञाणदिपादेन्द्रियबलबोध्यङ्गमार्गाङ्गपारमितासर्वाभिज्ञादशबलवैशा-
रद्यावेणिकबुद्धधर्म [16^a] समाधिधारणीमुखानि स्रोतापत्रं सृष्टागा-
म्यनागामो यदि बार्हन्, यानि विद्यन्ते मार्गफलानि [तानि] सामान्यतो
विशेषतो वा एकजातीयानि । इति विस्तरो यावत्सर्वज्ञानम् ।

सर्वधर्माणामविपरीतस्य भावं सम्यक् प्रजानातीति प्राज्ञः । 158 पञ्चम्या
निमित्तपरित्यागो हेतुप्रत्यय उच्यते । अपरिग्रह इति अपरिग्रहणमदर्शनम् ।
सैव बुद्धप्रज्ञा परि 159 कल्परहितेत्यर्थः । अनुपादानहेतुना किं साक्षा-
त्क्रियते ।

प्रज्ञाचारो निर्विकल्पमचरित्या चरत्ययम् ॥

प्रज्ञेति । सैव निर्विकल्पकज्ञानम् । सदा सर्वविकल्पवियुक्तोऽपि
बुद्धप्रज्ञा 160 प्रकर्षं प्रज्ञप्त्या ज्ञानमिति नाम । अनाकारानिमित्तानभिधानाव-
भासी । 161 विषयसमुत्थनिमित्त 162 स्वभावविकल्पस्याप्यभावात् निर्विकल्प
इत्याख्या । अप्रतिष्ठितोऽपि अवस्थान्तरेण प्रज्ञप्त्या नाम व्यवस्थाप्यते ।

158 This explanation of the suffix must come after the explana-
tion of *prātipadika* according to the Sanskrit text This is it appears
due to the order in the Chinese translation

159 Or *arthaparīkalparahita*

160 Poussin suggests *sarvavikalpabuddhi-samāropa-vivikta*
This is based on wrong punctuation

161 The passage is ill understood by Poussin on account of wrong
punctuation

162 According to *Vaiṣṇāṣikas* three *vikalpāḥ* *svabhāvat-*
abhinirūpanāḥ *anusmāranāḥ* See *Kośavyākhyā* p 67 and the
note 129 above

यथा निष्कृतो दीपः निष्कृतोऽर्धेन¹⁶³ इति । बुद्ध¹⁶⁴प्रज्ञाप्रकर्षः व्ययदास्त
उक्तः । सन्तानस्यास्य निर्विकल्पक इत्याद्या यथा विकल्पज्ञानं सविकल्पक-
मिति । तत्र मान¹⁶⁵सज्ञानमनुत्पन्नगति चयेत्युच्यते । [16^b] अनया
ज्ञानचयेया अदृष्ट्यपरधर्मस्यमाधर्मकारनिमित्तत्वात् नाप्या पश्यतीति ।
तदेवादर्शनं तत्त्वदर्शनमित्युच्यते । यथायत् साक्षात्कृतत्वात् ।

नरादर्शनप्रियादृश्यलक्षणं सविकल्पकं निर्विकल्पकं वा - तत्त्वदर्शनं
सिध्यति¹⁶⁶ । तथा यदि दृश्यस्यमाया, न यत्कल्पमदृश्य¹⁶⁷स्यमापेति ।
यद्यपि संवृत्तः समनादृष्टिस्तत्त्वदृष्टिरित्युच्यते, तथापि गृहीतव्यमित्य-
मसमदृष्टिस्तत्त्वदृष्टिरित्युच्यन् इति ।

न सर्वाणि, दृश्यानि तत्त्वानि । ¹⁶⁸संविदुत्पत्तिहेतुत्वात्, यथा

163 "Le sens ne paraît pas douteux. C'est par métaphore qu'on parle de l'extinction de la lampe, du Nirvāṇa du saint : puisque extinction et Nirvāṇa n'ont aucun rapport avec quel ce soit (comp Kośa, II, 284) De même on ne peut attribuer la Prajñā à qui que ce soit (L. V P) This is rather an imposed interpretation. According to the just previous line it is to be interpreted that a *dīpa* does not exist after extinction, yet it is said that *dīpa* is extinguished, so also Arhan

164 Poussin suggests with query *Buddhisamāropa* "Les ideations adventices, etc" He has not probably well understood the Chinese phrase - *chiao-hui tseng* : The first two characters mean *buddha* *śāna*, buddha in the sense of *prabuddha* "enlightened one" cf Kośayākyā, p. 3, 8. This phrase is already used twice I p 16b last line and II, p 16a line 6 (Chinese text) The last two characters I have taken for *prākṛiya* here. Rosenberg Dict. gives *prākṛika*. So *Samāropa* is not only an equivalent for them

165. Lit *manogṛhita* (or *upādāna*) *śāna*

166 This is an objection by Yogācāras

167. *Ka-chien dīpa*. In the previous clause it is *so-chien*

168 *Ch' kai-yen ku*. Here *kai* is for *sarvīd*. Note *kai* for *vid* in *lokavīd*.

मरीचिकासु जलम् । [अतः] सर्वाणि दृश्यानि न तत्त्वानि । तथता
यदि दृश्यस्वभावा, न दृश्यनिमित्तग्रहस्तत्त्वदृष्टिः सिध्यति । यद्यदृश्या,
न यत्तद्व्यं तथता साक्षाद्दर्शनमिति । दर्शनादर्शनयो¹⁶⁹ कार्यं नाम साम्यम् ।
ज्ञानं¹⁷⁰ संस्कृतम् तथता चासंस्कृता इति स्वभाववैपम्यम् । यदि दर्शनम्,
विषमदर्शनं¹⁷¹ [मेव] सिध्येत् ।

सर्वान् धर्मस्वभावान् पश्यतीति दर्शनमपि, सर्वथा तदा अजाति-
स्वभावकम् । अत एवमदर्शनमेव प्रकृत्या [17 a] दर्शनमुच्यते । इति¹⁷²
न वैपम्यम् । सर्वधर्मो अनभिसमया इत्येकक्षणसाक्षात्कार एव सत्या-
मिसमयो नाम । न दूषयितव्यं¹⁷³ मात्मसंवेदनमिति । दुसाधनत्वात् ।
ज्ञानं ज्ञानस्य¹⁷⁴ तत्त्वासाक्षात्कारकं स्यात् । द्विविधमपि¹⁷⁵ न दृश्य-
विषयस्वभावम् । अभिधत्वाद् युगपत्सर्वसाक्षात्कारः । यदि परमार्थतः,
विषयनिमित्तावभासो ज्ञानञ्च प्रकृतितोऽजातिस्वभावम् । अतो नाभिसमयो
न च प्रतिलोमः¹⁷⁶ ।

यथाह सूत्रम् । न त्वया अभिसमयेनाधिगमेन वा तथागते दर्शनं
कार्यम् । अयं फायः सर्वचक्षुर्निषयातीत¹⁷⁶ इति हि ब्राह्मण तथागतो
बोधिमूले सुनिषण्णः साक्षात्करोति सर्वधर्मान् अधिगम्यान् सर्वमिध्या-

169 Let *adṛśya* Poussin renders this passage thus : "Voir ce qui n'est pas visible, est-ce-là ce que vous nommez adequet ? But this is not the sense intended in the sentence

170 *Id* derived from *darśana*

171. See question to this effect on p. 91, 5

172 Or *prakāśana*, *darśana*

173 This is not clear even from the comment which introduces it simply *veti, tathā hi* Poussin puts it "Le savoir ne peut pas réaliser la vraie nature du savoir". My rendering is strictly according to the Chinese syntax

174. *Jñāna* and *viśaya*, according to the comment

175 Or *adhiḡama*

176 M. vṛtti p. 541, 36 na Yogācārah ... kasyacid dharmasya prāptim sochati na abhisamayam 1

विपर्याससमुत्पन्नश्लेशसमुच्छेदम् । एवमादि सूत्रमपि सर्वथा अनुसर्तव्यम् ।
इत्यलं प्रासङ्गिकेन । प्रवृत्तं विचारयामः ॥

चरणं¹⁷⁷ नाम भ्रमणम् । चरणं नास्तीति अचरितम् । प्रतिपत्ति-
विहीनम् नार्थमिति वृत्तम् । निर्विकल्पकप्रज्ञोऽनिमित्तं चरन्नेव चरति¹⁷⁸
इत्यतोऽचरित एव चरतीत्युच्यते । अनेन¹⁷⁹ तु संक्षिप्तोक्तं पूर्णम् [17b]
प्रहाणसंसिद्धफलम् ॥

योगाचार एवमधिकल्पप्रज्ञाचारित्वात् अचरन्नपि चरति, चरन्नेव न
चरति । सर्वालम्बनमनस्कारविधिकः सर्वधर्माणामत्यन्ताभावप्रतिष्ठितः
तद्यथाकाशः¹⁸⁰ । सर्वपरिक्ल्पापगतो विशुद्धः शान्तो निरोधसमाप्ति
प्रपिष्ट इव सर्वधर्मस्वभावान् पश्यति ।

युद्धानां धर्मकायोऽचिन्त्यः अपरिच्छिन्नः¹⁸¹ भृशः अनालयः अलक्षणः
अदृश्यः अविश्लेषिकः अनुत्पादः अनिरुद्धः, अनुदयव्ययः¹⁸² परिशुद्धः शान्तः
निर्विशेषः¹⁸³ अपिश्यः¹⁸⁴ अनाभासः सर्वमलत्वीरणविगतः¹⁸⁵ । सर्वयुद्धि-
प्रज्ञामिलापविषयमार्गातीतः¹⁸⁶ । एवं पश्यन्नपि न पश्यति यत् किञ्चन ।
अपश्यन्नपि पश्यति पश्यन्नेव न पश्यति ॥

177. *yā* ls. Poussin : "déplacer-fouler"

178. *Śāsteśhasrikā*, p. 765 : *na carati rūpe rūpanimittā l na rūpam nityam itī carati l yo rūpe carati sa nimittā carati ... l*
Aṣṭaśhasrikā, p. 401, *asya samudhāra na pravartante l ya evam carati sa na kvacit carati l*

179. Lit. *īdam*.

180. Poussin : *Tadyatha-kāle*.

181. *Kośa*, V, 1 b 10, *Siddhi*, X, 16b 5 (L. V. P.).

182. *Nirutpatti kṣaya* (L. V. P.).

183. Omitted by Poussin.

184. Another reading : *animitta*—Shanghai and Taisho eds.
This reading is supported by the comment.

185. "Default-souffler" (L. V. P.).

186. Or *Buddhaprajñā* as on p. 95, 1.

एवं सम्यग्दर्शनपरिगृहीतत्वात् अप्रमाणपुण्यराशिमभिन्नर्धयति अनन्तः प्रणीतसुखफलमुपचिनोति । 187 विशुद्ध्यैकरसः परदुःखं नाशयति भैषज्य- राज इव सर्वं [18 a] सम्यक्प्रार्थना¹⁸⁹ प्रणिधानबहुलः ।

एवं तथागतधर्मकायसम्यगवलोकनं सर्वधर्माणां भावाभावनिमित्ता- दर्शित्वात् सम्यग्दृष्टिरित्युच्यते । सर्वपरिकल्पानामुपशमः सम्यक् संकल्पः । सर्वधर्मा निष्प्रपञ्चाः सर्वाभिलाषसंप्रशान्ता इति साक्षात्कारः सम्यग्वाक् । सर्वधर्मा अदृढतत्त्वभावा इति कायवाङ्मनोभिस्तद्देतुकर्माकरणं सम्यक् कर्मान्तः । सर्वधर्मा¹⁸⁹ अनुदया अव्ययाः, यश्च धर्मस्वभाव उदयो व्ययश्च [स] सदानुत्पन्नः [इति] सम्यगाजीवः । सर्वधर्मा अनारम्भा इति¹⁹⁰ अर्थोपायानभिसंस्कारः सम्यग्व्यायामः । सर्वधर्माणामत्यन्तासाक्षा- दर्शनविषयता भावाभावमननविगमो यत्किञ्चन निश्चयाभावः सम्यग् ध्यानम् । एवं सम्यक् पश्यन् तथा आर्याष्टाङ्गिकमार्गमभ्यस्यति । अर्थोऽयं विस्तरेण यथा बोधिसत्त्वपिटके तत्र तत्र देशितः ॥

एवं सम्यक् पश्यन् न केवलमार्याष्टाङ्गमार्गमभ्यस्यति [18 b] संक्षिप्योक्ता पट्टपारमिता अपि परिपूरयति । 191 अप्रयोगेऽपि यस्त्यस्ति । कथमयमर्थः । 191 तथा हि । सर्वप्रकारनिमित्तानि विस्तृजति सर्वबलेशांश्चोत्सृजति इतीयं नाम दानपारमिता ॥ सर्वालम्बनानि व्युपशमयति । अनुपलम्भभावनानां मनसिकरोति । इयं शीलपारमिता ॥ सर्वालम्बनानां चेदनां न क्षमते ।

187. Poussin takes this compound as adjective to *phala*. But, I have done it otherwise according to the comment

188 Lit *prārthita*

189 *Tseng, irdhā, upacaya, chien, hrāsa āpachya* Poussin's rendering of this passage does not accord with the Chinese syntax

190 *yong mong-vira* according to Rosenberg. Poussin puts it "energie" - *virya*

191-191. This portion is left out by Poussin

इयं क्षान्तिपारमिता ॥ अनुपादानमनुत्सर्गञ्च सर्वचर्या निस्सरति । इयं
वीर्यपारमिता ॥ सर्वमनस्कारासमुदाचारेणात्यन्ताप्रतिष्ठानम् । इयं
ध्यानपारमिता ॥ सर्वधर्माणां प्रपञ्चानुत्थानं द्वयनिमित्तविचिक[िता] इयं
प्रज्ञापारमिता ॥ अयमर्थो विस्तरशो यथा प्रज्ञपरि¹⁹²पृच्छासूत्रादौ तत्र
तत्र देशितः ।

एवं ¹⁹³सुविहारोऽप्रमाणद्वारं भवति । अपरिमितसूत्रे भगवता विस्त-
रेणोक्तम् । महार्थैर्हितयद्बलैः ¹⁹⁴समृद्धो भवति । [इति] । शान्तिनो यथातत्त्वं
जानीयु प्रमादविरहिताश्च शिक्षामारमेरन् ¹⁹⁵ ॥

[इति] महायानकरतलरत्नशास्त्रम्

[समाप्तम्]

— [०]:—

192 Śikṣāsamuccaya 125, Mdo (Csoma) 13 — Compare la
pratique des Pāramitas dans Śraddhotpāda 3, 2 13b (L. V. P.)

193—193. Left out by Poussin

194 Jao : I have suggested samyaddhā tentatively

एवं सम्यग्दर्शनपरिगृहीतत्वात् अप्रमाणपुण्यराशिमभिवर्धयति अनन्तः
प्रणीतसुखफलमुपचिनोति । 187 विशुद्ध्येकरसः परदुःखं नाशयति मैषज्य-
राज इव सर्व [18 a] सम्यक्प्रार्थना¹⁸⁸ प्रणिधानबहुलः ।

एवं तथागतधर्मकायसम्यग्बलोकनं सर्वधर्माणां भावाभावनिमित्ता-
दर्शित्वात् सम्यग्दृष्टिरित्युच्यते । सर्वपरिकल्पानामुपशमः सम्यक् संकल्पः ।
सर्वधर्मा निष्पपञ्चाः सर्वाभिलाषसंप्रशान्ता इति साक्षात्कारः सम्यग्वाक् ।
सर्वधर्मा अवृत्तकस्वभावा इति कायवाङ्मनोभिस्तद्देतुकर्माकरणं सम्यक्
कर्मान्तः । सर्वधर्मा¹⁸⁹ अनुदया अव्ययाः, यश्च धर्मस्वभावा उदयो व्ययश्च
[स] सदानुत्पन्नः [इति] सम्यगाजीवः । सर्वधर्मा अनारम्भा इति
¹⁹⁰वीर्योपायानभिसंस्कारः सम्यग्व्यायामः । सर्वधर्माणामत्यन्तासाक्षा-
दर्शनविषयता भावाभावमननविंगमो यत्किञ्चन निश्चयाभावः सम्यग्
ध्यानम् । एवं सम्यक् पश्यन् तथा आर्याष्टाङ्गिकमार्गमभ्यस्यति । अर्थोऽयं
विस्तरेण यथा बोधिसत्त्वपिटके तत्र तत्र दैशितः ॥

एवं सम्यक् पश्यन् न केवलमार्याष्टाङ्गमार्गमभ्यस्यति [18 b] संक्षिप्तोक्ता
पदपारमिता अपि परिपूरयति । ¹⁹¹अप्रयोगेऽपि घस्त्वस्ति । कथमयमर्थः ।
¹⁹¹तथा हि । सर्वप्रकारनिमित्तानि विस्ृजति सर्वकलेशांश्चोत्सृजति इतीयं
नाम दानपारमिता ॥ सर्वालम्बनानि व्युपशमयति । अनुपलम्भभावनानां
मनसिकरोति । इयं शीलपारमिता ॥ सर्वालम्बनानां घेदनां न क्षमते ।

187. Poussin takes this compound as adjective to *phala*. But, I have done it otherwise according to the comment.

188. Lat. *prārthita*

189. *Tseng, vyādhi, upacaya, chien, hrāsa āpachya*. Poussin's rendering of this passage does not accord with the Chinese syntax.

190 *yang mong - tsa* according to Rosenberg Poussin puts it "energie" - *tīrya*.

191-191. This portion is left out by Poussin.

इयं क्षान्तिपारमिता ॥ अनुपादानमनुत्सर्गश्च सर्वचर्या निस्तरति । इयं
वीर्यपारमिता ॥ सर्वमनस्कारासमुदाचारेणात्यन्ताप्रतिष्ठानम् । इयं
ध्यानपारमिता ॥ सर्वधर्माणां प्रपञ्चानुत्थानं ह्यनिमित्तविविक्त[ता] इयं
प्रेहापारमिता ॥ अयमर्थो विस्तरश्चो यथा ब्रह्मपरि¹⁹²पृच्छासूत्रादौ तत्र
तत्र देशितः ।

एवं ¹⁹⁰सुविहारोऽप्रमाणद्वारं भवति । अपरिमितसूत्रे भगवता विस्त-
रेणोक्तम् । महार्थहितयद्गुलैः ¹⁹¹समृद्धो भवति । [इति] । शान्तिनो यथातत्त्वं
जानीयुः प्रमादविरहिताश्च शिक्षामारभेन्¹⁹⁹ ॥

[इति] महायानकरतलरत्नशास्त्रम्

[समाप्तम्]

—:[०]:—

192 Śikṣāsamuccaya, 125, Mdo (Csoma), 18.—Compare la pratique des Pāramitās dans Śraddhotpāda, 3, 2, 18b (L. V. P.)

193—193. Left out by Poussin

194. Jac.-t. I have suggested samrādhi tentatively.

ADDITIONAL NOTES

P. 34, n. 6 Kośavyākhyā, I, p 2, 1 23 :

ध्वणं क्रमेण श्रुतचिन्ताभावनामयप्रज्ञोत्पादनार्थम् । तदुत्पादनं
फलेशप्रदाणार्थम् । तत्पुनः सर्वदुःखोपशमलक्षणनिर्वाणार्थम् ।
इति प्रयोजननिष्ठा ॥

Ibid, p 9, 1 14 :

तत्र श्रुतप्रयोगजा श्रुतमयी । युक्तिनिध्यानप्रयोगजा चिन्तामयी ।
भावनप्रयोगजा भावनामयी । etc.

P 39, 5 Cp Pramāṇavārtika, II, 365 .

मन्त्राद्युपप्लुताक्षाणां यया मृच्छकलादयः । अन्यथैवाव-
भासन्ते तद्रूपरहिता अपि ॥ वृत्ति—अन्यथा सुवर्णादित्येन ।

P. 39, 10-12. Read in Maj. 28, Mahahatthipadopama Sutta .

युक्तं पनेतं भगवता :— यो पटिञ्चसमुप्पादं पस्सति । स धम्मं
पस्सति । यो धम्मं पस्सति सो पटिञ्चसमुप्पादं पस्सति । p. 190

P. 44 2 Anumānanyānatz is explained differently in the Pramāṇa-
vārtika

P. 47, 14 n. 67. The same in the Kośavyākhyā, I, p, 28, 8 :

आत्मशब्दो हि चित्तमात्मेत्युपचर्यत इति वक्ष्यते ।

Cp Ibid, p 77, 20

(भा-) अदङ्कारसंनिधयत्वात् चित्तमात्मेत्युपचर्यते । (व्या-)

अदङ्कारसंनिधय आत्मेत्यात्मवादिनः संकल्पयन्ति ।

* Cp this statement in the Kathopaniṣad, III Sāṅkhya doctrine

P. 48, 15-16. Cp Maj Vol I, p 227

P. 67, 10 Cp Sthiramati's Trisāṅkabhāṣya :

विज्ञानं पुन प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नत्वात् द्रव्यतोऽस्तीत्यभ्युपेयम् ।

p 2 1 16

P. 61, 19. Abb Kośa, Bhāṣya III, 27, p 43, 15 .

अयोनिशो मनस्फारहेतुका अविद्योक्ता सूत्रान्तरे इति । and p 44,
15. अन्यः पुनराह (= भदन्तश्रीलाम्) अयोनिशो मनस्फारो
हेतुरविद्याया उक्तः सूत्रान्तरे ।

P. 62, 6 This idea is well expressed in the Suttanipāṭa 843 :

सच्चंति खो ब्राह्मण किं वदेय्य, मुसाति वा सो विवदेय केन ।

यस्मिं समं विसमञ्चापि नत्थि स केन वादं पटिसंयुजेय्य ॥

P. 69, 14 Cp Nyāyamukha ad ver. 7. Tucci, Translation, p 30.

P 71, 2 Cf —

निर्वाणस्य महायाने प्रतिपिद्धत्वात्—

—Abhis. Āloka, p 57.

P 71, 14 —

तथताभावस्तथता इत्यत एव निर्देशस्य हस्तत्वमित्याचार्यवसुबन्धुः ।

Abhis. Āloka, p 369

P. 77, 10 Cp. another explanation in Abh. Kośavyākhyā II, 44, p. 83

(भा-) कथं पुनर्भगवानुभयतो भागविमुक्तः । (ध्या-) क्लेशा-
घरणं समापत्याघरणञ्चोभयतो भागः । ततो विमुक्तः ।

P 77, 12, n 64 It will be interesting to note the whole context here -

निर्वाणसामान्यगतेस्ततोऽन्यैरपि पुद्गलैः ।

सत्त्वानुलैर्बुद्धधर्मन्तरं सुमहामहम् ॥

शून्यतामात्रसादृश्यात् यदि नाधिक्यता भवेत् ।

रोमकूपाणुकच्छिद्रेणाकाशं प्रतिबिम्बयेत् ॥

P. 78, 12 The Statement : *Khapuṣpa* etc. is rather ambiguous as it stands in the Chinese. The commentary explains it as follows : "If you say it is not lost," etc purports to refute the supporting factor. "If you say it is not lost" is stated towards the Vādin's (= *Sāstra* *Acārya*) former statement of "the existence of sky-flower being lost " So [*Prativādin*] now says it is not lost. "Sky-flower-non-existent term" etc explains the factor of its not being lost "The term" (*Śabda*) means the statement of the term That is to say [my] statement of non existent sky-flower can combat the statement of the non-existent sky flower of the Vādin, by explaining that it is the same as the *tridhātū* of the real nature Then the nature (*stabhāva*) of sky-flower is not non existent The Vādin's *samādṛṣṭānta* cannot be established

So my original pakṣa is not lost. This is the re-statement of the supporting factor of the Prativādin by the Vādin.

It appears now that we may construe the sentence here in the Skt. text thus :

अस्त्यपुष्पमिति शब्दोक्तिघातूनां सस्यमावत्यात् ।

If this my reading is accepted, the stop put after *Śabda*, *Sheng* in the Chinese text must be omitted. The commentary also appears to support this conjecture.

P. 83, 8. n 97. Op. Pram. Vār vṛtti' ad IV, 157 : *Dvyanukādikramena karyadavyasamyogaparamparaya ca dravyam utpadyate* .

Dvyanuka is sometimes called parent atom. Though it is product, yet it is the same as the original atom in quality, there is nothing newly added and created in the combination of two atoms (Op. the extract from Kwei-chi's commentary on the *Vijñaptimātratā-vimśikā* of Vasubandhu in the *Vaisesika Philosophy*, p 129, with note 2) According to Sridhara "a single atom and three atoms have no productiveness, and a *dvyanuka* must conjoin with another *dvyanuka* to produce any of the things in the world" Ibid p. 130 It appears that our author, Bhāṣavivēka wants to disprove some such view of the *dvyanuka* atoms in this passage Dr H. U. draws attention to the fact that Bhāṣavivēka does not call single atoms *dravya*, but two atoms and three atoms are so called. (Op Nanjo, No 1085, *Prāṇāpradīpa*, Pp. 60a, 91 'b) Ibid 131 According to Dharmapāla *dvyapuka* is perceptible, but Śāntarakṣita—Kamalaśīlas take it to be imperceptible, see *Ālambanaparīkṣā*, p 60 with Note, 10 One may refer profitably to my paper : *Śaṅkarācārya on Bud. Idealism*, in the *Jour. of S V. O Institute, Tirupati*, Vol I, part 2, for some discussion on atomic theory

P. 88, 12 n 123 J Masuda points out that the *samyaktva-niyāma* is the first stage of the *Darśanamārga* The word *niyāma* has been analysed into *nis+āma āma* meaning "rawness", is the passion or that *indriya* which did not ripe The Āryan path can transcend this rawness, therefore it is called *niyāma* And he says that the *samyaktva* is interpreted to mean *nirvāna* or Āryan path, see his translation of Vasumitra's *Bud. Sects*, pp. 27, n 3, and 40 n 9.

P. 89, 8, P. 90, 6 There is only one quotation so far from this Sūtra, namely in the M. vṛtti, p 516, 1—4. Some Sūtra of this name

in Nanjio's Catalogue No 264—265 = No 173 in the Cat the Tib Bud Canons Japan

P 91, 10 Cp Haribhadra's remark :

धर्मतैषा सम्यक् प्रतिपन्नसमाधे. योगिनो बुद्धैर्व्याकरणं क्रियत इति ।

Abb Āloka p 62 and see Aṣṭasāhasrikā p 13 13

P 97, 1 Doubtful passages of the Sūtras should be interpreted in the light of the other passages whose imports could not at all be doubtful , this is one of the principles adopted in the science of interpretation Haribhadra informs us that the same has been sanctioned by Buddha himself .

प्रदेशान्तरे भगवतामिहितम्—सूत्रं शिक्ष्य सूत्रान्तरेण व्याख्या-
तव्यम् इति । Ibid p. 45.

P 97 5 Cp Similar expression in Brhadāraṇyaka IV, 3 23

यद्वै तन्न पश्यति, पश्यन् चै तन्न पश्यति । नहि द्रष्टुः दृष्टे
विपरिलोपो विद्यते । अविनाशित्वात् ।

This appears to be the same as the ekakṣapasaṅkṣātkāra (p 96) of our author

P 98 13 Nothing is known about the Bodhisattvapīṭaka only reference to it is in Rosenberg's Vocabulary p 399, c 3, and the Dictionary of Chin Bud terms by W E Southill and L Hodous where it is simply mentioned

P 99 4 No 158 in the Catalogue of the Tib Bud Canons Sendai Japan 1934 There is No Chinese version known to us

INDICES

TABLE OF INDICES

- I. Canonical Quotations.
- II. Ācāryas.
- III. Sanskrit Index
- IV. English Index.
- V. Bibliography.

CANONICAL QUOTATIONS

CHAPTER—I

- P. 39 9. *Bhagavān āha...* on non—substantiality of dharmas
and on *Dharmatā—Śūnyatā—Buddha*
- P. 40, 1-2 *Yañ pratyayaṃ jñāyati...*
- P. 47, 12 13. *Ātmā hi ātmano nāthaḥ ..*
- P. 48 3. *Yathoktam ..* on concomitance of birth and decay
,, „ 11-13 [M Nikāya] . . A denial does not incur the contradic-
tion of one's own proposition
- P. 48 16 *Bhagavān ..Anātmakās sarvasamskārah i*
,, „ 16 „ *Anityās sarvasamskārah*
- P. 50, 17-19 *Bhagavān...* on two *anās*
- P. 56, 15 , p 59, 4 *Yena Śūnyam .* on *Śūnyatā*.
- P. 62, 6 *Bhagavān...* on denial of true and false
,, „ 13. On Dharmas not being made void by means of
voidness
- P. 66, 1. *Bhagavān...* on the method of charity by a Bodhisattva.
,, „ 3. „ ...On worthiness for becoming a Bodhisattva.
,, „ 4. „ .. On Bodhisattva's preference to the worldly
service
,, „ 13. „ On Bodhi devoid of time limitations

CHAPTER—II

- P. 69, 15 *Ākāśam anāptiḥ* from *Abh. Kośa*.
- P. 70, 8 *Bhagavān..* on *Pratisankhyānirvāha*.
,, „ 10. „ On *Nirvāṇa*
,, „ 14. „ On *nirmitasattva*.
,, „ 17. „ On negation of existence to *Nirvāṇa*.
- P. 71, 1-3 On *Nirvāṇa* mere a concept
- P. 74, 2 *Sūtram* (— *Mañjūśrīprajñāpāra* 2)...on the *vision eye*
,, „ 4. „ On *Paramārthasattva* not within the domain of
jñāna
,, „ 6 „ On Bodhi not obtainable.
,, „ 7-8 „ On seeing of Truth being an absence of dharmas.
seeing
- P. 75, 3-5 (*Āgama*) On *samprajñāna*

- P. 76, 2. *Sūtre*...on Tathāgata, a status of absolute absence of birth.
- „ „ 9. *Tadāgame*...on the soul not reached by the mind and speech.
- P. 85, 5. *Prajñāpāramitāyām*... (Śātas.) on Bodhisattva's non-conception of any aspect of any thing.
- P. 86, 14. *Bhagavān*... (Kāśyapapar.) on *madhyamā pratipad*.
- P. 87, 5. „ „ On the same topic.
- P. 88, 1. „ * On Bodhisattva's not taking any object for meditation nor realisation of any goal.
- P. 89, 7. *Sūtre*. on Paramārthasatya
- P. 89, 8. *Mañjuśrīpariṣecchā* on 'the wisdom-eye.
- P. 90, 4. *Bhagavān*...on true intellection (*pratipatti*).
- P. 90, 5. *Śāstra*...on Tathāgata's not perceiving *Bodhi*.
- P. 90, 6. *Mañjuśrīpariṣecchā* on seeing the truth.
- P. 91, 10. *Sūtra*...on Bodhisattva's having instruction from Buddhas.
- P. 92, 8. „ „ ...On the negation of *dharma* and *kāya* and on the meaning of Āryas' silence.
- P. 93, 9. *Sūtre*...on the mind inseparable from discrimination.
- P. 96 ; 14. „ „ On Tathāgataśāyadarśana.
- P. 98, 13. *Bodhisattvapiṣṭaka* on true interpretation of eight-fold path.
- P. 99, 4. *Brahmapariṣecchā* on true interpretation of six pāramitas

II

INDEX OF ĀCĀRYAS

Ācāryas whose opinions are cited in the foot notes
(abbreviated below n)

Udyotakara 37 n 26 47 n 64 63 n 131

Kamalaśīla Ad Notes

Kuntaka (Vyaktiviveka) 39 n 31

Kumārila 39 n 31 41 n 48 42 n 49 44 n 55, 69 n 12

Candrakīrti 39 n 33 40 n 37 42 nn 46 47 51 n 85

Dhānūga 39 n 31 42 n 49 43 n 51 46 n 61 80 n 85

Dinakara 36 n 20

Dharmakīrti *passim* under Pramāṇavārtika and Nyāyabindu

Dharmapāla 36 nn 18 19 21 73 n 37 83 n 97

Dharmottara 38 n 30

Nāgārjuna 38 n 28 39 n 32 44 n 55a 60 n 122

Buddha 44 n 52

Bhāmaha 36 nn 20 23

Bhāṇaviveka Ad Notes

Maitreya 40 n 37 60 n 122

Yasomitra 67 n 2 89 129

Vasubandhu 45 n 56 60 n 122 80 n 85

Vasumitra 77 n 70

Vijñānabhikṣu 82 n 92

Śābarasvāmīn 69 n 12

Sāntarakṣita Ad N

Śrīdhara

Sthiramati 64 n 137

III SANSKRIT INDEX

The first figure refers to pages and the next to lines.

- अकथ्य 57, 8, 60, 2.
 अगोचर 91, 9, n. 145 ; 92, 6.
 अवलोकन 84, 15.
 अचेलक 83, 9.
 अञ्जन 34, 2.
 अद्वय 84, 9 ; 87, 7-8.
 अनवतप्तहृदय (M. S.) 40, n. 37.
 अधिष्ठित 39, 6.
 अनमिलाप्य 60, 9-10.
 अनिर्वचनोपपत्ति 60, n. 123.
 अनुत्पत्तिनिस्स्यभाव 58, 8.
 अनुमान 39, 3 ; 63, 7 ; 68, 5, 16 ; 69, 5, 72, 11 ; 81, 15 ; 83, 11 ;
 =युक्तिनिधायि 64, n. 138.
 —न्यूनता 44, 2.
 अन्त 50, 12—51, 2 ; 59, 9-10 ; 85, 3, 86, 4, 5, 15.
 अन्ययान 57, 15.
 अप्रतिसंख्यानिरोध 71, 14.
 अप्रमत्त 40, 2.
 अमित्रा 51, nn. 85, 95 ; 78, 1.
 अमिमुखी 65, 4.
 अभिव्यक्ति 38, n. 29 ;
 59, 5—7, 11.
 अभिसमय 77, 7 ; 91, 2, 6, 7 ;
 96, 12, 14.
 अर्थापत्ति 69, 10 ; —सम 69, 12.
 अर्हन् 95, 1, n. 163.
 अदृश्यवादिन् 40, 3.
 असंवास्य 57, 9.
 असंस्कृत 73, n. 35.
 असर्वत्वात् 43, 2.
 आकाश 67, 10—11, n. 2 ;
 71, 12 ; 73, 1 ;
 —आयतनसमापत्ति 68, 14, 16.
 आगम 51, 1 ; 71, 6 ; 75, 5 ;
 76, 9 ; 89, 12.
 आत्मन् 47, 12 ; 60, 12 ;
 65, 9 ; 76, 5, 10, 11, 82,
 n. 92 ; (=चित्त) 47, 14 ;
 —धाद 76, n. 54 ;
 —संवेदन 96, 9.
 आनन्द 50, 18.
 आभास 93, 10.
 आमोह 84, 15 ; 87, 11-12.
 आर्यसत्त्व 71, 3 ; 77 3.
 आश्रयपरावृत्ति 75, 7, n. 49 ; 76, 1.
 इन्द्रियत्वात् 52, 1.
 इष्टदेव 65, 8.
 उत्पत्तिनिस्स्यभाव 56, 13 ; 58, 9.
 उपलक्षण 63, 12 ; 68, 7, n. 6.
 श्रद्धि 39, 6 ; 78, 1.
 एकयानप्रस्थानिक 57, 16.
 काश्यप 86, 14 ; 87, 5.
 काय (तथागत—) 96, 15.
 कायेन साक्षात् 92, 10.
 कामल 34, 1.
 क्षेत्रोण्डुक 41, 2.
 फौशेयक्रिमि 35, 4.
 पलेश 61, 17 ; 77, 4 ;
 —आचरण 77, 11.

लघुष्य 34, 10 ; 59, 11 ; 67,
 4 ; 70, 2-4 ; 72, 4 ; 78,
 6-79, 10 ; Ad. Notes.
 गव्यजपाल 35, 10 ; 39 5 ; 40,
 7 ; 41, 13 ; 74, 13.
 गुण 63, 9.
 चित्त 50, 15 ; 93, 5-6.
 चित्रकार 34, 15 ; 35, 2.
 जितपुत्र 41, 15 ; 45, 6.
 ज्ञान (लौकिकलोकोत्तर) 73,
 8-9 ; 74, 1 ;
 by convention 94, 11.
 —क्षोतस् 87, 13.
 शापकहेतु 56, 7.
 तत्त्व 35, 14.
 —दर्शन 95, 5-6 ;
 —दृष्टि 95, 8-10 ; 96, 1.
 —व्याकरण 91, 10, 92, 7.
 तत्त्वामृतावतार 58, 1 ; 76, 14.
 तथता 35, 18 ; 71, 14 ; 73,
 6, 11 ; 74, 10 ; 75, 1,
 5 ; 76, 4-10 13 ; 95, 7 ;
 96, 3.
 तयागत 71, 1 ; 74, 6 ; 75,
 5 ; 76, 2-3, 91, 10 ; 92,
 6 ; 96, 14.
 —गमेकाय 33, n. 2, 76. n. 54.
 साम्रशादीय 73, 1.
 सीक्ष्येन्द्रिय 34, 7.
 तिम्रोहितवृत्ति 55, 11, 20,
 सीर्थिक 57, 15 ; 60, 11 ; 64,
 10. —पुत्र 71, 1 ; 76, 5.
 तूष्णीभाष 92, 8, 13.

तैमिरिक 41, 2 ; 84, 12.
 त्रिधातु 78, 5,—79, 6.
 त्रिमण्डलपरिशुद्धि 65, 6 ; 66, 12.
 व्यध्व 65, 11.
 दर्शन (by convention)
 96, 7 ; —भागे 77, 3.
 दीप 95, 1.
 दृष्टान्त 36, nn. 20—26 ; 80, 85.
 द्रव्यसत्त्व 35, 12.
 धर्म 82, n. 92 ; 92, 9 ; —काय 75,
 7 ; 76, 1 ; 97, 11, 98 ; —ता
 34, 7-8 ; 39, 11 ; 40, 6 ;
 —नैरात्म्य 77, 9.
 —समता 91, 4 ; —आयतन 35,
 17.
 धम्मपद 47, n. 66.
 धातुसंज्ञा 88, 16.
 धी 93, 6.
 ध्यान 88, 1-14.
 ध्यायितमुष्टिसूत्र, भार्य—(M. S.) 74,
 n. 43.
 नय 33, 6 ; 34, 13.
 नामकाय 46, 9.
 नास्तिक 57, 8 ; 60, 2.
 निकायिन्, सपर—69, 9.
 निरोधसमापत्ति 97, 9.
 निमित्तशब्द 46, 4.
 निघाण 70, 11, 15, 18 ; 71, 2, 4 ;
 75, 3.
 निर्विकल्प 33, 11, 16 ; 35, 5, 84,
 16 ; 86, n. 116 ; 87, 8 ;
 88, 17 ; nominally 94,
 13.

- कदाचन 89, 4, 13 ; 94, 10.
 नेय्यायिक 42, 10 ; 46, 12 ; 51, 12 ;
 62, 8, 71, 8.
 नैरात्म्य 47, 14.
 पक्ष 36, 1.
 परतन्त्रस्वभाव 57, 1—12 ; 58, 14 ;
 59, 14 ; 60, 3, 8.
 परमाणु 65, 9 ; 82, 13 ; 83, 3, 8.
 परमार्थ 89, 5 ;—सत्य 33, 6 ; 34,
 13 ; 35, 14 ; 74, 4 ; 89, 7.—ध्यान
 87, 16,
 परिकल्पितस्वभाव 61, 21.
 पशुपक्ष्यादि 61, 18.
 पारमिता, पर—98, 15,
 पुरुष 79, 11 ; 81, 4.
 प्रकृतिपुरुषवादिन् 78, 5.
 प्रशस्ति 37, 1 ;—धर्म 60, 1-2.
 प्रज्ञा 34, 3, n. 6 ; 93, 4 ; 94, 8,
 10 ; as the sun 93, 1 ;
 —चक्षुस् 74, 3-4 ; 89, 8-11.
 —प्रकार्य 94, 11,
 प्रणिधान 33, 16 ; 98, 3.
 प्रतिज्ञा 35, 13, 19 ; 51, n. 85 ;
 —विरोध—41, 9 ;
 —हानि 44, n. 52.
 —हेत्वोर्विरोध 42, 12, nn. 48-49.
 प्रतिपद, मध्यमा—86, 4 ; 87, 2—6.
 प्रतिपत्ति 90, 1, n. 135 ; यथाभूत—
 90, 4,
 प्रतिषेध 50, 5—11 ; 62, 5—11 ;
 63, 3 ; 79, 7.
 प्रतिसंख्याननिरोध 70, 8, 17 ; 71, 7,
 13 ; 72, 6.
 प्रतीतिबाध 40, 7 ; 41, 7, 11.
 प्रत्यक्ष 41, 5.
 प्रत्यक्षबाध 40, 6 ; 41, 4.
 प्रत्यक्षबुद्धि 40, 5.
 प्रधान 79, 11.
 प्रयत्नानन्तरोपकत्व 69, 14.
 प्रादेशिक 82, 12.
 प्राप्तकाल 57, 16.
 फलसाक्षात्किया 88, 13.
 बाल 59, 6.
 बुद्धिमान 59, 6.
 बोधि 66, 14 ; 74, 5 ; 90, 6 ; महा-
 66, 12-16 ;—मूल 96, 16 ;
 —सत्त्व 66, 3-4,
 बोधिसत्त्वभूमि (M.S.) 60, n. 122.
 ब्रह्मचर्य 66, 6.
 ब्रह्मपरिपृच्छा (M. S.) 99, 4.
 ब्राह्मण 48, 11 ; 62, 6 ; 66, 13 ;
 74, 6 ; 96, 15.
 भगवन्त् 39, 9 ; 48, 11 15 ; 50,
 17 ; 62, 6 ; 66, 1, 3-4.
 70, 8, 12, 14 ; 86, 14 ; 87, 5.
 भाव 35, 9.
 भावना 34, 5 ; 83, 13, 15 ; 84, 9 ;
 85, 2 ;—मार्ग 77, 3.
 भैषज्यराज 98, 2.
 भञ्जुघोषसिद्धान्त (M.S.) 58, n. 112.
 भञ्जुधरी 74, 3, 4, 7.
 —परिपृच्छा (M.S.) 89, 8 ; 90, 6.
 मतानुहा 49, n. 75.
 मध्यम see प्रतिपद and मार्ग.
 मनस् 82, 12 ; 83, 1, 8 ;—इन्द्रियवत्
 52, 1.

- मन्त्र 39, 6.
 मरीचिकासु जलम् 96, 1.
 महत्परिमाण 55, 15.
 महदादि 54, 13.
 महापुरुषवत् 33, 14.
 महेश्वर 65, 9.
 मानसज्ञान= चर्या 95, 3.
 माया 34, 9 ; 85, 1.
 —पुरुष 56, 1, 8 ; 59, 7 ; 61, 1 ;
 89, 14.
 मार्ग 77, 8-9 ; मध्यम—85, 5 ; 87, 1.
 अष्टाङ्गमार्ग 98, 14.
 मिथ्याग्रह 50, 15.
 मुक्ति 77, 11.
 मुनि 48, 3.
 मूढ 34, 13 ; 41, 5.
 मृत्पिण्ड 54, 6, 17.
 यक्षपिशाचविषय 34, 15.
 धनत्रय 77, 7.
 युक्त्यागम 92, 14.
 योगशास्त्र (M. S.) 56, n. 107 ;
 57, n. 111.
 योगाचार 56, 7, 11 ; 59, 3 ; 73,
 6 ; 88, 16 ; —चारिण 64,
 5, 8, 12.
 योगिन् 64, 8, 12 ; 65, 4 ; 67, 1 ;
 70, 5 ; 78, 3 ; 83, 11 ; 84,
 14 ; 91, 7.
 योनिशोऽग्रहण 61, 19, n. 124.
 रत्नकूट 86, n. 116.
 रत्नचूड (M. S.) 66, n. 148.
 रोमकूप 77, 12.
 रूप्यादि 55, 2, 7.
 लोकानुवर्तन 59, 16.
 वन्ध्यापुत्र 63, 6.
 वणोन्नाहवणन 77, n. 64, Ad. N.
 वात्सीपुत्रीय 73, 4, n. 35.
 वाद 57, 16.
 वादिन 49, 10.
 विकल्प (Three) 94, n. 162.
 विकल्पसम 54, 4, 9.
 विमर्शिताग्रता 58, 13.
 विपक्ष 38, 5 ; 39, 1.
 विपाकविज्ञान 75, 8.
 विपुलस्त 34, 4, 5.
 विरुद्धाव्यभिचारिन् 69, 7.
 विद्यादकाल 39, 1, n. 32.
 वीर्य 33, 10.
 वेंधम्यद्वैष्टान्त 38, 5.
 वैभारिक 68, 13 ; 70, 7 ; 72, 6 ;
 73, 4.
 वैशेषिक 41, 16 ; 45, 12 ; 51, 14 ;
 54, 5 ; 58, 7, 82, 9 ; 83, 9.
 व्यङ्ग्य, व्यञ्जक 63, n. 131.
 व्यक्त 45, 9 ; 49, 4 ; 54, 14 ; 80,
 1-2, 7.
 व्याख्या 34, 4, 6.
 शक्ति 50, 7, 10.
 शब्दवादिन्, नित्य-43, 15 ; 51, 14.
 शशशृङ्ग 40, 4.
 शाब्दिक 42, n. 49.
 शास्त्रविरोध 41, 9.
 शास्त्र 56, 16 ; 58, 14.
 शिशा 43, 11 99, 8.
 शून्यता—बुद्ध 39, 12 ; —विकल्प 84,
 16 ; 85, 2.

- साक्षात् 87, 14, n. 121 ; 88, 15.
 शून्यपर्याय 36, 4 ; 49, 19.
 शून्यवादिन 50, 3 ; 51, 4.
 संवृत्तिसत् 63, 4.
 संवृत्तिनय 77, 9.
 संवृत्युपचार 59, 16.
 संस्थित 85, 16.
 संप्रधान 75, 4.
 संयोग 33, 11.
 संयोगि 91, 11 ; 92, 6.
 संभार 59, 16 ; 65, 7, n. 144.
 सत्ता 80, 1, 2, 7, n. 78 ; 81, 8,
 nn. 83, 86.
 सत्य see आर्य ; —दर्शन 74, 7 ; 91,
 6, —अमितसमय 96, 9.
 सत्यद्वयावतार (M. S.) 75, n. 46.
 सन्तान 40, 10, 11 ; 41, 1.
 समतादर्शिन् 91, 4, 5.
 समनुपश्यति 85, *passim*.
 समन्वय 80, nn. 78-79.
 समयविरोध 70, 9.
 सम्यक्त्वनियाम 88, 12, n. 123,
 Ad. N.
 सर्वरूप 54, 14, 55, 10.
 सर्वानित्यत्वात् 43, 1.
 सर्वास्तिवादिन् 67, n. 2.
 सांख्य 41, 17 ; 45, 9 ; 49, 3 ; 51,
 16 ; 54, 13 ; 56, 4 ; 58, 7 ;
 79, 11 ; 83, 9.
 साजात्य 80, 1, n. 78.
 साध्यधर्मिन् 38, 1,
 साध्यप्रतिज्ञाविरोध 61, 8.
 सूत्र 74, 3, 6 ; 76, 2.
 सौत्रान्तिक 72, 10.
 स्तेन 49, 13, 14.
 स्वभाववादिन् 43, 8,
 स्वभावविकल्प 89, 3 ; 94, 12.
 स्वभावादि 65, 9.
 स्वयूष्य 77, L.
 होनयानिन् 77, 1.
 हेतु (उभयसम्मत) 46, 5, 10 ; 51, 9,
 10 ; 68, 2.
 हेयावरण 83, 14.

Insight 25

- Instruction 30
 Intermediate space 24
 Jñeyāvaraṇa 27
 Kṛapūṣpa 22
 Knowledge (supramandane) 1 3
 24 29 30 (unshakable) 28
 Kṛtakatva 7
 Leader 17
 Logic means of—19
 Logic an 6 7 8 12 23
 Lokānuvartana 17
 Madhyamaka 5
 Magic power 12
 Magically created 12 13 17 18
 28 30
 Magician 4
 Mahāśvara 20
 Master 15 23 25
 Material cause 14
 Matchless 29
 Māyā 8
 Meditation 1
 Mind 11 16 27 30 (faculty) 12
 Mīmāṃsaka 14
 Naked bodied 27
 Negation 19
 Nihilism 11 17
 Nirmitaśabda 9
 Nirvāṇa 23
 Non all 7
 Non entity 23
 Non duality principle of—28 29
 Non substantiality 23 29
 Non void 28
 Omnipresence theory of—15
 Painter 2
 Pakṣa 7 9
 Paratantra 15 16
 Particularisation (upalakṣaṇa) 21
 Path of moderation 28 —eightfold
 31 32
 Perceptive 5
 Perceptual 5
 Perfection 6 32
 Pointer 14
 Puruṣa 25 26
 Prajāpatisdharma 17
 Prajñā 1
 Prakṛti 25 26
 Pratipatti 30
 Pratisaṅkīkṣāśirodhā 23
 Prāptiśāśmūtpannatva 8 19
 Prayātānantariyakatva 22
 Proposition 21 22, 23
 Realistic thinker 23
 Reason (hetu) 12
 Running towards an object 29
 Sādhyaśama 9
 Sahetuka 8
 Samādhā 31
 Samvṛtyupacāra 17
 Sandalwood 26
 Śābhyā 6 8 10 12 14 16 26, 27
 Samskāra 8
 Sautrāntika 24
 Science 11
 Siddhasādhana 7 8 13 18 24 28
 Silk worm 2
 Self purification 31
 Sky flower 25 26
 Soul 18 25
 Speeches 15 18
 Speakable 15 18
 Sphere three—20
 Stream of elements 5
 Suchness 24 25

- Śūnya 16, 25, , (void) 10, 28 ;—ta
 1, 2, 5, 8, 11, 12,—vāda 11.
 Supportless 29
 Supreme lord 25
 Syllogism 2, 7, 21, 22
 Svabbāva-vādin 7
 Svavacanavirodha 9, 10
 Tāmasāśītya 24.
 Tathāgata 30, 31.
 Thief 10. ,
 Times, three—20
 Tirthika 18, 25, 27
 Triguṇa 14.
 Truth 1 Noble—25
 Vaidhāṣika 21, 23, 24.
 Vaiśeṣika 6, 8, 12, 14, 15, 26, 27.
 Vātsīputriya 24.
 Vehicle, small—25
 Veil of knowable things 25
 Vikalpasamajñā 14
 Void, see Śūnya
 Vyakta 8, 10
 Wisdom-eye 29.
 Wisdom faring 30
 Wisdom-resultant 31.
 Wisdom-sun 30,
 Worldhog 2
 Yena śūnyam etc. 16
 Yogācāra 15, 24, 29.
 Yogin 19, 20, 22, 25, 27 28, 29, 30,
 31.
-

- Śunya 16, 25., (void) 10, 23, —ta
 1, 2, 5, 8, 11, 12, —vāda 11.
 Supportless 29
 Supreme lord 25
 Syllogism 2, 7, 21, 22
 Svabhāvavādin 7
 Svavacanavirodha 9, 10
 Tāmraśāṭṭya 24
 Tathāgata 30, 31.
 Thief 10.
 Times, three—20
 Tīrthika 18, 25, 27.
 Triguna 14.
 Truth 1 Noble—25
 Vaidhāṇika 21, 23, 24
 Vaidika 6, 8, 12, 14, 16, 26, 27.
 Vātsīputriya 24.
 Vehicle, small—25
 Veil of knowable things 25
 Vikalpasamajāti 14
 Void, see Śunya
 Vyakta 8, 10
 Wisdom-eye 29.
 Wisdom-faring 30.
 Wisdom-resultant 31.
 Wisdom-sun 30,
 Worldling 2
 Yena śunyam etc 16
 Yogācāra 15, 24, 29
 Yogin 19, 20, 22, 25, 27 28, 29, 30,
 31.
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APPENDIX
KARATALARATNA

Chap. I

P.	N.	P.	N.
33.	1, 諸有所行	53.	92, 異空慧者
33.	2, 理	53.	94, 彼
33.	3, 踰	55.	97, 顯現異
34.	8, 已入	55.	98, 所顯
37.	24, 假說同故	55.	99, 據
37.	25, 難令…不可…有	55.	101, 文煩
39.	34, 被 ^{for} 彼	56.	102, 處投寄
40.	38, 似	56.	103, 有所
43.	50, 明了	56.	105, 颯颯
47.	65, 都無所有	57.	110, 假立性
48.	68, 不相離	59.	118, 迷……迷
48.	71, 所許	59.	120, 覺
48.	73, 同彼	64.	134, 悟入
52.	87, 所遺色	61.	136, 根實
53.	91, 實有		

APPENDIX
KARATALARATNA

Chap. II

P.	N.		P.	N.	
67.	1,	若不開示	81.	89,	無能
68.	5,	略舉名相	84.	103,	無動了知
69.	10,	義準	88.	123,	正性離生
70.	13,	嚙鉢羅	90.	135,	行解
70.	15,	微妙(妙)	90.	136,	真實
71.	21,	聖教	91.	140,	思惟
71.	25,	假立	93.	163,	慧
72.	30,	故	95.	161,	覺慧增益
72.	33,	辯	95.	167,	可見……所見
73.	38,	世 for 此	95.	168,	起解因故
74.	41,	所見	96.	173,	謂
75.	48,	非離非有實性…	97.	177,	(遊履)
		…有……	98.	189,	增……減
76.	56,	咄無……並無	98.	190,	勇猛
79.	76,	親現	99.	194,	饒益

ADDITIONS AND ALTERATIONS

Page line

- 32, 29 Read "innumerable discourses".
- 41, 2. " वेशमशक as on p. 65, l. 1.
- 47, 6. After स्यात्, add : यदि उक्तं वचनं नाभावद्रव्यमिति, संस्कृता अपि नाभाव-
द्रव्याणि इति.....
- 49, 13. Read परिचोदित for आहृत—
- 52, 6. Or स्वपक्षरागवृष्ण—
- 56, 14. Lit. इति चेदयमर्थः
- 57, 1. Read परिकल्पितः परतन्त्रस्वभावे.....
- „ 3, 10. „ परिकल्पितस्वभावः
- 59, 1. „ तदा पुनः सिद्ध—
- 64, 13. „ चिन्ताप्रविचय—
- „ 15. } „ यस्तेन for त्वरितं.
- 83, 14. }
- 65, 8. Note some observations on the Buddhist conception of
gods by E. J. Thomas, Life of Buddha, p. 208.
- 66, 6. The Chinese may syntactically read : कथम् for परम्
- 76, 3. Add विस्तर : after इति ।
- 77, 11. Read विमुक्ति and note Maj. II, 90, p. 129 : एत्थ.....न विधि
नानाकरणं वदामि यदिदं विमुक्तिया विमुक्तिम् ।
- 78, 9. After—मयं add : खण्डुप्पमस्ति उत न । यदि वदसि
- 84, 17. } सम्यक्प्रदान = सम्मावधान in Pali.
- 97, 6. }
- 96, 11. साक्षात्कार = Anubhava of Advaitins, v. S. Radhakṛṣṇan,
Indian Philosophy, II, p. 510-11.
- 97, 4. Lit. निमित्तमवचन.....
- 98, 11. After यत्किञ्चन add : चिन्तनाभावः सम्यक्प्रवृत्तिः । सर्वाकारसर्वधर्मानुपादानेन
यत्किञ्चन
- 97, 7. Read conveniently यथाभूत

ERRATA

P. L.

- | | | | | |
|---------|--------------------------------|---------|-------------------------|---------------|
| 2. 32. | Read 'enveloped' | 39. 6. | „ | 'वधिद्वि—' |
| 4. 19. | „ 'converse' | 43. 12. | „ | 'पाल' |
| 8. 26. | „ ' <i>pratitya</i> ' | 48. 7. | „ | 'वधुः' |
| 9. 26. | „ ' <i>svavacanavirodha</i> ' | 51. 1. | „ | 'द्वितीय' |
| 11. 28. | „ 'undiscriminative' | 52. 13. | „ | 'रहित' |
| 12. 24. | „ 'gem like' | 54. 1. | „ | 'आख्येयैत' |
| 14. 16. | „ 'of' before 'the
nature.' | 54. 13. | „ | 'साधन' |
| 16. 20. | „ 'is' for 'in' | 55. 13. | „ | 'एक' for दण्ड |
| 20. 9. | „ ' <i>Abhinvebi</i> ' | 60. 13. | „ | 'आत्मादि' |
| 23. 17. | „ 'consider' | 61. 3. | „ | 'सकल्यताम्' |
| „ 32. | „ 'concomitance' | 70. 12. | „ | 'वद्वेग' |
| 34. 13. | „ 'परामर्शस्य' | 80. 1. | „ | 'सकल्येव' |
| „ 7. | „ 'साधनस्य' | 82. 13. | Insert [9 b] before | सकल्य- |
| 35. 10. | „ 'सकल्य' | 88. | Read everywhere निधित्य | |
| 38. 2. | „ 'प्रत्ययः' | | for निधित्य | |